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Sylvia Tesh — In Support of "Single-Issue" Politics

Gary D. Wekkin — National-State Party Relations: The Democrats' New Federal Structure

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

WALTER LAFEBER analyzes the Reagan administration's policies toward Central American revolutions. He argues that the policies have been ineffective because they are based on a misunderstanding of both the history and present nature of those revolutions.

SYLVIA TESH questions the widely held view that single-issue political groups threaten democracy. Distinguishing issue groups from interest groups, Tesh contends that issue groups are concerned with multiple, not single issues; that they are seldom uncompromising; and that rather than ignoring the common good, single-issue groups foster a more democratic means of determining it.

GARY D. WEKKIN analyzes the relations between the strengthened Democratic National Committee and state Democratic parties on delegate selection rules for the presidential nominating convention.

JOHN T. TIERNEY examines the political calculus underlying the creation of government corporations at the national level and identifies factors affecting their ability to operate efficiently and effectively.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The Reagan Administration and Revolutions in Central America

WALTER LAFEBER

Recent U.S. presidents have won office less for having proved their talent in governing than for an ability to soothe. These presidents have resembled the clergy welcomed by a tragedy-stricken family. Richard Nixon's mysterious "plan" for peace helped him defeat the Vietnam-tarred ticket led by Hubert Humphrey. Jimmy Carter's non-Washington background seemed a welcome relief after the chicanery of Watergate and the Nixon pardon. Ronald Reagan offered both congeniality (a welcome contrast to Carter's up-tight insecurity) and a soothing traditionalism that promised the triumph of the nation's past over the complexities of its future.

In no foreign policy area has Reagan's traditionalism been more apparent than in Central America. And no area needed more attention. His ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, warned in early 1981 that "Central America is the most important place in the world for the United States today." Many North Americans seemed to share that view, at least in 1980. Reagan consequently ran on a Republican platform that deplored "the Marxist Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua and the Marxist attempts to destabilize El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras." The plank condemned Carter's offer of aid to the Nicaraguans.

The platform then warned of possible future action: "However, we [Republicans] will support the efforts of the Nicaraguan people to establish a free and independent government."[1] Arguing that foreign devils and ideologies were to blame for Nicaraguan troubles, these words ignored reality. If Central

[1] The text is found in the *New York Times*, 13 July 1980.

WALTER LAFEBER is the Marie Underhill Noll Professor of American History at Cornell University. His books include *America, Russia, and the Cold War* (in four editions), *The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective*, *The New Empire*, and *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*, from which this article is adapted.

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America had suddenly become "the most important place in the world" for U.S. security, Washington officials had made it so through a century of North American involvement, and particularly by their post-1954 military and economic policies. The overwhelming number of Central Americans were in rebellion because their children starved, not because they knew or cared anything about Marxism.

Reagan's closest advisers elaborated the platform's themes. Richard Allen, soon to be the president's national security adviser, reassured frustrated voters during the campaign that the new administration would stop "Fidel Castro's Soviet-directed, armed and financed marauders in Central America." Allen urged the use of military force. In a fascinating interpretation of the past century of U.S. interventions in the Caribbean region, Allen added: "U.S. military power has always been the basis for the development of a just and humane foreign policy." He played to a large number of North Americans who felt that, in the words of one irate citizen, "What we need is another Teddy Roosevelt."[2] The halcyon days of empire building could be recaptured, if only North Americans thought positively, acted militarily, and rewrote history.

Reagan and the Cold War Prism

The rewriting of history was of special importance. After the experiences of Vietnam, many North Americans were reluctant to become involved in another indigenous revolution. The new administration and its supporters tried to circumvent that problem by declaring, in the president's words, that the Vietnam conflict was "a noble cause," and—more important—that the problems in Central America were not indigenous but caused by Castro and the Soviet Union.

Within a month after taking office, Secretary of State Alexander Haig warned North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) delegates that "a well-orchestrated Communist campaign designed to transform the Salvadoran crisis from the internal conflict to an increasingly internationalized confrontation is underway." In mid-March, a "senior official"—obviously Haig—declared the revolutions were part of "a global problem," so "we have to talk to the Russians about them."[3] The mistakes in Vietnam would not be repeated; instead of trying to resolve the problem within only Central America, the administration intended to "go to the source" of the problem. The phrase meant a possible attack on Cuba, since Castro's regime, in the words of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders, "is a Soviet surrogate."[4]

[2] The Allen quotes are in *Latin America Weekly Report*, 4 December 1981, 1; and Penny Lernoux, "El Salvador's Christian Democrat Junta," *The Nation*, 13 December 1980, 633; *Washington Post*, 7 October 1977.

[3] Text is in *New York Times*, 21 February 1981, 6; also quotes in *Washington Post*, 9 March 1981; *New York Times*, 14 March 1982.

[4] U.S. Department of State, "Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency," *Current Policy*, no.

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Reagan then raised tensions with Cuba to the highest pitch since the 1962 missile crisis. Some officials demurred. The top U.S. official in Havana, Wayne Smith, told the State Department that Castro's aid to the revolutionaries had been greatly overestimated, and the Cuban leader wanted to negotiate with—not confront—the United States. Enders nevertheless repeatedly accused Castro of uniting revolutionary factions so that, as they had in Nicaragua, the rebels could establish "more Marxist-Leninist regimes in this hemisphere." At best this was a partial truth. Not Castro, but the Catholic church and professional groups had been most critical in creating a united front against Anastasio Somoza in 1978 and 1979. But that interpretation threatened the administration's simpler views about Central American revolutionaries. Enders was correct in claiming that Cuban arms helped the Sandinists. He neglected to add, however, that they received more weapons from other sources, including Venezuela and the U.S. Mafia.[5]

The major administration effort to sell its version of Central American history came in mid-February 1981, when the State Department issued a long "White Paper" on Cuban and Soviet involvement in El Salvador. Within four months, the White Paper came under scathing attacks from correspondent John Dinges of the *Los Angeles Times* and Latin American expert James Petras in *The Nation*. In June they were joined by the *Washington Post* and, most remarkably, by the usually pro-administration *Wall Street Journal*. These attacks shredded the White Paper's claim that Cuban and Soviet officials guided the revolutionaries, and that large Soviet bloc arms shipments enabled the rebels to expand their control. The State Department then issued a second White Paper that acknowledged errors in the first, but reasserted claims about Soviet and Cuban involvement.[6] The second paper convinced few more readers than had the first. No serious observer doubted that Castro and Russian officials were deeply interested in the revolutions and worked to encourage them. But few outside the administration believed that the Soviet bloc provided most of the arms (which came largely from the immense private international arms market or from dead

376, 12 March 1982, 3. The first time the "go to the source" phrase was used was probably by William Clark, deputy secretary of state and later Reagan's national security adviser; his quote is in *Washington Post*, 9 March 1981.

[5] Jiri Valenta, "The U.S.S.R., Cuba, and the Crisis in Central America," *Orbis* 25 (1981): 736–38; Wayne Smith, "Dateline Havana . . . ," *Foreign Policy* no. 48 (Fall 1982): 157; Enders's statement is in U.S. Department of State, "Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency," 1; and in Enders's essay in Howard J. Wiarda, ed., "The Crisis in Central America," *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review* 4 (1982): 7–8.

[6] Mark Falcoff, "The El Salvador White Paper and Its Critics," in ibid., 18–24, is a good defense of the "White Paper," and gives some of the key criticisms offered by James Petras in *The Nation*, 28 March 1981; *Los Angeles Times*, 17 March 1981; Robert Kaiser, "White Paper on El Salvador is Faulty," *Washington Post*, 9 June 1981; and *Wall Street Journal*, 8 June 1981. The original "White Paper" was U.S. Department of State, *Communist Interference in El Salvador; Documents Demonstrating Communist Support of the Salvadoran Insurgency*, 23 February 1981 (author's possession).

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or captured government soldiers), or that international communism rather than nationalism actually fueled the revolutions.

By late March 1981, the administration's policy was in trouble. Despite Reagan's obvious talents as a communicator, public opinion polls showed North Americans overwhelmingly opposed to any U.S. military involvement in Central America; they were highly skeptical of the Reagan-Haig approach.[7] A State Department expert on Latin America declared anonymously that perhaps the crisis had been overblown by the media. In this case, however, the media had only avidly followed the administration's lead.[8]

The White House staff tried to deflate the crisis because of fear that the Central American fireworks distracted North Americans from supporting Reagan's domestic economic measures, which were approaching decisive action in Congress. But the president was also bitter. Asked on March 27 about his foreign policy problems, he blamed them on a worldwide conspiracy: "We have to recognize that the campaign against what we're doing, the helping of El Salvador, is a pretty concerted and well-orchestrated thing." The propaganda, he went on, has "been world-wide. And you find the same slogans being used in demonstrations in European countries about the United States in El Salvador. You find it here." That explanation failed to explain why the Roman Catholic church, Mexico, and Venezuela, among many other anti-Communists, opposed the Reagan-Haig definition of—and a military solution for—the Central American crises.

The president's words closely resembled the "paranoid style," as historian Richard Hofstadter had noted during the 1960s, that frequently afflicted North Americans. But the administration kept at it. After examining these explanations and the release of documents to support the explanations, the authoritative *Latin America Weekly Report* of London claimed that "the administration has been grossly inept, misusing, manipulating, and inventing evidence. This has meant that even when it does have a case, few believe it."[9]

In view of these failures, why did the Reagan administration persist in following its policies? A number of reasons can be offered. The president and his closest White House advisers were inexperienced and ignorant of foreign policy. Their background and ideology led them sincerely to believe that the Soviets caused most of the world's problems, even in Central America. Their approach, moreover, promised sweet political rewards. By fixing on the areas as the first arena for confrontation with the Soviets, the administration could win in its own "backyard." The world could see then that Carterism had given way to tough Republicanism. Reagan thus escalated a regional conflict into a global confrontation between the superpowers. Knowing little about Central America,

[7] A good summary is in Cynthia Arnson, *El Salvador: A Revolution Confronts the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1982), 73.

[8] An analysis is in *New York Times*, 14 March 1981.

[9] *Latin America Weekly Report*, 26 March 1982, 10–11; the Reagan quote is in *Washington Post*, 29 March 1981.

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and—ironically—actually underestimating the power of the revolutionaries, the president refused to pursue a possible political settlement in El Salvador after the rebel offensive failed in early 1981. He decided instead to display U.S. power.

His advisers had little idea of how to deal with Communists or revolutionaries outside of using force. Lacking the Richard Nixon-Henry Kissinger subtlety in using China and economic leverage to contain the Soviets, or anything resembling Carter's policy of employing human rights as a diplomatic weapon, the new administration could not think creatively in political and diplomatic terms. Any tendency to think politically was short-circuited by a purge in the State Department that removed many of the Foreign Service officers who were most experienced in Latin American affairs and whose places were taken by military officers appointed by Haig. The most notable were General Vernon Walters, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who long had intimate ties with Latin American dictators; Robert McFarlane, a former Marine Corps officer whom Haig named as State Department counselor; and Lieutenant-General Gordon Sumner.[10]

Some of the strongest opposition to Haig's policies, however, came from the Pentagon. In a reversal of the usual textbook version of how bureaucratic politics are supposed to work, the State Department argued for a military approach (even a blockade) in Central America, while the military leaders in the Pentagon opposed it. The Pentagon's reasoning was not complex. Reagan had promised the largest peacetime military budget in history. The generals and admirals did not want to lose those billions by sinking into an unpopular war. Because of this internal opposition, the administration's policy did not go decisively in any new direction. It was unable to move ahead militarily and incapable of moving politically.[11] The policy resembled an antique clock that could no longer tell time; it was largely useless, but the family could not bear to discard it and lacked the capacity to fix it.

Jeane Kirkpatrick and the "Authoritarians"

Besides looking at Central America through the prism of the cold war, the administration formulated another theory about the revolutions. It had appeared before, in the 1940s, to support the elder Somoza's dictatorship. Now the theory surfaced in a 1979 essay by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. She had been a professor of political science at Georgetown University in Washington, D. C., before this essay caught Reagan's eye and he appointed her U.S. ambassador to the U.N. in 1981.[12]

[10] *Boston Sunday Globe*, 6 September 1981; Carla Anne Robbins, "A State Department Purge," *New York Times*, 3 November 1981.

[11] See also *Latin America Weekly Report*, 13 November 1981, 10.

[12] The Kirkpatrick essay and other essays she has written on Latin American and U.S. politics can be found in Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), especially 23–90. Haig's speech is excerpted in *New York Times*, 21 April 1981.

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Kirkpatrick based her argument on a sharp distinction between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" governments. Authoritarians sought to preserve "traditional" societies, she argued, and maintained open capitalist economies. Totalitarians, however, sought to control every part of society, including the economy. Good authoritarians included Somoza and the Shah of Iran. Bad totalitarians were exemplified by Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler. An expert on South America, Kirkpatrick attacked Carter for opposing authoritarian governments merely because they violated human rights. Somoza, she believed, had established little more than "an efficient, urban political regime."

Certain conclusions followed from this formulation. Human rights dropped precipitously in importance. A government's degree of anti-communism and its warmth towards foreign investment became the major measuring sticks in any U.S. decision to help or hinder that government. In a major speech of 31 March 1981, Haig adopted the Kirkpatrick rationale and, presumably, the policy results. He announced a preference for authoritarians because they "are more likely to change than their totalitarian counterparts." Kirkpatrick's reading of history was triumphant, at least in Reagan's Washington.

Some observers doubted the accuracy of Kirkpatrick's reading. True, authoritarian societies had changed, but sometimes for the worse—as when the tsar of Russia gave way to the Communist party. Authoritarians in Latin America (and the Middle East), moreover, did not always preserve traditional societies. Somoza, the Salvadoran oligarchs, and the Guatemalan generals had destroyed the bonds that held their societies together. If authoritarians had been as beneficent and flexible as Kirkpatrick claimed, the professional elite and the Catholic church (certainly the most "traditional" institution in Latin America), would not have become revolutionaries. Authoritarians had exploited and divided their societies until radical revolution became the last hope of the masses and the middle class.

Against Kirkpatrick's and Haig's hopes, moreover, their authoritarians did not even turn out to be good anti-Communists. Both officials had focused on the Argentine military regime as a linchpin of anti-communism in the hemisphere. Haig and General Walters worked hard to involve the Argentine generals in Central America so they could help train Salvadoran and Guatemalan soldiers. In early 1982, however, Argentina went to war with Great Britain over the Falkland Islands. The United States supported the British position. Deeply angered, the Argentine military immediately moved closer to the Soviet Union (to whom they annually sold vast amounts of wheat), and publicly lined up with Castro on important Third-World issues.[13]

Within a year after the Reagan administration adopted the authoritarian-totalitarian distinction, the policy was paralyzed. The authoritarians could not

[13] Critiques can be found in Theodore Draper, "The Ambassador's Theories," *New York Times Book Review*, 25 July 1982, 1; Thomas J. Farer, "Reagan's Latin America," *New York Review of Books*, 19 March 1981, 12–13; Robert E. White, "Central America: The Problem that Won't Go Away," *New York Times Magazine*, 18 July 1982, 22.

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handle modernization. They responded to change with violence. They cozied up to the Soviet Union. Kirkpatrick's thesis failed even to offer a coherent criticism of Jimmy Carter. She had labeled his policies, especially in the human rights area, as largely responsible for Somoza's defeat. Actually, Carter had supported Somoza and then the National Guard until nearly the moment of the Sandinist victory. Finally, her claim ignored the revolution's causes. More accurate was the historical summation of a fearful National Guard officer as Somoza fled for his life: "I'm going too. There is no way we can defend ourselves against the people. It's not the guerrillas I'm afraid of but the people. I know they hate us and they could overwhelm us."[14]

Reaganomics for Latin America

By late 1981, as the president's initial policies had hit dead ends, the administration tried to regroup and develop a three-pronged approach. First, it stepped up military aid to El Salvador and reopened the pipeline for such assistance to Guatemala. (That pipeline had been closed since 1977 because the Guatemalan generals refused to meet Carter's requests to reduce the shootings, beheadings, and torturing of political opponents. By 1981 the generals had not changed, but the U.S. government had.)[15] Second, the president approved a plan to destabilize and overthrow the Nicaraguan government through a range of indirect and direct pressures, a policy examined below. Reagan and Haig attempted to keep these first two steps out of public discussion. But they and Enders trumpeted their proposed third policy: a Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) that Reagan promised would revitalize friendly Central American and Caribbean countries through $350 million of U.S. aid and a major application of free-market principles.

No one doubted the need for a new economic approach. In 1980 the region's economic growth fell below population growth. Unemployment shot upwards as trade collapsed. Without major revolutionary problems, even Costa Rica endured a 60 percent inflation rate and a 200 percent devaluation of its currency.[16] The only Central American democracy edged towards bankruptcy. Reagan responded with $350 million, but gave $128 million of it to El Salvador. Even if the funds had been equitably distributed, the amount could have made no more than a tiny start in slowing the capital outflow. The president was mainly urging Latin Americans "to make use of the magic of the marketplace, the market of the Americas." In this spirit of Reaganomics, he proposed lower trade barriers for inter-regional commerce and open doors for North American investors.

The best rationale for such an approach came from Michael Novak. A Roman Catholic and a Democrat, Novak had turned to neoconservatism in the late

[14] Quoted in Bernard Diederich, *Somoza and the Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central America* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1981), 327.

[15] *Latin America Weekly Report*, 13 November 1981, 11.

[16] Enders essay in Wiarda, ed., "Crisis in Central America," 8; *New York Times*, 1 February 1982.

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1970s. He worked at the American Enterprise Institute, a major "think tank" for the neoconservative movement, and in 1981 Reagan named him to head the U.S. delegation on the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

In his thoughtful essay, *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*, Novak rightly observed that Latin American growth rates since 1945 had risen at a pace seldom matched anywhere in the world.[17] The southern nations, however, lacked "the political will and the economic techniques" to use the new wealth equitably. Novak understood that oligarchs and militarists were the guilty parties; he did not try to defend them. He called instead for business people to copy the North American example by developing a pluralistic, marketplace economy where capital could become "creative" and individual freedom prosper. If better times did not quickly appear, he worried, "Liberation Theology" could win the day.

Novak saved his sharpest knives for the radical priests and bishops who used dependency theory to explain the crisis, and who urged greater state involvement to break Latin American dependence on capitalist powers. He warned that their approach could lead to a "new union of Church and state (this time on the left)" that might well end in "economic decline" and the suppression of individual freedom. Novak criticized the church for giving "too little encouragement to economic activism," but "much to political activism."

He countered by emphasizing "the role that business corporations—especially domestic ones—might play in building up structures of middle-class democracy." When that was accomplished the three strong Latin American institutions—clergy, military, and large landowners—"may be checked by the growth of a new middle class based in commerce and industry." Novak thus justified the use of marketplace economics much as Kirkpatrick justified Reagan's support for Latin American dictators. Each policy rested on a certain reading of history.

Novak's analysis, however, had little in common with Central American history after 1900. Contrary to his claim, "business corporations," including domestic firms, had been in the forefront of the region's development, but had never seen the need to build a "middle-class democracy." For their own reasons, they preferred cheap, docile labor to a more expensive, aggressive, middle class. The foreign-owned banana and mining companies, the banks, and the huge agribusinesses that flourished in the 1960s wished to maintain the status quo, support slow (usually imperceptible) reform, and ally themselves to the oligarch-military complex. The wealthy and powerful Central Americans, not unnaturally, cooperated. Novak erred in believing Central Americans bore major responsibility for their economic dilemmas. At nearly every opportunity, North American firms had tried to fix the marketplace instead of allowing it to operate freely. They had used their great political power in exactly the manner Novak condemned—that is, by controlling or eliminating political and economic competition. They often did so, moreover, with the help of the U.S. government.

[17] Michael Novak, *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), especially pp. 287–314.

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Novak missed the main theme in post-1900 Central American history. The United States, which he believed served as an example for Latin Americans, repeatedly used its political, economic, and military power to fix the marketplace, and so the "magic of the marketplace" never worked. U.S. officials and business executives believed in *realpolitik*, not magic. Novak, moreover, failed to mention that Central and South Americans repeatedly tried to break free of this system so they indeed could, as he noted, creatively check the power of the church and the military and overcome "state tyranny." But each time they tried—in Nicaragua during the 1920s or after 1977, in Guatemala during the early 1950s, in El Salvador during the early 1980s—they ran up against the power of the United States government.

One cannot use force to prevent a people from controlling their own resources and political processes, then condemn that people for failing to do so. Novak emphasized that "liberty" was the "key" to having enough "bread." Neoconservatives in the United States raised that formula into an article of faith. But the formula had not worked in Central America. The people had the "liberty" only to starve until many concluded that control over "bread" might give them some "liberty."

The irony of Novak's position became apparent in 1982 when Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) proposal ran aground on North American—not Central American—refusals to play by marketplace rules. After intense lobbying by U.S. business and labor groups, the House of Representatives threw out the CBI's free-trade provisions for footwear and leather goods imported from Latin America. The president then weakened his own plan by bowing to domestic pressure and imposing import quotas on sugar. The plan had little effect on other Central American exports because most (such as coffee and bananas) did not compete with U.S. products, and so already entered under favorable tariffs. Many Latin American executives also opposed key parts of the CBI, including tax breaks to foreign businesses and more rewards to foreign investors. These business people understood full well that once foreign investors entered their market, U.S., Japanese, and West European multinational corporations would control it.[18] The CBI would thus merely strengthen the economic dependency that had plagued the region's past.

Novak's analysis did not recognize the huge role government would have to play in Central America before U.S. business virtues could be safely installed. But recognizing that problem would only have led Reagan and Novak into another sticky issue for free-marketeers: Who would control the government? If the Central American conservatives so favored by the Reagan administration held power, the status quo would surely continue. But removing those conservatives could require revolutionary tactics.[19] Reagonomics could believe that the

[18] *Latin America Weekly Report*, 28 May 1982, 4; Michael Kryzanek, "President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Formula," in Wiarda, ed., "Crisis in Central America."

[19] See Richard R. Fagen, "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Market . . . ," *International Organization* 32 (1978): 292–93.

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larger capitalists deserve favor because they create wealth, but in Central America that view continued to be a prescription for economic and political disaster. Reagan, Novak, and other neoconservatives cannot have both a freer market in the Caribbean and also more equal distribution of wealth. Such a feat is impossible until a fundamental restructuring occurs, a change that will take decades and require revolutionary tactics. No one around Reagan advocated such change. Novak did not even discuss the problem.

The CBI became a channel for sending aid to such right-wing regimes as El Salvador's. But in none of its forms did CBI bridge the chasm that separated Reagonomics from historical realities in Central America. Some U.S. business people deeply involved in Latin America understood the intellectual problems that bedeviled the Reagan administration. One such group listened without enthusiasm to speeches by Enders, NSC (National Security Council) adviser William Clark, and other top officials who again elaborated on the Cuban and Soviet evils. One executive later commented: "So we're going to fight the Commies. What else is new?"[20]

Reagan received little help from allies in resolving his dilemmas. Enders claimed that Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela "have almost precisely the same approach" to Central America.[21] The generalization was questionable. Despite their own massive economic problems, the Mexicans continued to support the Sandinist government and insisted that Castro be brought into negotiations for a settlement. Even Venezuela, wary of the revolutionaries, followed suit and tried to find some political arrangement before radicalism, and perhaps armed conflict, struck the entire area.[22]

A split in the Atlantic Alliance was equally serious. West German Social Democratic officials worked so closely with the Sandinists and the Salvadoran revolutionaries that Reagan finally sent Enders to tell them to stop interfering in Central American affairs. Dependent on U.S. military power for their security, the West Germans complied.[23] The French Socialist government of President François Mitterrand, however, stood fast. Mitterrand sent $15 million worth of arms to the Sandinists just as Reagan attempted to isolate them. French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson listened to Haig's displeasure, then declared: "The worst error we could make would be to follow the policy adopted by the United States."[24]

El Salvador: Recycling History

When Reagan entered office, the Salvadoran rebel offensive launched in early January 1981 had failed. He had a sudden opportunity to negotiate a settlement

[20] *Latin America Weekly Report*, 2 July 1982, 6.
[21] Ibid., 18 September 1981, 5, has the Enders quotation.
[22] Ibid., 13 August 1982, 5; *New York Times*, 11 March 1981.
[23] *Latin America Weekly Report*, 18 September 1981, 2.
[24] Ibid., 16 July 1982, 11.

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of the bloody revolution. But the president remained true to his ideology. Instead of seizing the moment for discussions, he drove for total military victory. U.S. officials assumed they were pursuing a new, tougher approach when they were actually continuing a decades-old policy that had helped cause the revolution. The Reagan administration sought to fight fire by pouring on gasoline. But with approximately 4,000 rebels facing 17,000 U.S.-trained and supplied army and security forces in a tiny country, Washington's wager on military victory seemed sound. Within two months, however, the war stalemated. A Pentagon study concluded that the Salvadoran army, despite U.S. training, resembled a nineteenth-century force incapable of fighting any kind of war, conventional or guerrilla.[25]

The administration panicked. Having announced that he intended to restore U.S. military credibility in a vital East-West conflict, the president watched victory move out of reach. When Haig dispatched top officials to plead with West Europeans and Latin Americans for cooperation, they returned empty-handed. Particular embarrassment occurred when Haig reprimanded Panama for funneling arms to the Salvadoran rebels. Since 1903 the United States had controlled Panama as a virtual colony. But the Panamanian president denied any role, adding: "The only country that uses our territory against our will to interfere in El Salvador is the United States." General Omar Torrijos, Panama's strongman, told the U.S. ambassador: "This message has come to the wrong address. It should have been sent to Puerto Rico."[26]

Reagan had little better luck at home. Despite his use of tried-and-proven cold war rhetoric, despite the media's failure to show the complexities and causes of the Salvadoran revolution, the White House admitted in March 1981 that public opinion opposed the president's policy.[27] A Reagan spokesman noted that Roman Catholics especially condemned the policy, and did so in thousands of letters sent directly to the White House.[28] The State Department then tried to reverse the opinion by issuing the "White Paper," but as noted above that attempt boomeranged. One knowledgeable observer, Jiri Valenta, even argued that Reagan helped the Soviets; the Russians were militarily tied down in Afghanistan, and could become involved directly in Poland, so they doubtless hoped that Reagan would likewise become bogged down in his own "backyard."[29]

In Salvador, meanwhile, the death-squads worked efficiently, even if the army did not. The remains of 300 to 500 civilians were found each month, on average. Over forty mayors and local councilmen who belonged to President José Napoleon Duarte's Christian Democratic party were killed during the year ending April 1981. The party's secretary general had no love for the guerrillas, but

[25] *New York Times*, 21 February 1981.

[26] Quoted in Penny Lernoux, "They're *Our* S.O.B.s . . . ," *The Nation*, 28 March 1981, 363.

[27] See the study by the Columbia University School of Journalism, summarized in *Latin America Weekly Report*, 20 February 1981, 5.

[28] *New York Times*, 14 March 1981; *Washington Post*, 10 March 1981.

[29] Valenta, "U.S.S.R., Cuba and the Crisis in Central America," 738–40.

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he warned that if the right wing won the military victory sought by Reagan, "we may all end up in exile in Venezuela, or"—he drew his finger across his throat. One leading government official admitted in April that "right-wing violence has gotten out of hand. . . . We can't control the Treasury Police and the National Guard."[30]

In October 1981, the revolutionary spokesmen again offered to negotiate "without preconditions." The State Department flatly rejected the overture. It argued that captured documents proved the revolutionaries hoped to use the mediation effort throughout 1981 only to stall for time and split the United States from the Salvadoran government. A revolutionary spokesman did not disavow the documents. He did emphasize, however, that the program in the documents was optional, and that the issues could be negotiated. The State Department apparently did not press to test the spokesman's sincerity. U.S. policy precluded such negotiations.[31]

The policy only intensified the war. U.S. military aid that amounted to $6 million in 1980 leaped to $35.5 million in 1981 and $82 million in 1982. Some 1,500 Salvadoran soldiers received special training in North American camps. Economic aid tripled from $58.5 million in 1980 to $189 million in 1982. The United States sent more aid to El Salvador in 1981 and 1982 than to any other Latin American nation. The assistance could not do the job; it could not, for example, begin to offset the $1.5 billion of capital that fled the country for U.S. and Swiss banks during those years.[32]

If the military victory moved out of sight, a second objective appeared more attainable. Reagan began to base his entire policy on an election scheduled for March 1982. He hoped that it would bring to power a regime that could draw off support from both the reactionary military and the revolutionaries. The election's purpose was important—to choose a constituent assembly that would write a new constitution and choose an interim president to govern until new elections were held in 1983 or 1984. Going along with carefully worked-out policy, Duarte's government offered the rebels a place on the ballot if they would lay down their arms and play by the new political rules. The revolutionaries, however, understood that such an approach could mean their physical as well as political death. Their suspicions were confirmed when the security forces' death-squads circulated a list of over one hundred rebels to be shot on sight. Five leading leftist leaders, representing a spectrum of the most revolutionary groups, instead appealed to Reagan for talks "without preconditions by any of the parties to the conflict."[33] U.S. officials again quickly rejected the offer.

[30] Quoted in *Washington Post*, 21 March 1981; also see ibid., 9 March 1981.

[31] The documents are declassified; copies in author's possession, for which the author is indebted to Alex Singer of Cornell University. See the analysis in *New York Times*, 5 November 1981.

[32] U.S. Department of State, "El Salvador," *Gist* (June 1982); U.S. Department of State, "Latin America and the Caribbean Bilateral Assistance," *Current Policy*, no. 269, 23 March 1981; *Latin America Weekly Report*, 30 January 1981; U.S. Department of State, "El Salvador," *Gist* (February 1983).

[33] Quoted in *New York Times*, 28 January 1982.

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On 28 March 1982, elections were held throughout El Salvador, except in a few rebel-controlled areas. The revolutionaries warned Salvadorans not to vote, but the turnout, announced by the government to be 1.5 million voters, was enormous. (Later investigation concluded the turnout was closer to one million or 1.2 million, but that level was impressive nevertheless.) Assistant Secretary of State Enders lauded the voters for repudiating "the claim of the violent left that it has the people behind it."[34] Unable to win its military victory, U.S. officials brandished the March election results as if they were waving a talisman to drive off the forces of darkness.

The talisman possessed few supernatural powers. Central American leaders, particularly those in El Salvador, had too long made mockeries of such elections. A Latin American expert at the conservative American Enterprise Institute in Washington stated the problem in moderate terms: "Elections in Central America, with Costa Rica being the major exception, have generally been peripheral to the main arenas of politics."[35] Without a democratic tradition, but burdened by a bloody history of corrupt elections and military death-squads, El Salvador was supposed to move overnight from feudalism to a workable democratic system.

Unsurprisingly, feudalism triumphed. As peasants voted, their identity cards were marked and their thumbs stamped with ink. Authorities claimed these measures were aimed at eliminating vote fraud, but rumors warned of ugly consequences for those lacking these receipts. Ballots were numbered and ballot boxes transparent. Salvadorans felt they cast their votes in full view of the government.[36] Given the peasants' fear of the military, a fear warranted by the bodies left in streets or piled up at the bottom of ravines, the election results did not surprise. Major Roberto D'Aubuisson led a coalition of right-wing groups that won thirty-six seats of the sixty in the constituent assembly.

It was a stunning victory for the forces of darkness. D'Aubuisson's ARENA (National Republican Alliance) party turned out to be the best organized in the campaign, even though it had been hurriedly put together by exiled oligarchs and reactionary military officers. Duarte's Christian Democrats won only twenty-four seats, despite strong U.S. support that included rumored financial contributions. Part of the aid came from the CIA, whose director, William Casey, acknowledged that the intelligence agency had been involved in the election, and had provided "information and capabilities" to the Duarte government before the voting.[37] D'Aubuisson, on the other hand, received help from McCann-Erickson, the largest U.S. public relations agency operating abroad. In a well-run

[34] U.S. Department of State, "Commitment to Democracy in Central America," *Current Policy*, no. 386, 21 April 1982, 1-2.

[35] Wiarda, ed., "Crisis in Central America," 5-6.

[36] *Latin America Weekly Report*, 19 February 1982, 7; White, "Central America: The Problem That Won't Go Away," 25.

[37] *Wall Street Journal*, 16 July 1982; *Latin America Weekly Report*, 6 August 1982, 3; *New York Times*, 30 July 1982.

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advertising campaign, McCann-Erickson spent $200,000 to sell the right-wing terrorist's brand of electoral politics. Most of the money probably came from Miami-based émigrés, who counted on D'Aubuisson to restore the old order.[38] The CIA proved no match for Madison Avenue.

Reagan's policy lay in ruins. Before the election, State Department officials had claimed that only Duarte could restore the nation, and denounced D'Aubuisson as the reported leader of "a right-wing terrorist group."[39] After the election the United States had to accept D'Aubuisson as the country's legislative leader—and elected by the process the Reagan administration had devised. The respected *Economist* of London concluded that after Reagan spent months trying to civilize them, "he saw a majority of voting Salvadorans apparently plumping for savagery."[40]

Having made the election the centerpiece of his policy, Reagan now moved to destroy its results. When D'Aubuisson threatened to put a friend in the presidential chair, U.S. officials brought pressure on the Salvadoran army, which still held ultimate power, to appoint a moderate. The military, faced with possible cutoff or reduction of U.S. arms, complied. But then the D'Aubuisson-led assembly stopped the land reform program, the program with which the United States had planned to win the hearts and minds of the masses away from the revolutionaries. D'Aubuisson was not about to hand out the wealth of those who had helped him to power. Pushed by U.S. congressional demands that the land reforms continue, the State Department attempted to put the program back on track. The result was a standoff. U.S. officials could not undo the results of an election they had made their own. Meanwhile, leaders of the land reform charged that as much as $30 million had been lost because of theft and corruption.[41]

U.S. pressure to reverse the election results finally created an anti-American backlash. D'Aubuisson declared that Salvadorans had to organize so they could refuse Washington's continual demands. The nation's second-largest newspaper claimed that U.S. reform programs threatened the country with "total bankruptcy." A liberal Salvadoran complained that it was "preposterous the way the United States stomps through here."[42] The nation's dislike of foreigners had sturdy roots in history, so such attitudes were not surprising to those who knew that history.

Another election result was more grim. Within four months after the balloting

[38] Wayne Biddle, "The Selling of D'Aubuisson," *The Nation*, 24–31 July 1982, 72–73.

[39] Excerpts of statement in *New York Times*, 14 March 1981; State Department letter to Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, 12 May 1981, quoted by White, "Central America: The Problem That Won't Go Away," 25.

[40] *Latin America Weekly Report*, 2 April 1982, 1; *The Economist*, 1 May 1982, 14.

[41] A good summary of the land reform program at that point is in two stories in the *Washington Post*, 31 May 1982; also *Latin America Weekly Report*, 30 April 1982, 4; and Oxfam America's *El Salvador Land Reform 1980–1982 Impact Audit* by Laurence R. Simon and James C. Stephens, Jr., with 1982 Supplement by Martin Diskin (Boston: Oxfam America, 1982); *Latin America Weekly Report*, 30 July 1982, 12.

[42] Quoted in the *New York Times*, 20 June 1982.

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a number of Christian Democratic leaders were murdered, including six mayors. Witnesses blamed military-controlled death-squads.[43] The country's defense minister, General José Guillermo Garcia, held the most power and had become Reagan's main hope, but Garcia could not control the death-squads. Nor could he control his own more moderate military officers. The officer corps deeply divided along generational and ideological lines. One popular officer caused a crisis in early 1983 by threatening to rebel against Garcia unless the defense minister fought more vigorously against the revolutionaries. With U.S. support, the uprising was put down, but Garcia was forced out and army morale was shattered. Other younger officers talked of possible discussions with the revolutionaries. In May 1983, the military fell under the control of extreme right-wing officers who had been linked to terrorism and the murder of North Americans.[44]

The revolutionaries also suffered from dissension. The traditional divisions between the moderate Left and hard-line Marxist guerrilla fighters intensified after the election. In early 1983, one rebel group killed the leader of another revolutionary fraction. Ill and disillusioned, Cayetano Carpio—the father figure of the rebellion—committed suicide. It seemed that the revolutionaries were held together only by U.S. opposition to negotiations and the bloodthirstiness of the right-wing death-squads. (A Salvadoran tourist official explained the sharp drop in foreign visitors by noting the 35,000 civilians who had been slaughtered in the three years after 1978, and then admitting, "we have an image problem.")[45]

In February 1983, Jeane Kirkpatrick announced victory. "The guerrillas are not winning anything," she said on a visit to El Salvador. "They do not even expect it." She applauded the country's "legitimate democratic government," an apparent reference to D'Aubuisson. But within a month Kirkpatrick had caused a major crisis within the Reagan administration and brought Salvador back to the newspaper headlines. She returned from her trip to tell Reagan that unless U.S. military aid rapidly increased not only El Salvador would fall to the revolutionaries, but all of Central America could soon come under control of Cuban-oriented regimes. Reagan began making public statements that unless Congress at least doubled military aid to Salvador, Mexico could ultimately be affected and Soviet-supported governments would then be on the doorstep of the United States.[46] ("As San Salvador goes so goes Nutley, New Jersey," was the way skeptical critics rephrased the president's domino theory.)

Kirkpatrick triggered the panic for several reasons. In early 1983 the revolutionaries so effectively regrouped that they successfully struck and briefly con-

[43] Ibid., 1 June 1982, 5 August, 1982.

[44] Gino Lofredo, "In Salvador, Discontented Officers," *New York Times*, 24 May 1982; *Washington Post*, 7 July 1982; ibid., 1 June 1983.

[45] Quoted in *Latin America Weekly Report*, 26 February 1982, 3, which considered the explanation a strong candidate for "the understatement of the year award"; *New York Times*, 27 July 1982; *Washington Post*, 31 July 1982.

[46] *New York Times*, 10 February 1983; see especially *Washington Post*, 6 March 1983. Reagan's speech is analyzed in ibid., 11 March 1983.

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trolled new areas of El Salvador. They demonstrated military capabilities that the U.S.-trained Salvadoran troops could not handle, and that further dispirited and divided Garcia's officer corps. The revolutionary Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN) began to predict military victory within a year. But Kirkpatrick had another concern closer to home. Under Enders's quiet leadership, the State Department had begun to explore a "two-track" proposal that would lead to negotiations with the rebels while the fighting continued. Enders had taken over control of policy when Secretary of State George Shultz (who had replaced Haig in mid-1982) displayed little interest in Latin America. Kirkpatrick was appalled at Enders's "Lone Ranger" policymaking and went directly to Reagan to stop the two-track approach. She was joined by Reagan's NSC adviser, William Clark, who had little experience in foreign policy (although he and Shultz were the president's two closest advisers in the area). Clark was fully committed to a hard-line, military approach to Central American problems. Kirkpatrick and Clark succeeded in seizing the policy from the State Department.[47] In May 1983, Reagan fired Enders.

The immediate result was a vastly enlarged U.S. military involvement in the Salvadoran bloodbath. Reagan urged Congress to double military assistance to at least $110 million per year, vastly expand the training of Salvadoran troops by U.S. advisers, and possibly raise the number of those fifty-five advisers already stationed in the country. Meanwhile the president publicly portrayed the situation in stark terms, and shrewdly moved to blame revolutionary victories on his congressional critics who refused to give him all the money he wanted to pour into Salvador. Kirkpatrick added to the pressure when she suggested the need for hundreds of millions of dollars for a Central American "Marshall Plan" that would create a new economic infrastructure (highways, utilities, and schools). Finally, Reagan's advisers resorted to the old standby—elections. They demanded that the March 1984 presidential elections be moved to late 1983. The advisers believed the voting would undercut the growing political attractiveness of the revolutionaries—who, sensing military victory and knowing their candidates' lives could not be made secure from D'Aubuisson's assassins, refused to join the election process.[48]

Although these proposals caused furious political debate in early 1983, they of course offered little that was new. The Kirkpatrick-Clark policy only enlarged an approach that had already failed, an approach that was based on U.S. military aid and advisers. The more they North Americanized the war, the more the revolutionaries could claim to be fighting against a foreign invader and the more the Salvadoran government became dependent on the United States. Indeed, the Salvadoran military was already so dependent and weak that the very mention of U.S.-rebel negotiations had terrified Garcia's officers and threatened to paralyze their operations in the field. Many of them feared they were following

[47] *Washington Post*, 6 March 1983; author's interviews in Washington, D. C., March 1983.
[48] Ibid.; *New York Times*, 6 March 1983.

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the same dead-end path trod in 1979 by Somoza's National Guard in Nicaragua. As for the election proposal, it was—in the words of a State Department official—a symbolic gesture to please North Americans who continued to have a touching faith in national balloting, even when that balloting occurred in the middle of a violent revolution that wracked a country having no tradition of democratic elections. The suggestion for a new Marshall Plan (or "Kirkpatrick Plan," as it came to be known) was more interesting. It, however, immediately raised the questions posed by Thomas Mann to Eisenhower's cabinet in 1959: Are we certain, Mann asked, that U.S. politicians and taxpayers will carry through on such a long-term commitment, and that the Latin Americans will carry through on their responsibilities for reforms and administration? The Alliance for Progress had answered those questions with a resounding, tragic negative.

By the spring of 1983 Reagan had three general alternatives in Salvador. He could withdraw U.S. support of the makeshift, uneasy right-wing coalition and allow the revolution to take its course. This alternative would probably lead to a breakup of the military government, an all-out terrorist campaign conducted by D'Aubuisson's forces, and then a victory by either the revolutionaries or by a group made up of the more moderate FDR (Revolutionary Democratic Front)-FMLN leaders and the more liberal military officers. A second alternative would be a negotiated settlement in which the United States would work closely with Venezuela, Mexico, and perhaps Spain. Meaningless elections would have no place in this alternative. Instead, the United States would work with its military allies in Salvador while the other powers would deal with their contacts among the revolutionaries. The objective would be to split off both the far-Left and far-Right and create power sharing between those on both sides willing to compromise. The United States and the other powers would then be responsible for enforcing the compromise.

Reagan showed no sign of following either of these alternatives. One wing of the Republican party, which included Kirkpatrick and Clark on foreign policy issues, posed a major obstacle. It would brook no compromise with leftist forces. Reagan agreed with those Republicans. On the political level, he had no intention of compromising (nor did he have any idea about how to go about it). On the ideological level, he delivered several remarkable speeches in March 1983 that called for a virtual holy war against communism. There seemed little chance that he would either withdraw or pursue a meaningful negotiated settlement. That left the third alternative—to pursue traditional policies and further commit the U.S. military to the war. While promising that no U.S. combat troops were to be involved in the fighting, Reagan prepared to send ever-larger numbers of military and economic advisers. That North American power could ultimately "win" the war could not be doubted. Reagan could win much as William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, and Calvin Coolidge had won against revolutionaries in Nicaragua between 1911 and 1933. But neither could it be doubted that such a victory would require a continuing bloodbath in Central America, further polarize the area and thus turn the initiative to the extremists on both sides, divert U.S. attention and resources from more important domestic and foreign

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problems, and result in a running argument with allies who feared the president's policy.

And after Reagan or his successor won such a victory, conservative forces would necessarily govern repressively while the remnants of the revolutionaries regrouped to fight again. Salvadoran history would simply be recycled back to early 1981.

Nicaragua and Honduras: Transforming International Conflict into Revolution

Policy in Salvador fulfilled Kirkpatrick's hope that the United States would side with authoritarian regimes. Policy towards the Nicaraguan Sandinist government displayed the reverse side of the Kirkpatrick thesis. The approach fit a longer North American view, originating as early as the 1790s—revolutions of the Left were inherently dangerous to U.S. interests and were to be met with displeasure or force.

The Reagan administration moved quickly to weaken the Sandinists' hold on power. The 1980 election results in the United States made little difference in this regard; a high Nicaraguan official declared privately that if Carter had remained in office, "we would still be at loggerheads."[49] The problem was historical and ideological, not personal or partisan. Reagan only turned the screws more rapidly and tightly. By late February 1981 economic aid was turned off. In the summer Washington officials accused the Sandinists of moving close to the Soviet bloc. By the end of the year the president endorsed a CIA plan that aimed at destabilizing the Nicaraguan government. He also accepted a Pentagon program for rapidly building up Honduran forces. Those troops, aided by more than 100 U.S. military advisers and as many as 5,000 ex-Somoza supporters, were poised to wage war against the Sandinists.

Two particular issues pushed Reagan's policy so far so fast. One was Sandinist military aid to the Salvadoran revolutionaries. The other was the Nicaraguan regime's tightening of internal controls that drove out private business and threatened to turn the country into a consolidated socialist state. In 1981 the two issues were closely related. Broken by the Somozas' forty-year-long robbery, tied by terms negotiated with the international bankers in 1979 and 1980, and saddled with an economy devastated by the civil war, the Nicaraguans needed U.S. economic help above all else. Only the United States could provide the $3 million a day that one top Nicaraguan official estimated his country needed to survive. Only U.S. approval could open doors to international lending agencies or encourage other nations to help. "We need 10 years to regain the 1977 gross national product," the Nicaraguan official declared.[50] Without Washington's aid the Sandinists would not accomplish even that goal.

[49] Author's interview with an anonymous Nicaraguan official in Ithaca, New York, 29 October 1981.

[50] Ibid.

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Holding the high cards, U.S. officials demanded in late January 1981 that Nicaragua stop helping their "revolutionary brothers" in El Salvador and pull back from a growing relationship with Cuba and the Soviet bloc. Haig announced he was stopping $15 million of economic aid headed for Managua, as well as nearly $10 million of wheat, for thirty days to test whether the Sandinists would stop helping the Salvadoran rebels. Bread lines appeared in Nicaraguan cities. One of Reagan's National Security Council officials warned a Nicaraguan: "The question is not whether U.S.-Nicaraguan relations are good or bad, but whether there will be any relations at all."[51]

In early April, the State Department announced good news: the Nicaraguan "response has been positive. We have no hard evidence of arms movements through Nicaragua during the past few weeks, and propaganda and some other support activities have been curtailed." But then came the non sequitur: because "some arms traffic may [*sic*] be continuing and other support very probably continues," aid would be cancelled anyway.[52] The announcement was illogical. Politically, however, it made sense because it appeased the extreme right-wing of the Republican party led by powerful Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina. Helms, who chaired the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Latin America, had demanded an end to the assistance. Diplomatically, moreover, it demonstrated to the administration's satisfaction a toughness that failed to appear in the confusion and failure that marked Reagan's foreign policy elsewhere, including El Salvador.

With its economic leverage gone, the United States could no longer use it to discipline the Sandinists as they reopened the arms flow to El Salvador and employed Communist-bloc equipment and advisers to build a 25,000-man army (the largest in Central America) and a 30,000-strong militia. The Sandinists wanted to develop a 50,000-man force if they could find the resources. They did find help behind the Iron Curtain, and obtained tanks, helicopters, heavy artillery, and surface-to-air missiles. They also sent seventy men to Bulgaria for jet training. ("Yes, they are there," a high Nicaraguan official admitted privately, "but don't worry. They are flunking the course." His North American listeners were not amused.)[53]

But if the United States had lost some leverage, the Sandinists had lost most of their alternatives for development. As a member of their three-man governing junta, Sergio Ramírez Mercado, noted in early 1982: "We know that we cannot produce the profound social gains we want if we are in confrontation with the United States." To accomplish such gains, the Sandinists believed they had to dismantle the system inherited from Somoza. They intended to develop light industry and agriculture for internal consumption as well as export. Sandinists planned to rebuild by controlling capital movement, and by combining state

[51] Quoted in *New York Times*, 13 February 1981.

[52] Quoted in ibid., 2 April 1981.

[53] Ibid., 14 January 1982; author's interview with Nicaraguan official, 29 October 1981; *Washington Post*, 31 January 1981; *New York Times*, 12 February 1981.

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controls with a private sector that accounted for over 60 percent of the economy. Political pluralism had to be limited. National efforts could not be spent on political struggles. North Americans, however, viewed this particular kind of one-party state with alarm.

By mid-1981 all U.S. aid had stopped. The revolution moved sharply to the left. Businessmen who criticized the government were arrested or exiled. (The regime carefully tried to maintain the appearance of balance by simultaneously jailing several Communist party members.) Cut off from U.S. money, Sandinists found help not only in Western Europe and Mexico, but in the Soviet bloc and General Muammar Qaddafi's Libya. But the aid was insufficient. The Russian promise of $166 million over five years, with perhaps more to come, hardly touched Nicaraguan needs. The Sandinists tightened up at home. Aid to the private sector dropped. Incentives for foreign investors disappeared. State controls and nationalization spread. But without U.S. aid, little seemed to help. Inflation and unemployment rose. "We have failed so far economically," a high Nicaraguan official admitted in late 1981.[54]

Political repercussions quickly followed. The three-man junta and the nine-person directorate (which theoretically held ultimate power) divided between pragmatists who wanted to slow down use of state controls and self-styled Marxist-Leninists who pushed for rapid centralization. Officials who tried to restrain the Marxist-Leninists began to quit or were expelled from the regime. Many who left, however, continued to plead for U.S. help. Alfonso Robelo, for example, warned that U.S. hostility played into the hardliners' hands. Arturo Cruz, a respected banker, revolutionary, and ambassador to Washington before he quit the Nicaraguan government, remarked as he left his home country that although he disagreed with the Sandinists, he would do all in his power to support them rather than have the regime fall because of U.S. pressure or internal opposition.[55]

The moderates were trapped. As the Roman Catholic leaders cooled towards the revolution, unsympathetic clergy were picked out for political attack and humiliation by the Sandinists. Church leaders became more hostile and the Sandinists responded in kind. The regime cracked down on 50,000 Miskito Indians in distant provinces along the Atlantic Ocean and the Honduran border. Never hispanized, the Miskitos had historically opposed attempts by Managua to control them. They had become fertile ground for ex-Somoza supporters. Some 10,000 of the Indians moved into Honduras for refuge. As they did so, their village priests also turned against the government. A large, rebellious force had developed, and in turn the radical Sandinists urged further centralization of power and aid from the Soviet bloc to deal with that force.[56]

[54] A good brief discussion is in *Latin America Weekly Report*, 25 June 1982, 9; the quote is from author's interview with Nicaraguan official, 29 October 1981; see also *New York Times*, 8 May 1981; and Thomas W. Walker, "The Sandinist Victory in Nicaragua," *Current History* 78 (1980):61.

[55] Quoted in *Washington Post*, 16 November 1981.

[56] *New York Times*, 29 May, 18 June 1981, 18 August 1982.

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Reagan's hope of slowly strangling the Managua regime appeared to be working. Caught in what one Sandinist leader called "a vicious circle," the more the government extended its control to protect itself, the more it alienated key segments of the population. Ex-Somoza henchmen and disaffected Sandinists found support among the Indians and from the Salvadoran military. They also found friends in Florida and California, where the United States government allowed anti-Sandinist troops to drill, although most former Sandinists would have nothing to do with these remnants of the hated National Guard. Reagan did little to stop the old Somoza supporters. "Under the Carter and Nixon administration, what we were doing was a crime," said the leader of one private army. "With the Reagan administration no one has bothered us for ten months."[57]

In November 1981, Reagan approved a $19 million CIA plan to undercut the Sandinist regime. In December, Haig refused to rule out a U.S. blockade of Nicaragua or the mining of harbors. Enders told the Senate that plans had been drawn up, but not yet approved, for military action against both Cuba and Nicaragua.[58]

Reagan's advisers planned to use Honduras as a staging area for the attacks. The choice was not surprising. If Somoza's Nicaragua had been the most cooperative of all Latin American countries in supporting U.S. policies, Honduras had run a close second. The Hondurans had long been more fully controlled by North American capital than even Nicaragua. Their new professional army had been produced by U.S. advisers and training schools. As many as 5,000 Somoza followers made Honduras home base. Honduras once again became what it had frequently been since its independence 150 years earlier, a launching area for attacks on neighboring regimes. Eisenhower had used Honduras for this purpose when he overthrew the Guatemalan government in 1954.

Once again, U.S. policy began to turn during the final months of the Carter administration. It nearly doubled military aid for Honduras to $5 million in 1980. Reagan again doubled military assistance, then raised it to $15 million for 1982. He also dispatched a team of Green Berets to operate along the Salvadoran border. In mid-1982 and again in early 1983, U.S. troops went through maneuvers with the Honduran army (merely to test "communications procedures," said one U.S. officer), and built a large base camp located just forty-five miles from a major Nicaraguan military station. Honduras possessed a 20,000-man army and the largest, best-equipped air force in Central America. The United States sent in even more transport planes and large helicopters to increase the army's mobility. In mid-1982 skirmishes broke out in which Nicaragua claimed forty soldiers died.[59]

[57] Quoted in ibid., 28 December, 2 May 1981.

[58] Enders's quote is in *Latin America Weekly Report*, 18 December 1981, 12; other reports on the destabilization plan are in Loren Jenkins, "Honduras on the Edge," *The Atlantic* 250 (1982): 16–20; *New York Times*, 6 December 1981.

[59] The U.S. officer is quoted in *New York Times*, 5 August 1982. A good background on the build-

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A war between Honduras and Nicaragua could involve El Salvador and Guatemala. The latter two countries could not pass up the opportunity to attack their rebels who found sanctuary in Honduran jungles or obtained help from Nicaragua. The entire region could ignite. Another, more immediate danger also loomed. U.S. policy could push Honduras into its own revolution. For once again the United States threatened to destablilize a friendly government by using it to fight a battle in the cold war.

At first glance, Honduras appeared to be as compliant to U.S. wishes as the sterotypical banana republic was supposed to be. When Washington officials demanded an end to the long-lived, thoroughly corrupt military government, the Hondurans held elections in 1981 and 1982 that brought a respected lawyer, Roberto Suazo Córdova, to the presidency. Delighted State Department officials lauded the results as a vindication of U.S. policy in the area. They celebrated too soon, and, perhaps, knowingly. Suazo Córdova, by constitution and by fact, did not rule the country. The army commander-in-chief held that power. Only he, not the president, could constitutionally give marching orders to the army, and he held veto power over the president's appointment of cabinet members and their subsequent actions. The professional, self-dedicated army officer corps had become the most coherent institution in an increasingly fragmented country.[60]

In 1981 and 1982, the military came under the control of certain army officers (known respectively as the "iron circle") who were led by General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez. General Alvarez hated anything that he thought might be associated with communism, and he particularly detested Nicaragua. Trained in Argentine military methods, Alvarez quickly cultivated U.S. officials. After Honduran troops helped the Salvadoran army massacre guerrillas and peasants during late spring of 1982, the FMLN revolutionaries darkened much of Honduras by blowing up electrical power stations. An infuriated Alvarez flew to Washington seeking more help. He returned with $23 million of military aid.[61] Alvarez fit well into Reagan's plans, even if the general did not gain power through democratic elections.

But the United States was crossing a deep ravine on a tottering bridge. Despite Alvarez and a long history of U.S. ties, Honduras remained a country that had endured 126 changes of government, 16 constitutions, and 385 coups since gaining independence. Life expectancy was under fifty years. Peasants in rural areas earned $150 annually, 30 percent had no land at all, and nearly half their children died before the age of five. The country carried a $1.7 billion debt, but its foreign currency reserves sunk below $20 million in 1981, and capital started

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up is in Jenkins, "Honduras on the Edge," 18–20; see also U.S. Department of State, "Latin America and the Caribbean Bilateral Assistance," *Current Policy*, no. 269, 23 March 1981; *Washington Post*, 5 May 1981; *New York Times*, 9 August 1981; *Latin America Weekly Report*, 30 July 1982, 1–2.

[60] The best account is James A. Morris and Steve C. Ropp, "Corporatism and Dependent Development: A Honduran Case Study," *Latin American Research Review* 12 (1977): 27–68; Anne Nelson, "Honduran Choice," *The Nation*, 12 December 1981, 629.

[61] *Latin America Weekly Report*, 23 July 1982.

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to exit. Most ominously, given Reagan's plans, the military appeared hollow. Top officers who opposed Alvarez's militancy warned that the army might dominate Hondurans, but it had no chance against the battle-tested, dedicated Sandinists—at least not unless the United States provided massive support. As one former Honduran officer warned; "Here soldiers are rounded up into the army from . . . movie houses and concerts. And you have a high command that would send them out to fight, then take off for Miami the minute things got bad."[62]

As the pressure built in 1981 and 1982, Honduras began to crack. For the first time in recent history, politicians and labor leaders disappeared or were found murdered. "Clandestine cemetaries" appeared. Death-squads and torture became more widespread. Left-wing guerrillas kidnapped, robbed banks, murdered, and hijacked. Mass demonstrations of as many as 60,000 people protested repression by security forces. Two U.S. military advisers were shot and the Honduran Congress was bombed.[63] The country slid towards terrorism precisely as Reagan was developing it into a base for military action against the Sandinists and Salvadoran revolutionaries.

As regional conflict impended, Nicaragua moved to the left. One Western diplomat observed that Reagan's intentional radicalization of the Managua government "only makes sense if you think that the radicalized state will be of short duration."[64] The polarization of Honduras, however, made sense only in the long sweep of U.S. involvement in Central America. Each time Washington officials had used one of the southern nations for the sake of U.S. interests, it seemed that North Americans won in the short run and Central Americans lost in the long run. An observer with perspective could conclude that Honduras in the 1980s resembled Nicaragua in the early 1970s.

Conclusion

By the 1980s, the U.S. system in Central America had turned full circle. It had opened the twentieth century by using military force to fix North American control over the area. Given its armed might and economic power, no one could doubt that the United States would dominate the area at will. Even in El Salvador, whose oligarchs had a proud history of keeping foreigners at bay, North American influence developed until by the 1920s, in the words of one horrified diplomat, the U.S. minister bragged "that he made the native police kneel down when he passed."[65]

[62] Quoted in *Washington Post*, 5 May 1981; also *New York Times*, 1 September 1982; Jenkins, "Honduras on the Edge," 18; Catholic Institute for International Relations, *Honduras: Anatomy of a Disaster* (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, undated but probably 1975), 3–5.

[63] *New York Times*, 25 September 1981; *The Economist*, 4 September 1982, 33–34.

[64] *Washington Post*, 26 July 1982.

[65] Francis White to Joseph Grew, 11 October 1924, decimal file 121.4/12, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

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By the 1930s such kowtowing, not to mention landing the U.S. Marines, had become too costly. Nor were such blatantly imperialist gestures any longer needed. The blunt instruments were replaced with the Good Neighbor's economic leverage. That leverage had been maturing since the United States checked the British entrepreneurs and gained economic supremacy in the region before World War I. The Good Neighbor was reinforced by the common effort of World War II, although that effort did not produce equal benefits for all the countries involved. Using government controls during the conflict and freer-market principles afterward, the United States built an economic empire at the expense of its Latin American neighbors.

By the 1950s, the Good Neighbor had lost its power. It did so at the moment U.S. economic hegemony was besieged by West Europeans and Japanese, and Washington's political hegemony was embarrassed by Fidel Castro's survival. The Alliance for Progress attempted to modernize and extend Good Neighbor principles, but updated New Deal remedies no longer worked. Indeed, they weakened the system by raising both the expectations of the masses and the wealth and power of the oligarchs. Revolutionary groups multiplied, the United States responded with increased military commitments. That response reached a high point in the Reagan administration. Having helped create a fertile ground for revolution, the United States helped it grow with military confrontation. Such a policy was logical only if North Americans were willing massively to intervene in, and perhaps occupy, Central America (much as they did between 1911 and 1933), or if their local allies in the area were trustworthy and stable. Neither condition existed.

Nor could U.S. officials square their policies with Thomas Jefferson's theory of self-determination. The contradiction between Jefferson's ideals and North American actions in Central America appeared in his lifetime; by the time of Theodore Roosevelt the United States explicitly defined such self-determination unilaterally and in its own interest. If Central Americans hoped to determine their own futures, for better or worse, they could not do so through election processes (which had long been corrupted and made meaningless everywhere except Costa Rica), or through their elites (who prospered by exploiting their own people). Outside Costa Rica, no peaceful means for needed change existed. As poverty accelerated, revolution erupted. In 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz told Congress that the United States would not tolerate "people shooting their way into power."[66] But other secretaries of state had not taken that view when oligarchs and generals shot their way into power in Salvador in 1932, Nicaragua in 1934 to 1936, Guatemala in 1954, or Honduras in 1963. (Fortunately, Shultz's rule was also not applied in 1776.)

Unable to deal with the products of its own system, reconcile the contradiction

[66] Senate Appropriations Committee, "Testimony of Secretary of State . . . Shultz Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Senate Appropriations Committee, March 22, 1983," typescript in author's possession, 32.

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between its professed ideals and its century-old foreign policy, or work with other powers to resolve these dilemmas, the United States, from Eisenhower to Reagan, resorted to force. The result was more revolution.

In 1926, Stokely W. Morgan, assistant chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs in the State Department, told graduating Foreign Service officers that their government was enduring rough times in Central America, but as that region matured, the relationship would change:

> If the United States has received but little gratitude, this is only to be expected in a world where gratitude is rarely accorded to the teacher, the doctor, or the policeman, and we have been all three. But as these young nations grow and develop a greater capacity for self-government, and finally take their places upon an equal footing with the mature, older nations of the world, it may be that in time they will come to see the United States with different eyes, and to have for her something of the respect and affection with which a man regards the instructor of his youth and a child looks upon the parent who has molded his character.[67]

By the 1980s, however, too many of the youths viewed the teacher with neither respect nor affection, but as a presence that could be removed only with force. North Americans consequently faced revolutionary crises in Central America. The explanation for that confrontation lay not in Ronald Reagan's belief that "the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on."[68] It lay in the history of how the class-ridden remains of the Spanish empire turned into the revolution-ridden parts of the North American system.

[67] Lecture delivered before the Foreign Service School, 29 January 1926, in Joseph C. Grew to American Diplomatic Officers . . . , decimal file 120.3, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D. C. I am indebted to David Langbart for pointing out this document in the Department of State Archives.

[68] *New York Times*, 20 October 1980.

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In Support of "Single-Issue" Politics

SYLVIA TESH

First the popular press took up the theme and more recently the academic press has echoed it: the rise of single-issue politics threatens the American political system. It is said that citizen groups organizing in ever greater numbers to push single issues ruin the careers of otherwise fine politicians who disagree with them on one emotional issue, paralyze the traditional process of governmental compromise, and ignore the common good in their selfish insistence on getting their own way. These charges are directed at organizations on both ends of the political spectrum—not only by people who claim to stand in some politically neutral spot but also at times by the very groups that take public stands for and against issues. Having a passionate conviction about abortion, disarmament, homosexuality, guns, feminism, tax laws, or the environment is increasingly described as a political problem itself.

This article questions that position. It argues that the familiar charges against single-issue politics are false. In addition, it suggests that the charges conceal fundamental political debates about the appropriate role of citizens in representative government. First, the issues around which people organize are multiple, not single, and therefore it is unlikely that their advancement will ruin the careers of otherwise acceptable politicians. Behind the charge of narrowness lies an enduring political question about the very legitimacy of citizens organizing over issues, instead of over the distribution of power. Second, contrary to surface appearances, compromise is a constant feature of issue politics, taking place both among members of issue groups, and at all levels of governmental decision-making. The latent question concerns who makes those compromises and who should make them. Third, issue groups possess a deep concern for the public good and, far from being selfish, they hold to a view of public decision-making

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that rejects the traditional acceptance of self-interest as a legitimate ground for pressuring government.

Democratic Theory: Interest Groups versus Issue Groups

Twentieth-century American political theory ignores issue groups. Both pluralists such as Robert Dahl, V.O. Key, and Joseph Schumpeter, as well as their more radical critics, such as Theodore Lowi and E.E. Schattschneider, concentrate instead on *interest* groups.[1] Like James Madison, they envision the citizenry as divided into sub-groups of people who, because of their differing economic positions, have conflicting political preferences. Members of these sub-groups support or oppose public policies according to whether the policies seem advantageous to their interests. Along with professional and occupational interest groups (such as the American Medical Association or the Steelworkers of America), these theorists grant interest group status to religious and ethnic groups (such as Jews and Hispanics) on the assumption that one's position as an identifiable minority has important economic implications. In the regular course of politics, these interest groups conflict with one another, each pressuring the government to support policies favorable to its own interests. While pluralists have made a virtue of these competing interests, defining democracy as the process that mediates the conflict, and their critics have pointed to the non-democratic consequences of pluralism, neither group of theorists has paid much attention to political alliances formed not around interests but around issues. Despite their differences, both the mainstream theorists and their critics take for granted that the concept of an "interest group" adequately describes the politically significant sub-categories of Americans. In doing so, they misrepresent the existence today and in the past of citizen groups frankly organized around ethical principles.

Such organizations have a long history in American politics. The first American peace group was founded in 1828, and antiwar organizations have been a more or less constant feature of the American polity ever since. The mid-nineteenth century also saw the birth of the women's movement, and the first of dozens of political organizations that have been devoted to women's equality. The temperance movement provides another example, with contemporary organizations to outlaw drunk driving extending the arguments developed some 150 years ago about misuse of alcohol. The crusade against slavery, begun immediately after the Revolutionary War, was the forerunner for all the organizations founded to advance Civil Rights in the twentieth century. Besides these celebrated

[1] Robert A Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1967); V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1969); Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942); Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969); E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

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causes, contemporary and historical citizen groups have formed to push for laws on a great variety of other issues, among them public education, cruelty to animals, capital punishment, civil liberties, contraception, and health and safety. The supporters of each of these causes construe them as questions of principle. Unlike members of interest groups, they couch much of their support (or in some cases their opposition) in terms of what is right and just public policy.

These groups have not been entirely neglected by twentieth-century political theorists. V.O. Key, for example, has written movingly about the civil rights and suffrage movements and Robert Dahl has included civil rights groups in his discussion of the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.[2] But Key described issue groups only to illustrate how the franchise has gradually been enlarged to include new voters and Dahl treated them primarily as influencers of public opinion with only indirect connections to the action taking place in Congress.

To discuss issue groups only as examples of ways that the voting public has been enlarged, or as background actors that merely generate public pressure, reflects a major weakness in political theory. Because they emphasize *interests*, neither pluralist theory nor the more radical theories that oppose it can account for people who join or otherwise support organizations unrepresentative of their own economic class or ethnic, religious or sexual identity. Tenured university professors who throw their prestige on the side of clerical union organizers, victims of rape or incest who oppose legalized abortion, men who march in demonstrations called by the National Organization for Women—all these people act irrationally according to the logic underpinning both pluralist and radical theory. Of course, if their fellow professors, victims, and men question their alliances these "renegades" readily explain that they are taking what they see as moral positions. But neither pluralist political theory with its emphasis on interests nor Marxist theory with its emphasis on class has a place for that explanation. And here is the heart of the matter. Cutting across categories based on economics are categories based on ethics. While most well-off people may consider unions to be either irrelevant or unnecessary, and most violated women want the option of abortion, and most men may be apprehensive about the idea of social and economic equality with women, others respond to these demands for change on the basis not of their "interests" but on the basis of deeply held beliefs about what is right.

This is not to deny the importance of economic realities in shaping political ideologies. Rather, it is to call attention to additional components of these ideologies. A comprehensive political theory would recognize that groups that create and advance political issues may not be mere covers for hidden selfish or class interests. To recognize this fact expands the dominant, narrow concept of human nature as self-interested and competitive, and gives to moral commitments the legitimacy they deserve. Moreover, it makes possible a broader understanding of how political change occurs. Toward that end, it is essential to mark

[2] Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*; Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy*.

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the distinctions between issue groups and interest groups. They differ from one another in important ways.

Interest groups are private. Open only to people in specific occupational professional or ethnic categories, they represent preexisting associations. One has to be a doctor to join the American Medical Association, a steelworker to affect the United Steelworkers, or black to have influence in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). An interest group's political goal is to affect the allocation of resources. It works for the passage of legislation that benefits its members. Issue groups, on the other hand, are public. They recruit members from the population at large. Anyone can join. Each organization starts from scratch, so to speak, appealing to prospective members in roles held by all Americans—those of citizen, consumer, taxpayer, or what Peter Schuck calls "member of the biosphere."[3] Although it may be possible to demonstrate that people who agree on political issues also have general economic or ethnic characteristics in common, the rationale for organization is not frank "interests." Instead, issue groups appeal to moral convictions about the rightness of policies. Whether contested laws and policies will personally benefit group members or not remains for them an insignificant consideration.

These distinctions between interest groups and issue groups are not subjective. As E.E. Schattschneider pointed out in *The Semisovereign People*, interest groups may claim that their policies benefit everyone but

> only a naive person is likely to imagine that the political involvements of the members of the American Bankers Association and members of the Foreign Policy Association are identical. In other words, we may draw inferences from the exclusive or the nonexclusive nature of benefits sought by organizations as well as we can from the composition of groups. The positions of these groups can be distinguished not on the basis of some subjective process, but by making reasonable inferences from verifiable facts.[4]

Schattschneider differentiated not between interest groups and issue groups but between "special interest groups" that speak for private economic entities and "public interest groups" that speak for the citizenry at large. This common terminology went relatively unchallenged until the mid-1970s, when public interest groups seemingly dedicated to one issue became newsworthy. Before that time, political theorists, journalists, and politicians concentrated on special interest groups, mounting debates and counter-debates about the democratic nature of these private lobbies."[5] In all these discussions, the claim by public

[3] Peter H. Schuck, "Public Interest Groups and the Policy Process," *Public Administration Review* 37 (1977):133.

[4] Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People*, 26.

[5] Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970); Lester Milbrath, *The Washington Lobbyists* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963); David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).

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interest groups that they speak for "the public" went unchallenged. But when new, broad-based groups like Common Cause were established, when they were joined by more narrowly-focused bodies like Handgun Control, Inc., and the National Abortion Rights Action League, and when these were countered by other broad organizations like the Moral Majority and other narrow associations like the national Rifle Association and the National Right to Life Committee, then the existence of public interest groups became as problematical as special interest groups. Suddenly, the distinction was less clear between lobbies representing the public and lobbies representing only some faction of the public.

In the face of this muddle, journalists and politicians turned up the flame under the older argument about the democratic nature of interest groups and threw into the pot a new argument about the representative nature of issue groups. Stirring these disparate topics together, they produced a mixture in which "interest groups," "special-interest groups," "PACs," "single-issue groups," "pressure groups" and "public-interest groups" were largely undifferentiated.

Newsweek offered its readers a sample of this peculiar stew of incongruous categories just prior to the 1978 elections. Its feature article, titled "Single-Issue Politics," began:

> From the grass roots to Capitol Hill the nation is caught up in a rugged new game of single-issue politics. Every conceivable issue seems to have competing pressure groups—from gun control and import quotas to abortion and nuclear power.[6]

The magazine supported this assertion by quoting Senator Edward M. Kennedy's statement that the "Senate and the House are awash in a sea of special-interest campaign contributions and special-interest lobbying." In the eight pages that followed, *Newsweek* persistently confused diverse sorts of lobbies, throwing together such varied associations as Equal Rights Amendments (ERA) backers, Native Americans, postal workers, the aging, traveling salesmen, chiropractors, Common Cause, the Boilermakers' union, the Clamshell Alliance, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), and the American Medical Association as though they all were organized for similar purposes, had similar relations with government, and posed similar political dilemmas.

Issue groups themselves, acutely aware that "single-issue politics" has become as controversial a term as "special-interest groups," exacerbate the confusion. In fund-raising letters to their members, many routinely label their counterparts on the opposite end of the political spectrum "special interests" or "pressure groups" or sometimes just "lobbies," using all these terms pejoratively. In contrast, issue groups tend to call themselves, if anything at all, "citizens' associations." There are exceptions. World Hunger Year sends out appeals with the words "Another single-issue group" emblazoned across the envelope. Not much given to such irony, and perhaps not considering the history of the term, the Moral Majority calls itself a "special-interest group" in its pamphlet "What is the Moral Ma-

[6] "Single issue politics," *Newsweek*, 6 November 1978, 48–50.

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jority?" (although the *Moral Majority Report* in March 1983 published an article by former Representative Jim Jeffries warning of the dangers of "special-interests," a category from which he clearly excluded the Moral Majority).[7] Similarly, the League of Women Voters announced in one letter to supporters that its "special interest" is the improvement of elections. For the most part, however, issue organizations, by questioning the legitimacy of their opponents and by avoiding the label "issue group" for themselves, unwittingly add to the pervasive sentiment that there is something undemocratic about organizing over moral principles.

Single and Multiple Issues

The 1978 defeat of Iowa Senator Dick Clark by Roger Jepsen was widely explained by invoking "single-issue politics." In a post-election interview with the *New York Times*, Clark's campaign manager blamed "pro-life forces" for the loss of his seat, and a representative of the "forces" acknowledged that Clark had been a targeted candidate.[8] A few days later, *New York Times* journalist Anthony Lewis, citing the Clark-Jepsen campaign, wrote: "Whatever one's personal view of abortion, the influence of voters prepared to decide on that issue alone obviously raises problems for the political system."[9] Regardless of these and other newspaper accounts, however, little evidence supports the contention that Jepsen defeated Clark on a single issue. In fact, the work of John E. Jackson and Maris A. Vinovskis suggests that abortion has not been a key factor in *any* political campaign.[10] And the *Conservative Digest* divulged that "Roger Jepsen's campaign benefitted mightily from the support of nearly every New Right political action committee and New Right citizens organization."[11] More significantly, the abortion issue itself is not a "single" one. Indeed, both supporting and opposing groups portray it as a multiple issue.

Some groups that lobby on the abortion issue are frankly multi-issue organizations. For them, a coherent political ideology ties abortion to myriad other issues. Other groups advance a narrow argument on abortion, but they too are implicitly multi-issue because, subtly or obviously, they make their cause part of the liberal or conservative agendas. In other words, while it is possible to construe abortion as a single issue concerning the termination of pregnancy, no organized political group treats it that way. They all advance it as an example

[7] Jim Jeffries, "Fatal flaw cited in House's system," *Moral Majority Report* 4 (1983):5.

[8] *New York Times*, 13 November 1978.

[9] Anthony Lewis, "A singular issue," *New York Times*, 16 November 1978.

[10] John E. Jackson and Maris A. Vinovskis, "Public opinion, elections and the 'single-issue' issue" in Gilbert Steiner, ed., *The Abortion Dispute and the American System*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983). It should be noted that Jackson and Vinovskis consider pro- and anti-abortion groups "interest groups" (as well as single-issue groups), and that their conclusion reflects a bias toward political organizations that do not threaten the status quo: "In sum, we do not see any peril to the traditional electoral process from [these groups]. . . . The electoral system is in little danger of being damaged by the abortion policy controversy" (p. 81).

[11] "The new right: a special report," *Conservative Digest* 5 (1979):9–22.

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of some more fundamental political arguments. In fact, what makes abortion worthy of so much political debate is its deliberate connection by issue groups to political principles. For its supporters, legalized abortion means freedom for women to control their own reproduction and thus their lives. It is thereby inextricably connected to the women's movement's goal of equality between the sexes. Making this connection, Planned Parenthood, in a letter to members, affirmed its view that "no woman, black or white, rich or poor, can ever be truly free without the right to personal control over her reproductive life."[12] The National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) has tried to argue the pro-abortion position as narrowly as possible, primarily expressing the opinion that women should be able to choose whether or not to have an abortion. But the language in which they make that argument is part of the liberal discourse. In appeals to members and supporters NARAL has tied the pro-choice position to other liberal causes, not just to women's equality, but also to "equal rights for black Americans" and to traditional liberal concerns for the "less fortunate" and for "minorities."

The opponents of abortion argue that the procedure is murder, not necessarily because they are pacifists or opponents of capital punishment (although some are) but because, like pro-choice supporters, they give abortion symbolic meaning beyond the act itself. For them, it places in the hands of human beings decisions that are rightfully God's. In addition, they believe that abortion poses a threat to the traditional role of women and thus to the stability of families, causing an increase in venereal disease, sex crimes, homosexuality, pre-marital sex, drug and alcohol abuse, and atheism. Developing the link to atheism, the *Moral Majority Report* called Planned Parenthood, which it sees as an "abortion referral agency," its "major enemy" and castigated Planned Parenthood for its "hedonistic approach to sex, its immoral approach to life, its belief that there's no God and that there's just this one life and no life after death."[13]

Given the language in which the abortion debate has been couched, it seems clear that even if Senator Clark had not been opposed by "nearly every New Right political action committee and New Right Citizen's organization," he would have lost the election. Simply by supporting legalized abortion, he indicated support for the women's movement and all that the movement implies about equality between the sexes. He simultaneously demonstrated "softness" on changing sexual and social and religious mores. In other words, his position on abortion showed his liberal politics.

It would be a mistake to disparage the connections that issue groups explicitly and implicitly make between the abortion issue and wider questions by labeling

[12] This and other direct quotes from various issue organizations are all taken from several hundred mass mailings collected by the author from late 1981 through early 1983. In those few instances when more precise citations can be given, they will be, but by and large these appeals are neither dated nor are the envelopes postmarked.

[13] Haven Bradford Gow, "Planned Parenthood: major enemy, says pro-life activist Scheidler," *Moral Majority Report* 3 (1982):7.

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the links mere political tactics to gain supporters. The organized proponents and opponents of legalized abortion genuinely conceive of the issue as an inclusive one, and each side fears that a victory by the other on the narrow issue of abortion will condone significant, undesirable changes in the fabric of American life, not merely affect the laws concerning abortion itself.

The wider issues in the public abortion debate are the fundamental tensions that have distinguished conservatism from liberalism in America since its founding. In general, American political opinion clusters so closely to the political center that it can convincingly be argued that liberalism versus conservatism is, as Theodore J. Lowi commented, an "empty debate."[14] However, these opposing political positions are rooted in different ideologies, and from time to time there arises renewed emphasis on one position or the other by significant numbers of citizens. In the 1960s, liberals were challenged to take seriously the principles of liberalism and move to the left. By the 1980s, liberalism has been tamed, and it is conservatives who have been exploring their philosophical roots.

Conservative principles celebrate stability, constancy, and beliefs that the goal of community can best be achieved by encouraging individualism, that social hierarchies are natural and desirable, and that ordinary people cannot be the source of ultimate wisdom and knowledge. Liberal postulates mirror these—beliefs in change, communitarianism, egalitarianism, and humanism. Such abstractions have many possible interpretations. Thus, the actual preferences and practices of an individual citizen seldom reflect the clear dichotomies this framework implies. Nevertheless, these are the roots of liberalism and conservatism, and political issues are precisely those questions on which these differing principles can be brought to bear. On the question of abortion, liberals are likely to support legalization because they see it as one means to free women from a subordinate social position. Conservatives, especially the neoconservatives who are part of the New Right, are likely to oppose it because it seems to give inordinate power to human beings to make decisions they regard as belonging to God. While the response of some individual women and men to the abortion question may be entirely pragmatic, may have nothing to do with political ideology, and may even be theoretically "inconsistent" with their positions on other issues, the organizations that grapple with legalized abortion, being run by highly politicized people, take clear and consistent positions on political principles. Moreover, by making abortion a political issue, each organization participates in the rich, historical struggle over which principles should guide American society. In this way, virtually all the presumed single issues are revealed as multiple. Their supporters and opponents link them either straightforwardly or subtly to other issues and thus to the varied convictions supporting liberalism and conservatism.

Take guns, for example. The National Rifle Association (NRA) argues that any law that would control or ban guns would threaten the entire Bill of Rights.[15]

[14] Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 58–68.

[15] David I. Caplan, *Constitutional rights in jeopardy: the push for gun control* (NRA Institute for Legislative Action, Washington, D.C., [n.d.])

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Taking a clearly conservative stance, the NRA requires all prospective members to sign an oath of loyalty to the United States. It sprinkles its by-laws with politically loaded terms like "law and order," "right of self-preservation and defense of family, person and property," "the national defense," and the like. In contrast, the National Coalition to Ban Handguns and Handgun Control, Inc., both avoid direct mention of any political principles. Each says it opposes guns simply because they kill innocent people. But each also devotes a considerable portion of its message to maligning the conservative National Rifle Association. "A small but rich and vociferous group called the NRA," claims Handgun Control, Inc., "misrepresents our Constitution, [has a] callous disregard for the will of the people, . . . 'buys' Congressional support, . . . and dictates legislation in Washington." By taking a stand not only against killing but against a conservative issue group, they thus subtly tie support for gun control and bans on guns to liberalism.

The Equal Rights Amendment issue has been categorized along lines similar to that of abortion. Those favoring it—the National Organization for Women (NOW), the National Women's Political Caucus, the League of Women Voters, and ERAmerica—base their case on the liberal principle of equality. They argue it as narrowly as possible, focusing almost solely on economic equality (thereby coming close to turning themselves into interest groups), but nevertheless employing the principle of equality to justify the ERA. In opposition, the Moral Majority makes a case for the most conservative principles of sexual hierarchies, religious authority, and weak government. The Equal Right Amendment, it says, "equals abortion funding and homosexual/lesbian rights, . . . the drafting of women, . . . [the transfer of] immense new powers from the states to the federal government, . . . the vilest pornography, . . . [and the weakening of] our religious heritage." Similarly, Concerned Women for America opposes the ERA as part of its stand against the National Education Association (NEA). In a letter to supporters, it challenges the NEA (a "far left" organization) for its "anti-religious philosophy (humanism)," its support of "global education which [we believe is] indoctrination into one world government," and its opposition to "scientific creationism and voluntary prayer in the school." The NEA, claims the Concerned Women for America, "is the second most active group in America promoting the ERA. They are, in fact, one of the most effective of all, because NOW is seen by the public as 'far-out feminists' while the NEA is seen as 'middle of the road'. "

"Clean air" is another frequently mentioned single issue. But every one of the twenty-five organizations that make up the National Clean Air Coalition advocates clean air as a multiple issue. Environmental Action, for example, links its support for clean air to occupational safety and health, bottle bills, mass transit, and the Superfund for toxic wastes. The Environmental Defense Fund thinks clean air goes along with the protection of wildlife, energy conservation and control of chemicals. The National Resources Defense Council sees air quality as an aspect of a concern for "the physical well-being of each and every one of us." And virtually every appeal by every environmental group contains a reference to

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industry as the enemy, from the strong Sierra Club position ("Dear Friend, Mobil Oil Company hopes you will throw this letter away. So do Shell Oil, Allied Chemical, Peabody Oil, Georgia-Pacific and an assorted number of mining, agribusiness and developmental companies") to more toned-down remarks by the Friends of the Earth or the Wilderness Society. So not only is clean air part of a number of other issues, but it is firmly tied to the traditional liberal advocacy of industrial regulation.

The nuclear weapons issue is similarly multiple. According to an article in the *Moral Majority Report*, that organization's support for nuclear armaments is part of the conservative struggle against "the Communist threat" and against "pacifism and situation ethics," and as the article's final statement makes clear, against egalitarianism: "Perhaps the national leadership has given insufficient attention to a basic principle: the traditional bond between the leader and the led, the bond that is welded by faith and trust—beginning at the top."[16] Some opponents of nuclear armaments (for example, Physicians for Social Responsibility and Ground Zero) have tried to make the issue singular by concentrating on the destructive potential of the weapons, but most argue, as do the National Mobilization for Survival and The Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy, that more weapons means not only destruction but reduced social spending. Thus, they connect their position to the liberal conviction that it is the federal government's responsibility to provide social services. In addition, the Union of Concerned Scientists links nuclear war to environmentalism, itself an example of liberalism, by including in appeals to members its opposition to "the sacrifice of our environment as more coal and synthetic fuels pollute the air." California Citizens for a Bilateral Freeze makes sure its supporters see the freeze as a liberal issue by reminding potential donors that the freeze has roots in protests against the Vietnam War. The multiple nature of the anti-nuclear argument is most forthrightly stated by the U.S. Committee Against Nuclear War. It is, they declare, "an economic issue, a social issue, an environmental issue—and more."

The most recent member of the issue politics club, the cause of homosexuality, also entered carrying a liberal banner. This newly politicized issue speaks liberalism, exhorting those who support the tenets of the women's and civil rights movements to consider gay rights a related issue. More specifically, the Gay Rights National Lobby currently lobbies for gay-related revisions of liberal policies such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, immigration law, legal services, and federal funds for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) research.

If issues are multiple in the ways just described, then it is unlikely that politicians will lose votes because of one issue.[17] Evaluating issues in relation to conservative and liberal principles, politicians, just like other people, tend to give them political meaning and to arrange them into categories. Some critics claim to see in this process some kind of conspiracy. One apparently liberal participant

[16] "ERA erupts again, the battle rages," *Moral Majority Report* 4 (1983):4–5.

[17] G. Russell Evans, "Bureaucrats, politicians have nurtured pacifism," *Moral Majority Report* 4 (1983):14.

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in a conference on lobby groups warned that "although many social issue activists sincerely believe that they are engaged in a 'single' cause—to stop the Equal Rights Amendment, retain the Panama Canal, fight gun control, bring prayer back to the classroom, or send homosexuals back to the closet—they are in fact linked, often by Richard Viguerie's computers, to a loose association that might be best described as a new (and still informal) conservative political 'party.' "[18] But unless current assumptions, whether phenomenological or Marxist, about the consistency of political ideology are seriously flawed, few people are being duped.[19] More plausibly, they actively support a variety of issues, and would agree with Iowa State Senator Minnette Doderer: "If you are wrong on one issue you are usually wrong on a lot of issues, and if you're right on one issue, you're right on others."[20]

This is not to suggest that political principles are always harmonious. Indeed, sharp conflicts among principles can make decisions difficult on some issues. Abortion is the current salient sample. However, regardless of the number of hypothetical politicians whose position on abortion flies in the face of their positions on other issues, voters' experiences suggest that only rarely do actual politicians face this conflict. In the majority of cases, politicians apparently manage to categorize abortion so as to avoid conflict, and issue groups that support or oppose candidates on the basis of their stance on abortion escape having to make wrenching decisions. The National Abortion Rights Action League did choose in 1982 to support otherwise conservative John McKernan of Maine for his pro-choice position over John Kerry, a liberal Democrat pro-lifer, and the Gay Rights National Lobby finally backed Gerry Sikorski for his pro-gay position, even though he came out against abortion rights. For the most part, however, politicians, like other politicized citizens, take consistently liberal or conservative positions on issues. To denegrate that consistency as unthinkingly ideo-

[18] Some issues, of course, are presented as apolitical and when this is so, they can be quite as singular as any critic has charged. The International Fund for Animal Welfare, for example, seeks members to oppose the killing of baby seals. Their message merely says that killing baby seals is cruel, so it should be stopped.

[19] David Jessup, "Can political influence be democratized?" in M. J. Malbin, ed., *Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Law* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), 37.

[20] Jorge Larrain, *The Concept of Ideology* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1979); Graham C. Kinloch, *Ideology and Contemporary Sociological Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981). Minette Doderer quoted in Elizabeth Drew, *Senator* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 46. What Doderer overlooked, of course, is that sometimes people from opposing political perspectives agree on issues, although they do so for different reasons. Both feminists and the Moral Majority oppose pornography, for example. And as Laura Lake points out, politically conservative hunters frequently join liberals to support environmental protection. See Laura M. Lake, "The Environmental Mandate: Activists and the Electorate," *Political Science Quarterly* 98 (1983):215–33. In other words, issues are not always linked to the same principles. To take another example, antivivesectionism, a cause advanced in the name of conservatism a generation ago, has recently been reintroduced as a liberal issue. It is now linked to a pro-regulation/environmentalism position through a be-kind-to animals theme.

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logical or as knee-jerk reactions misses the point. Supporters of issues consider issues concrete examples of abstract principles, and they advance them not only as important policies but also as a means to advance a particular vision of society. From this point of view, organizing around issues is a responsible act by people who take political life seriously.

Compromise on Single Issues

Another charge against issue politics is that issue groups refuse to compromise. Sometimes they are even accused of not knowing how to compromise. In either case, they transgress by not understanding that the American governmental system requires give-and-take.

Of course it is specious to argue that any organized collection of people is unfamiliar with the art of compromise. Group action is impossible without it. The leaders who direct and manage issue groups continually compromise over strategy and sometimes over substance. As one example, Jerry Falwell recently announced that the Moral Majority was ready to compromise on the abortion question. "I think," Falwell said, "we all are going to have to be willing to sit down and maybe not get our ideal but put in rape, incest, and the life of the mother."[21] Undoubtedly the change in position came from compromises within the Moral Majority leadership; clearly Falwell means that he will negotiate with Congress. More significantly, most issue groups staunchly claim—at least to an interviewer—that they compromise. A spokeswoman for the National Right to Life Committee readily says: "Within our organization there is a lot of compromise over how to state the issue and what position to take. With Congress we do give-and-take over strategy. We've compromised a great deal legislatively."[22] In the same vein, the field coordinator for the National Clean Air Coalition remarked: "We have shown that we are willing to accept things not necessarily exactly what we want." The field director for the Gay Rights National Lobby said: "We certainly do give-and-take. We'd be stupid to go and demand things. We have to start at a base line and establish relationships, lay misconceptions to rest. We're not here for the short term but the long haul. We know we're not going to win right away."

These claims to compromise are born out by many congressional staffers. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, access to the leadership of issue groups where these compromises are fashioned is patently available to those senators and representatives who champion the issues. Leaders of anti-abortion organizations work closely with Senators Orin Hatch and Jesse Helms, just as, for example, the staff of Gun Control, Inc. discusses its position with Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Peter Rodino, the National Rifle Association consults

[21] Ron Godwin, "Pro-lifers: A needed change in strategy," *Moral Majority Report* 4 (1983):4–5.

[22] This and other quotes from issue organization staff members come from a series of interviews, some in person and some by telephone, by the author during three days in Washington, D.C., in April 1983. The interviews, all unstructured, lasted between fifteen minutes and one hour.

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with Representative Harold Volkmer, and the Clean Air Coalition has a give-and-take relationship with Senator Harold L. Stafford and Representative Henry A. Waxman. As one House staffer put it: "Obviously there are some groups that are friends of yours. You have a long history of working together. These are people you respect. . . . If there is agreement and there is something to be done, then you try to work together to see how it can get done."[23] The time-honored outcome of that "working together," of course, is a bill. Issue groups do not seem to stand as exceptions to the rule that in Washington, lobbyists write most proposed legislation.

So on the level of internal decision-making and strategy, the question is not whether issue groups compromise. It is, more correctly, with whom and over what each compromises. In other words, issue groups may be little different from interest groups as far as compromise is concerned. But compromise is morally complex, and issue groups infrequently present themselves publicly as its practitioners. Some, in fact, even assert privately that they reject it. The director of communications for the National Coalition to Ban Handguns stated flatly: "We don't cooperate at all with anyone in Congress. We're too radical for them. Rodino and Kennedy only want to control handguns. We want to ban them. To us there is no compromise." In a somewhat milder style, a coordinator for the National Rifle Association made the same point: "There are many places we won't compromise; we try to be pretty tough on our stands." Such statements echo the rhetoric common to all issue groups' fund-raising letters, and undoubtedly give rise to the charge that issue groups are inflexible zealots. Few hints of past or future give-and-take occur there. This public presentation of themselves as uncompromising in the face of much actual compromise suggests that the compromise question is more normative than empirical. Should issue groups compromise?

The model for appropriate lobbying behavior that gives rise to the charge that issue groups don't do it right is provided by interest groups. Even if the question of whether interest groups' lobbying styles are themselves appropriate for a democracy is set aside, it is important to remember that interest groups, being private, differ fundamentally from issue groups, which are open to everyone. It is precisely the public nature of issue groups that makes compromise problematical. Being public, issue groups are caught in a contradiction. They cannot compromise or bargain with lawmakers without compromising themselves, that is, without diminishing their integrity with the public.

Several lines of reasoning lead to this conclusion. One line stems from the understanding that issue groups, by at least theoretically representing all members of the "public," represent no one in particular. Not being elected representatives of some identifiable subgroup, they would have no way to take a compromise—should they offer to make one—back to their constituents for ratification. In a sense, organized issue groups, instead of representing people, simply repre-

[23] Like the interviews with issue organizations, informal discussions with about a dozen or so Congressional staffers took place in Washington, D.C. in April 1983.

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sent an idea. This is radically different from representing a collection of people who want material benefits, and far more simple. As a "re-presenter" of an idea, one can only describe it as clearly as possible.[24] The issue lobbyist wants nothing more or less than congressional acceptance of the idea. If a lobbyist's sole job is to describe an idea then there is nothing over which negotiation is possible. A legislator either accepts it or rejects it.

A second line of reasoning stems from the constitutional conception of the citizenry as "outside" the government. The First Amendment, guaranteeing that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people to petition the government for a redress of grievances," makes the people separate from the government and implies that the government does the redressing. This guarantee suggests a one-way conversation between citizens and government, not a bargaining session, and gives citizens and government separate roles. Citizens petition, state their position, and explain their viewpoints. They do not trim down their desires or press for less than they want; they state their positions as forcefully as they can, knowing that the government will inevitably compromise among them. In other words, government has the duty and responsibility to make policy, accommodating the people, after they hear the people's divergent petitions. The fact that the "petitioning" frequently takes the form of an avalanche of resolute letters and postcards, strident confrontations in congressional offices, and emotional rallies and marches only underscores the concept that the people's place is outside the government and outside the deliberative process. This insistence on maintaining a separation between citizens and government serves to strengthen the First Amendment concept of the government as neutral—a concept that interests groups, with their celebration of bargain and compromise, can only undermine.

The third line of reasoning follows from an assumption that "public" equals "majority." An issue group's legitimacy rests on its claim that it represents public opinion. Indeed, virtually every organized issue group describes itself as representing the view held by the majority of the public. Both sides of the abortion debate and the gun debate, the environmentalists, the advocates of nuclear disarmament, the pro- and anti-ERA lobbies, and so on, all warn that their opponents, while dangerously well organized, well financed and powerful, are not "real, down-home regular Americans like you and me," as shown by these samples:

> Yes, the so-called "right-to-lifers" are powerful. Even though polls show that four out of five Americans do not favor ending legalized abortion, this religious-political coalition is going to force its will on all of us. . . .[25]

[24] Hannah Pitkin provides a more extended discussion of the difference between representing people and representing abstractions. She discusses the age-old political debate about whether representatives should reflect the opinion of those who elected them, for example, should mirror a political reality (something that is philosophically similar to "representation" as a portrayal or description), or should be independent decision-makers, acting for, or actually instead of, the represented. See Hannah Pitkin, *Representation* (New York: Atherton Press, 1968).

[25] National Abortion Rights Action League.

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A majority of Americans do not favor abortion on demand. Every "honest poll" proves this.[26]

. . . in-depth public opinion research . . . showed indisputably that the American people strongly support the rights of private firearms ownership.[27]

Public opinion polls continually reaffirm the fact that the vast majority of Americans want handgun control.[28]

. . . we are working and lobbying in Washington against a well-financed army of nuclear "freeze-niks" . . . unless we let the President and Congress know right away that not all Americans want their freedom jeopardized, a handful of hysterical radicals will end up dictating the destiny of our nation.[29]

The Gallup Poll says the majority of Americans agree with us on stopping nuclear buildup and seeking arms limitation agreements. . . .[30]

The claim to represent the majority opinion leads to a conclusion that compromise is inappropriate by the following reasoning—if what an issue group wants is also what everyone else wants and if the majority is supposed to rule, then no creditable issue organization would subvert the democratic system by bargaining away the public's preferences. Thus, again, the only legitimate bargaining can be done by Congress. Congress, unfortunately must compromise, not, as political therorists would argue, because the public's preferences sometimes conflict, but because the Congress is imperfect. In the issue groups' view (as expressed in their fund-raising letters), the legislative branch of government does include many good people. However, some members have been bought by non-public interests, some members are small-minded and bull-headed, some are caught in the snares of log-rolling, and some are gulled into accepting incorrect versions of the public's preferences. So bargaining is necessary, but it cannot and should not be the job of responsible issue groups.

Whether the staff and members of issue groups actually engage in any of the reasoning outlined here is a moot question. Few display much interest in the kinds of theoretical analyses that engage political scientists. The point is that even while social and political intercourse demands compromise, moral rectitude cautions against it. Americans celebrate the values of cooperation, community, and compromise as well as those of ethical certainty, steadfast adherence to principles, and resolution. But in fact, American folk heroes, both real and fictitious, embody the latter values, not the former. Against the Rosa Parkses, Henry Thoreaus and John Waynes, Americans celebrate few Great Compromisers.

The tension between politics that values compromise and politics that esteems principles is manifested in issue groups' demonstrations, rallies, marches,

[26] Letter from Jerry Falwell, 13 March 1983.
[27] NRA Institute for Legislate Action, *Ten myths about gun control*, 1981 pamphlet.
[28] Handgun Control, Inc.
[29] Letter from Jerry Falwell, 5 August 1982.
[30] The Council for a Livable World, April 1982.

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bumper stickers, lapel buttons, door-to-door canvassing, public forums, full-page newspaper ads, and silent vigils. All these activities aim to make what was once the vision of a few become the vision of many. Whatever consensus has been achieved on once-turbulent political questions like woman suffrage, equality for black Americans, and the meaning of the Vietnam War resulted from the actions of issue groups who sought to change public opinion and thus to construct a new context within which compromises would be reached. Being outside the policy process, they employed the only methods they could to do that.

Issues Groups and the Common Good

The final charge against issue groups is that they do not foster the common good. This accusation glosses over the enduring political question of how just societies arrive at the common good. By assuming that current political policies further the public's welfare, not only does it overlook those who have not benefited from those policies, but it ignores time-honored competing proposals about the abiding problem of identifying truly "public" policies. More importantly, it fails to acknowledge that issue groups embody a distinct understanding of how that public good should be determined. In other words, issue politics, far from disregarding the common good, points up flaws in the accepted measures for achieving it and proposes new avenues toward just public policies.

Despite the differing positions issue groups may adopt on particular topics, they are united by an unwillingness to accept pluralism's view of the common good as something only knowable *post hoc*. This unwillingness adds fuel to the allegations by less politically committed people that issue politics is selfish and undemocratic. But the insistence by issue groups on using the moral language of right and wrong, good and bad, instead of the political language of pragmatism, does not necessarily demonstrate undemocratic values. It can instead indicate a divergent vision of democracy. Indeed, although the particular stances advocated by issue groups may uphold either conservative or liberal principles, the forthright and combative style of issue politics reflects neither political ideology's assumptions about how to determine the common good. This point is not well understood by issue groups' critics. Seeing that some of them apparently reject the pluralist language of moral relativism, the critics assume that issue groups have adopted authoritarianism in its place. But instead of a retreat to pre-democratic authoritarianism, issue politics can be seen as an advance toward a more authentic democracy. Even those very conservative organizations that argue against humanism and base their politics on the revealed word of God demonstrate in their actions a solid bedrock of belief in democracy.

The sort of democracy they implicitly advance suggests them as examples, however varied and however flawed, of the participatory democracy envisioned by pluralism's critics. In general, these critics disagree with the pluralist conclusion that a smoothly working democracy and political cohesion depend on a

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large measure of citizen apathy.[31] Similarly, they reject the pluralist definition of the common good as whatever emerges from an open process of bargaining and negotiation among interests.[32] Instead, they argue for a political community that encourages citizens to develop convictions about the common good because men and women with such convictions can be drawn into active and responsible political participation.

For example, Carole Pateman, denying the pluralist assumption that apathy is both inherent and necessary, declared: "We learn to participate by participating." Moreover, she suggested, increased participation "might be effective in diminishing tendencies toward non-democratic attitudes in individuals. If those who come newly to the political arena have been previously 'educated' for it, then their participation will pose no dangers to the stability of the system."[33] In an echo of Jean-Jacques Rosseau, Pateman pointed out that when individuals are encouraged to concern themselves only with their private interests, they rarely develop the ability to think in collective terms. They are always in competition with people, not in cooperation with them. When individuals can participate, then they are "forced" to cultivate an understanding of the "public interest" that includes everybody.

Similarly, Sheldon Wolin argued that "while the liberals often proclaimed the need for rational political policies and objective public judgments, they actually produced a theory which made objective social and political judgments impossible."[34] He proposed that "the task of non-totalitarian society is to temper the excess of pluralism. This means recognizing that the specialized roles assigned the individual or adopted by him, are not a full substitute for citizenship. . . . [and] efforts must be made to restore the political art as that which strives for an integrative form of direction. . . ."[35]

Applied to issue politics, these views suggest that, while possibly the clashing beliefs among issue groups about the common good are indeed irreconciliable, it may be that a society that places a high value on participation in forming and advancing issues would produce a citizenry well able to shoulder the responsibility of deliberating over the common good. Such a society would define good citizenship more broadly than merely obeying the laws and voting. It would praise instead of malign men and women for taking an active part in political issues. This is not to suggest that such participation is easy. As Joseph Tussman

[31] Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 60 (1966):285–95; Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); John Gaventa, *Power and Powerlessness* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980).

[32] Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics," *American Political Science Review* 59 (1965): 39–51.

[33] Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory*, 105.

[34] Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960), 332.

[35] Ibid., 436.

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observed, the art of common deliberation demands "honesty, courage, objectivity, and self-discipline in the presence of passionate commitment."[36] But it is the foundation for genuine democracy.

Today's issue groups' major contribution to the common good is to redefine the context in which public policy is made. They try to politicize that which had been private, to broaden that which had been narrow, and to bring ordinary citizens into that which had been the province of professionals. It is no wonder that some of the professionals become alarmed. Interests, after all, do motivate all people some of the time and some people most of the time. But a democracy loses its claim to legitimacy when involvement by its citizens in political issues is interpreted as a threat to that democracy.

While it would be foolish to understate the dilemmas policymakers face when the nation, as represented by issue groups, is divided on questions such as the place of women, the control of violence, or the proliferation of nuclear armaments, it is a mistake to malign citizen organizations. Their goal is to make the nation more democratic, to entice more people into responsible citizenship, to foster public discussion about the principles that guide us, and to ensure that the compromises that necessarily occur are based on broad understandings of the common good.*

[36] Joseph Tussman, *Obligation and the Body Politic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).

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National-State Party Relations: The Democrats' New Federal Structure

GARY D. WEKKIN

Most students of American political parties agree that transformations undergone by the Democratic party during the 1970s have strengthened the national organization relative to its traditionally independent state and local units. Scholars such as Austin Ranney, William J. Crotty, Jonathan S. Jackson III, Charles H. Longley, and F. Christopher Arterton have produced a convincing literature analyzing the national Democratic party's unprecedented assertion of authority over state presidential delegate selection procedures, and its adoption of a national charter entrenching that authority and initiating organizational build-up at the Democratic National Committee (DNC) level.[1] Most agree with Crotty:

> The party reform movement altered the power distributions within the Democratic party in an even more fundamental way. The historic relationship between the national

[1] See, for example, Austin Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); William J. Crotty, *Decision for the Democrats* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Jonathan S. Jackson III and Robert A. Hitlin, "The Nationalization of the Publishers, 1980), 69–86; and F. Christopher Arterton, "Recent Rule Changes Within the National "National Party Renewal," in Gerald M. Pomper, ed., *Party Renewal in America* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 69–86; and F. Christopher Arterton, "Recent Rule Changes Within the National Democratic Party: Some Present and Future Consequences" (Paper presented at the 1978 meeting of the Social Science History Association, Columbus, O., 3–5 November 1978).

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party and its state and local units was altered, and before reform had run its course, dramatically reversed.[2]

A recent contribution to the literature has concluded that this alteration of the relationship between the national party and its state and local units enjoys broad support among Democratic party elites. Jackson and Robert A. Hitlin, who studied attitudes toward party nationalization among delegates to the 1974 charter convention and 1976 national convention, found positive levels of support for four developments: the holding of midterm national policy conferences; the establishment of a permanent national Judicial Council for adjudicating intra-party disputes; the assertion of national party authority over states' delegate selection procedures; and recognition of the national party's right to impose its rules on state and local party practices. Since a consistent majority of party activists favors these party-nationalizing changes, and since organizational elites have critical roles in determining the structure and direction of any organization, the nationalization of the Democratic party appears to be secure. Jackson and Hitlin concluded that "the Democratic party, after some 150 years of existence, has finally moved from a 'confederation' form of government into a 'federal' governing structure."[3]

Until recently, the power of the national Democratic party over state party units did resemble that of the United States government over the states under the Articles of Confederation—very little or no central power at all. Moreover, the Democrats' 1974 National Charter, which mandated organizational development of the national party and affirmed the supremacy of national party laws (such as delegate selection rules), does recall the United States's adoption of a federal Constitution establishing new national governing machinery and strengthening national power over the states. But Jackson and Hitlin carry their argument no further. High levels of elite support for party nationalization do not tell much about what federal relations will be like within the Democratic party now that the party has moved from a confederal to a federal structure. Will those relations be cordial and cooperative, or will there be much contention and conflict, as there has been over the American federal arrangement, despite similarly high levels of elite federalist support at the time of the nationalization of governing power?

The purpose of this article is to delineate the pattern of post-nationalization federal relations in the Democratic party through an examination of DNC-state party interactions regarding the selection of delegates to the national conventions. In theory, the DNC's authority to impose delegate selection rules has been clearly established. In fact, however, the authority of the DNC and its standardized rules are such recent developments, and the sovereignties and provincialisms of the states are so ingrained, that some federal conflict over delegate selection is unavoidable. Much remains to be worked out by political accommo-

[2] Crotty, *Decision for the Democrats*, 257.

[3] Jackson and Hitlin, "The Nationalization of the Democratic Party," 279–80.

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dation or, if necessary, by confrontation. How compelling is the DNC's charter-given and Supreme Court-backed authority, and how much does the DNC (comprising mostly state party representatives) intend to use it? How will the formerly sovereign state parties (comprised partly of elites who support nationalization) react to this authority?

The analogy of federal relations between the United States and the states since the adoption of the Constitution may provide answers to these questions. Common sense suggests that federal disputes and adjustments are found to occur when a longtime state domain of authority passes under national party jurisdiction; thus, DNC and state party politicians interacting in the new federal structure may take some cues from the nation's federal experience. A review of that experience reveals several historic patterns that resemble post-charter federal interactions within the Democratic party, suggesting six propositions about the conditions under which federal conflict will occur, and the kinds of conflict behavior disputing parties will engage in.

First, if a delegate selection rule clashes with a belief, law, or tradition that is an important tenet of a state's political culture, then a DNC-state party dispute seems likely to occur.[4] Also, if a national delegate selection rule would hurt a state party's institutional interests, then a DNC-state party dispute seems likely to occur. Conversely, however, if a national delegate selection rule does not contravene either state political culture or state party interests, then a state party will probably comply with the rule. In fact, if the DNC does not exercise its legal authority to the fullest and demand strict rule compliance in every respect, it may prevent many federal-state rules disputes from arising (and those that do arise from seriously challenging its authority). When such DNC-state party delegate selection rule disputes do occur, the disputant state and national party organizations usually will try to recruit the support of interested sub-party actors for their respective claims. Finally, when disputant parties solicit the support of interested sub-party actors, the latter will tend to support the point of view (state or national) best suiting their own interests.

Following are six sections in which I will cite historical occurrences suggesting each of the above propositions and will offer multiple examples of recent DNC-state party interactions illustrating each proposition. The data are mostly case evidence gleaned from archival research and interviews of seventy-four party officials concerning eighteen separate interactions between the DNC and the state parties of California, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, and Wisconsin. A more quantitative treatment is not possible; national delegate selection rules are a recent development, and rules disputes are not yet numerous enough for statistical methods to be applied. But there are enough data to point out the present direction, if not the final destination, of the evolving federal structure of the Democratic party.

[4] A rule "dispute" is defined here as any interaction in which a state party refuses to comply with, objects to, or tries to change the content of a DNC delegate selection rule. A dispute may take place during rule-making as well as rule-enforcement.

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The Role of Political Culture in Rules Disputes

The first proposition recalls the history of federal attempts to force Southern states to abandon longstanding policies of institutionalized segregation. Just as those states resisted federal intervention that contravened ingrained Southern racial beliefs and practices, so have some state parties resisted certain national delegate selection rules that contravened state political traditions and ways of selecting delegates. Blending in and working smoothly in the local political culture is essential for the political party, whose fortunes depend on the perceptions and behavior of its electorate. The necessity of reflecting local culture in order to survive and compete explains why the Democratic party is so different from state to state, and why federal-state rules disputes occur.

One rule that has run afoul of tradition is Rule 10A, which required, starting in 1980, that all state parties hold their delegate selection caucuses and primaries within a "13-week window" open from the second Tuesday in March to the second Tuesday in June. Streesing their state's tradition of holding the first presidential primary, New Hampshire Democrats refused to move their primary to a date inside this window in 1980. Testifying before the Winograd Rules Commission, New Hampshire House Minority Leader Chris Spirou (D) likened his state's feeling for the primary to that of a parent for a child, and the struggle between his state party and the DNC to a custody battle. Democratic Mayor Martin Gross of Concord, citing the longevity of the state's tradition of holding the first primary, told the commission: "We aren't exactly Johnny-come-latelys. We virtually started this business. . . . Enact your window and let us stand outside."[5] The Winograd Commission did just that. More recently, New Hampshire lobbied successfully to be exempted from compliance with Rule 10A in 1984. Indeed, the Hunt Rules Commission, which wrote the DNC's 1984 rules, specifically cited "the history of New Hampshire's early primary" in explaining its decision to adopt language exempting that state from compliance with 10A.[6]

Another rule that has contravened cherished state traditions is Rule 2A, which starting in 1976 required state parties to "take all feasible steps to restrict participation in the delegate selection process to Democratic voters only."[7] In 1976 and again in 1980, Wisconsin Democrats refused to comply with 2A, which would have required them to close the state's seventy-five year-old "open" presidential primary. The state party's resistance reflected the Progressive-influenced electorate's favorable orientation toward the open primary format and the freedom of choice and anonymity it afforded them. A 1966 Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory poll of 607 Wisconsin adults found that 82 percent opposed changing from an open to a closed primary format, while only 9 percent

[5] Jack Germond and Jules Witcover, "New Hampshire 'First' Is a Treasured Custom," *Washington Star*, 1 November 1977.

[6] Commission on Presidential Nomination, "Hunt Commission Report," final draft, 5 February 1982, mimeographed.

[7] Report of the Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure, *Democrats All* (Washington, D.C.: Democratic National Committee, 1973), 15.

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favored it. More recently, a 1980 University of Wisconsin Center-Janesville exit poll of 820 primary voters in three mixed urban-rural counties found that 78 percent opposed closing the open presidential primary, while only 12 percent favored closing it.[8] Mirroring this high level of support was the Wisconsin press, whose eight largest dailies ran 63 editorials against closing the primary (and only 5 editorials in favor) during the fifteen months prior to the 1976 primary contest.[9] Such opposition had a chilling effect on Wisconsin Democrats' compliance efforts. In 1976, the state party refused to comply with the requirement that it adopt an alternate (caucus) delegate-selection plan in case closed primary legislation failed. Democrats in the state legislature so opposed such legislation that the Democrat-controlled Assembly (63 of 99 seats) refused to debate a bill on the floor, while the Democrat-controlled Senate (19 of 33 seats) defeated a bill hours after DNC Chairman Robert Strauss had flown in to lobby for its passage. Democratic Governor Patrick Lucey, meeting with his legislative leaders and state party chairman, initiated a suit challenging the DNC's authority to make rules binding on states. Not surprisingly, the DNC Compliance Review Commission (CRC) unanimously voted Wisconsin Democrats guilty of noncompliance, and the DNC Executive Committee then imposed a caucus system of delegate selection on Wisconsin. But Wisconsin Democrats appealed this decision and assembled a coalition of interested sub-party actors that pressured the CRC into granting Wisconsin a last-minute "good faith effort" waiver of Rule 2A that allowed the 1976 open primary to stand. Having successfully defied the DNC and Rule 2A once, Wisconsin Democrats employed the same strategy in 1980, with the same result.[10]

Joining Wisconsin Democrats in resisting this rule in 1980 were the Democratic parties of Idaho and Montana, whose state political cultures disposed them to fight for their own open presidential primaries. Robert H. Blank's 1978 study of Idaho political culture reported that Idahoans have exhibited strong attitudes regarding: support for open primaries; low involvement in party affairs; nonpartisanship; voting independence (ticket-splitting); individualism; and resentment of policies and rules imposed from outside. In other works, Blank has argued that Idaho is part of a wider, mountain subculture, and that the historical setting, development, and resultant political beliefs of Montana are similar to Idaho's.[11] Montanans have been stronger ticket voters and more involved

[8] 1966 data from University of Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory, Project 266 (Winter 1966), Deck 01, question 8, summarized in Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction*, 168. 1980 data are available from the author (the director of the study). For additional survey data on this question, see Kenneth Lamke, "State's Open Primary Backed, 90% to 6%," *Milwaukee Sentinel,* 16 February 1980.

[9] Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, Clippings Files 324.34/Z and 324.346/Z, Madison, Wisconsin.

[10] Gary D. Wekkin, "The Wisconsin Primary and the Democratic National Committee: A State Party Struggles Against National Party Rules" (Ph.D. diss., University of British Columbia, 1980), ch. 6–8.

[11] Robert H. Blank, *Regional Diversity of Political Values* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of

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in party organizations than Idahoans, but they share their neighbors' individualism and preference for open primaries. In 1932, a closed primary bill was enacted by the legislature, but Montana voters rejected it in referendum.[12] As the state Democratic chairman noted: "It's a basic philosophy of Montanans. They think they are very independent, and they don't want to register by party."[13]

Both state parties had complied with Rule 2A in 1976 under special circumstances that did not exist in 1980. In 1976, Idaho's Senator Frank Church had run for president. Idaho Democrats, who could not get closed primary legislation enacted, had willingly adopted a caucus system because they knew Senator Church would run well in both primary and caucuses. They could thereby ensure that the composition of the Idaho delegation would reflect the will of the primary electorate. Montana Democrats, who also could not get a closed primary bill passed in 1976, were preparing to sue the DNC in order to keep their open primary when the CRC granted the state party a Rule 20 "good faith effort" exemption to Rule 2A. In 1980, however, Church did not run for president, and the new DNC rules stated that no exemptions from Rule 2A would be granted. Consequently, as Idaho state Chairman Wayne Fuller noted, Idaho Democrats "did everything we could not to comply with 2A, except file a lawsuit."[14] They feared voter and press reprisals if Idaho delegates did not reflect the outcome of the primary. Only lack of time and money forced the Idaho party to forego a lawsuit in favor of using caucuses again. Meanwhile, Montana Democrats lobbied the Winograd Commission against 2A, submitted a state delegate selection plan based on an open primary and refused to amend it, filed suit against the DNC, and ultimately pressured the DNC in the same way Wisconsin had done, with the same successful result.[15]

Michigan Democrats, on the other hand, willingly complied with Rule 2A in both 1976 and 1980. But historians have noted that Michigan Progressivism, at its peak not so strong as in Wisconsin, was rolled back by a reactionary backlash during the Prohibition era, when bootleggers became politically powerful in Detroit and elsewhere along the Canadian border.[16] Moreover, no presidential primary of any kind had been held in Michigan between 1928 and 1972, so that voters had not much time to develop attachments to their open presidential primary before the DNC outlawed it for 1976. Indeed, opposition to the new

America, 1978). See also idem., "Regional Diversity: Idaho and the Mountain States," *Ethnicity* 5 (1978):60–75.

[12] Michael Meloy (Montana Democratic party counsel), telephone interview with author, 13 May 1981.

[13] Sally Jordan (Montana Democratic chairwoman), telephone interview with author, 27 May 1982.

[14] Wayne F. Fuller (Idaho Democratic chairman), telephone interview with author, 26 May 1982.

[15] Meloy, interview; and Jordan, interview.

[16] Willis F. Dunbar, *Michigan: History of the Wolverine State*, George S. May, reviser (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1980), 515; and F. Clever Bald, *Michigan in Four Centuries* (New York: Harper Bros., 1961), 336–85.

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primary was actually strong at the grass roots level, where some taxpayers and many town, county, and municipal officials did not want to finance and administer another election.[17] In short, Michigan's political culture was not as favorable toward the open primary format as those of the other open primary states. This situation made it easier for Michigan Democrats to comply with the DNC rules than Democrats in Wisconsin, Idaho, and Montana, who faced a dilemma best summed up by South Carolina's party chairman:

> Now a state party puts itself in one hell of a difficult political situation when it pays attention to party rules and not the state law. . . . If you want to run in a bad atmosphere, you run where your party has apparently with deliberate intent ignored or violated a state law in order to adhere to a party rule.[18]

Rules and State Parties Organizational Interests

Other party interests quite divorced from culture may compel state parties to dispute a national rule. State parties are also likely to contest national rules adversely affecting their institutional interests, just as state officials have resented "pass-through" federal aids to city government categorical grants with strings attached, and other federal infringements on state authority and interests. For instance, a second reason that New Hampshire Democrats refused compliance with Rule 10A in 1980 and 1984 was that they had no wish to lose any of the media attention and campaign spending traditionally focused on their state by holding their primary on a shared date inside the "window."[19]

Also resisting 10A and winning in both 1980 and 1984 were the Iowa Democrats, whose resolve to resist stemmed from their interest in the national attention focused on their early delegate selection caucuses, and in the party-building benefits of those caucuses, which experienced quantum leaps in attendance after they first came to national attention in 1976. The Hunt Commission cited these party-building benefits in explaining its decision to let Iowa join New Hampshire in holding its delegate selection contest just ahead of the "window" in 1984.[20]

Not receiving such an exemption for 1984 were the Massachusetts Democrats, who had successfully resisted Winograd Commission and CRC attempts to force their primary inside the window in 1980. Two organizational interests galvanized 1980 resistance: Massachusetts's usual position as the first large in-

[17] House Legislative Analysis Section (HLAS), Analysis-HB 4392 (6-4-79), HLAS files, Lansing, Michigan; editorial, "Fund It or Dump It," *Lansing State Journal*, 15 February 1976; John Nehman, "Presidential Primary Has New Foes," *Detroit News*, 23 January 1980; and Hugh McDiarmid, "Judge Rules Against Primary," *Detroit Free Press*, 11 April 1980.

[18] Donald Fowler, quoted in Charles Longley, "Party Nationalization in America," in *Paths to Political Reform*, William J. Crotty, ed., (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1980), 179.

[19] Adam Clymer, "Democrats Propose to Speed Primaries," *New York Times*, 12 September 1977; and Jack Germond and Jules Witcover, "Iowa and New Hampshire Again Lead the Way," *Washington Star*, 15 August 1979.

[20] Commission on Presidential Nomination, "Hunt Commission Report," 20.

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dustrial state primary; and the state party's determination to help Senator Edward Kennedy's candidacy by holding its primary before the first Tuesday in March. This was the date on which the Democrats of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida had slated their primaries in order to deliver a momentum-building triple victory for President Jimmy Carter.[21]

In 1972, Illinois Democrats found Rules A-1, C-5, and C-6 (requiring affirmative action and banning closed meetings and endorsements of "official" slates) inimical to certain organizational imperatives. They disregarded these rules in the selection of delegates from eight Chicago congressional districts. Slate-making on the basis of party loyalty, work, and position (rather than on demographic characteristics) was essential to the well being of the Chicago Democratic organization in terms of maintaining party unity, providing incentives for those who do its work, and keeping those who comprise the party leadership in control of party affairs. Consequently, Mayor Richard Daley and other Cook County party leaders drew up a slate of delegate-candidates in a closed meeting, endorsed it as "official," and used the party machinery to elect that slate in the 1972 Illinois primary. They fought (unsuccessfully) for three years in the courts to get the DNC to accept those delegates and to recognize Illinois Democrats' rights to determine their own selection methods.[22]

Many state parties interested in maximizing their influence at the national convention resisted Rule 11 of 1976, which required that the "winner-take-all" method of delegate apportionment be replaced by a method "fairly reflecting the strength of each candidate's support *at all stages* of the delegate selection process."[23] New York Democrats submitted a delegate selection plan to the CRC that apportioned congressional district delegates in accordance with Rule 11, but that apportioned the state's sizeable at-large delegation on a winner-take-all basis. This plan was an attempt to retain some of the state's traditional influence at the convention, where the size of its delegation had given it great bargaining power during the days of "winner-take-all" apportionment and "unit-rule" voting discipline.[24] Democrats in New York and several other states, such as Texas, Alabama, Pennsylvania, and Georgia, have also violated the spirit, though not the letter, of Rule 11 through the use of "loophole primaries," in which presidential preference totals do not determine apportionment because voters also directly elect the delegates. With careful slate-making, this format could be used to produce a winner-take-all effect, since voters tend to vote for better known delegate-candidates, regardless of presidential preference.[25]

[21] Jerome Mileur, "Massachusetts Delegate Selection," *Comparative State Politics Newsletter* 1 (1980): 18; "New Hampshire Still Is First Vote," *Wisconsin State Journal*, 10 August 1979; and "South Plans Joint Primaries," *Detroit News*, 5 August 1979.

[22] William J. Crotty, "Anatomy of a Challenge," in R. L. Peabody, ed., *Cases In American Politics* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), 111–58.

[23] Commission on Delegate Selection, *Democrats All*, 18.

[24] Mary A. Scheckelhoff (DNC staff), telephone interview with author, 12 January 1978.

[25] Commission on Presidential Nomination and Party Structure, *Openness, Participation and Party-Building* (Washington, D.C.: Democratic National Committee, 1978), 89–91; and *Congressional Weekly Report* 33 (12 August 1975), 1812.

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State Party Compliance when Political Culture and Interests Permit

Of course, not every federal government initiative has become a states' rights issue. Cooperation is more commonplace than conflict in federal relations, with each level sharing policymaking, funding, implementing, and oversight responsibilities. Moreover, few of the disputes that do occur find all states on the same side against Washington. Most find states on both sides, depending on whether they consider themselves injured. Northern states sided with the federal government in demanding that Southern states end segregation; but they too questioned federal authority when busing later was used to integrate northern schools.

The same patterns appear in federal intra-party relations; cooperation is more common than conflict, and no dispute finds all state parties on the same side. In general, state party compliance behavior bears out Jackson's and Hitlin's finding of wide support for national party authority. All state parties comply with most DNC rules. Certainly all of the disputant state parties cited in this article willingly complied with all but one or two clauses of the twenty DNC rules (which contain more than sixty clauses). Sometimes state parties even comply with rules that are anathema to them. Southern state parties have complied, however reluctantly, with affirmative action requirements since 1968. Idaho Democrats do not like Rule 2A; yet they offered no resistance to it in 1976, when Frank Church's candidacy reduced the probability of discrepancy between open primary and closed caucus results. Indeed, state parties that dislike a rule nevertheless usually make some attempt to comply with it, if only to strengthen their claim for a Rule 20 "good faith effort" exemption, such as that Montana Democrats received for their 1976 efforts.

Most state parties not only comply with the rules, but adopt stances in favor of DNC authority. They tend to reprove non-compliant states, at least until their own domains are affected. Wisconsin Democrats, as DNC Chairman Robert Strauss was fond of pointing out, were foremost in condemning the Texas and Mississippi delegations in 1968, and the Cook County delegation in 1972; they then discovered "states' rights" when Rule 2A was adopted. Other states subsequently had no more sympathy for the Wisconsin Democrats than the latter had had for Texas, Mississippi, and Illinois. In 1979, Wisconsin Democrats could not even find a DNC member from another state willing to cosponsor a DNC resolution giving them until 1984 to "close" their open primary.[26]

Among those most critical of Wisconsin were the Michigan Democrats, who themselves had complied with Rule 2A in both 1976 and 1980. Michigan Democrats were not as constrained by their state political culture, and therefore could and did take strong steps in 1976 to enact legislation closing their primary.[27]

[26] Stuart Levitan, "Dems' Plea on Primary Fails," *Madison Press Connection*, 31 May 1979.

[27] See Gary D. Wekkin, "Delegate Selection Rules Disputes: Toward an Understanding of Federal-State Party Relations" (Paper delivered at 1982 meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, San Antonio, Tex., 18 March 1982).

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However, the open presidential primary adopted in 1971 also had its supporters, including Republican Governor William Milliken and such influential newspapers as the *Detroit Free Press* and *Detroit News*.[28] Consequently, the efforts of the state Democrats to enact compliance legislation encountered much public criticism, and failed to pass. But the state party easily qualified for a Rule 20 exemption enabling them to choose delegates by open primary. Having endured much to earn this exemption, Michigan Democrats were angered when the Wisconsin Democrats coerced the CRC into granting them a similar exemption, despite their bad compliance record. Michigan Democrats actually lobbied the CRC against an exemption for Wisconsin. They subsequently protested the CRC decision exempting Wisconsin to the 1976 Credentials Committee and threatened for a time to challenge the Wisconsin delegation on the national convention floor.[29]

No one was surprised when the commission writing the DNC's 1980 rules, chaired by Michigan State Chairman Morley Winograd, added a new clause forbidding Rule 20 exemptions from compliance with Rule 2A. In part, this new clause, Rule 2B, was aimed at Wisconsin. But Michigan Democrats also had benefited from the Rule 20 loophole in 1976. Winograd's zeal for a rule that would hinder his own state party led many to speculate that the main target of 2B was Michigan's own open primary, which many Michigan Democrats had opposed adopting back in 1971. Indeed, when Michigan Democrats introduced closed primary legislation at the start of 1979, they warned that if such legislation was not adopted by October 1, Rule 2B and the press of time needed to set up an alternate (a caucus or convention) system would force the state party to switch, irrevocably, to such an alternate system. When October 1 arrived, bills closing or repealing the primary had passed in each house and had gone to a conference committee for adjustment. But the state party announced that it henceforth was committed to choosing its 1980 delegates by caucus, regardless of whether conference committee attempts succeeded. The CRC offered to accept a closed primary plan after October 1, but the Michigan party refused the offer. Three months later, in January 1980, Michigan Democrats again stood by their caucus plan, when the DNC chairman capitulated to pressure to exempt Wisconsin's primary, and offered to let Michigan and Montana Democrats choose delegates by open primary as well.[30]

[28] See, for example, editorial, "Voters Should Have Choice in Presidential Nomination," *Detroit Free Press*, 9 April 1975; editorial, "An Open or Closed System?" *Detroit News*, 17 April 1975; editorial, "State Primary Sabotaged, and Voters Are the Losers," *Saginaw News*, 6 January 1980.

[29] Morley A. Winograd to Robert F. Wagner, quoted in transcript, Compliance Review Commission meeting, 5 March 1976, 125–31, DNC files, Washington, D.C.; Memorandum by Winograd to Senator Alan Cranston, 23 April 1976, Michigan Democratic Party files, Lansing, Mich.; and John P. Hunter, "Lucey Scoffs at Rumor of Delegate Fight," *Capital Times* (Madison, Wisc.), 12 July 1976.

[30] Susan T. Martin, "Presidential Rift May End in Compromise," *Detroit News*, 5 October 1979; Martin, "Democrats Give Up Hope on Primary," *Detroit News*, 1 October 1979; Hugh McDiarmid, "Caucus Replaces Primary for Dems," *Detroit Free Press*, 2 October 1979; editorial, "Primary: It Still Can Be Saved, if House Democrats Want It to Be," *Detroit Free Press*, 4 October 1979; editorial,

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As the experience of Michigan and Rule 2B suggests, sometimes state parties not only comply with the DNC rules, but actually welcome them, or even attempt to get the DNC to tailor the rules to their needs. Michigan party leaders wanted no primary at all, but they needed to "finesse" the primary out of existence because some Michigan newspapers and voters favored an open primary. Rule 2A, which most assume was adopted to prevent recurrence of crossover voting abuses such as those that took place in the 1972 Wisconsin and Michigan primaries won by George McGovern and George Wallace, respectively, was in fact much desired and lobbied for by Texas Democrats, who wanted the DNC to mandate (and take the political blame for) a rule that would keep Texas Republicans out of their primary.[31] One might label this kind of collusion between state and national party a form of "picket-fence federalism."[32]

DNC Flexibility to Minimize Conflict and Preserve Authority

Historical experience has shown that in a federal system, central authority may be squandered or may provoke resistance if applied too frequently or too harshly. It is best used judiciously in carefully chosen spots, allowing opportunity for voluntary compliance by the many who usually readily accept authority. Such wisdom informed the federal government's approach to school desegregation following *Brown* v. *Board of Education* (1954).

The DNC and its rule-making and rule-enforcement bodies (the McGovern-Fraser, Mikulski, Winograd, Hunt, and Compliance Review Commissions) appeared to share this philosophy, and to have governed their behavior by it. They have asserted and carried forward their charter-given authority; but they also have tried to accommodate state parties' needs, and on occasion even have retreated somewhat, in the interest of preserving that authority.

During the making of rules, DNC rules commissions have either diluted or added loophole clauses to rules that appeared certain of being disregarded (not merely disputed) by one or more state parties. At the insistence of countless state party "regulars," the Mikulski Commission (1976) dropped affirmative action quotas in favor of requiring state party affirmative action plans that, when subsequently approved by the CRC, made a state party almost invulnerable to challenge on discrimination grounds.[33] The Winograd (1980) and Hunt (1984)

"Primary: Democratic Pros Are Getting Their Way in Killing Presidential Vote," *Detroit Free Press*, 7 January 1980; Peter G. Kelly to *Detroit Free Press*, 19 October 1979; and John C. White to *Detroit Free Press*, 4 February 1980, DNC files.

[31] Kenneth A. Bode, interview with author, Washington, D.C., 17 August 1977; and Memorandum by Barbara A. Mikulski on Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure meeting in Denver, Colo., 3 August 1973, DNC files.

[32] The term was invented by Deil Wright. See his *Understanding Intergovernmental Relations* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury, 1978), 61–63.

[33] Personal notes from author's employment as Wisconsin Democratic Party affirmative action/delegate selection coordinator, Madison, Wisc., 1975–76.

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Commissions both had to add language to Rule 10A allowing some states to hold their traditionally early delegate selection contests outside the thirteen-week window. As one participant in both commissions put it: "It became clear to many as New Hampshire and Iowa mounted their lobbying campaigns, that there would be a New Hampshire primary and an early caucus in Iowa regardless of what the . . . Commission did."[34] The Mikulski Commission had done the same to Rule 11 (1976), in order to appease state parties accustomed to having much influence under the "unit-rule" and "winner-take-all" systems. The "loophole primaries" used by New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Georgia in 1976 were permitted in Rule 11's last clause, which read:

> In such primaries where votes are also cast for individual delegate candidates, the votes for such . . . shall constitute a fair reflection of the division of preference, provided that such delegates shall be elected from districts no larger than a congressional district.[35]

The Winograd Commission abolished these loophole primaries in 1980. But the Hunt Commission, under pressure from likely presidential candidates and the "loophole preferring" Democrats of New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, has revised the rule to allow state parties a choice of apportioning their 1984 delegates according to the fair reflection (proportional apportionment) standard, or on a "winner-take-*more*" basis, or by using loophole primaries again.[36]

Finally, of course, the DNC's rules for 1976, 1980, and 1984 all contained a catch-all loophole known as Rule 20, which exempts state parties from compliance with any rule that conflicts with state law, provided that "provable positive steps to achieve legislative changes to bring the state law into compliance with . . . these rules" have been taken by the state party.[37] The intent of this rule was to provide a loophole for state parties prevented from complying by a Republican legislature or governor (such as Michigan's Governor Milliken in 1976). Effectively, however, Rule 20 has functioned as an escape hatch for the DNC during exceptional cases when a state party has refused to comply with a rule, and is locked in an escalating confrontation with the DNC. The most notable such case was the last-minute exemption from 2A that Wisconsin extracted from the CRC in 1976.

During the enforcement of rules, as the above exemptions suggest, the DNC has not made a policy of demanding strict compliance in all regards, in the interest of moderating conflict with the state parties. In 1974, DNC Chairman Strauss effected the dismissal of a challenge to Mayor Daley's Cook County del-

[34] Elaine Kamarck, "What Next? A Look at Changes in the Presidential Nomination Process Passed by the Hunt Commission" (Paper delivered at the 1982 meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, San Antonio, Tex., 19 March 1982), 17.

[35] Commission on Delegate Selection, *Democrats All*, 18.

[36] Commission on Presidential Nomination, "Hunt Commission Report," 22–23; and David E. Price (Hunt Commission staff director), telephone interview with author, 8 June 1982.

[37] See, for example, Commission on Delegate Selection, *Democrats All*, 24; Commission on Presidential Nomination, "Hunt Commission Report," 32.

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egation to the Charter Convention, despite continued clear evidence of slating and affirmative action violations.[38] Longley's study of the CRC's voting behavior in 1975–76 reported that on votes determining states' rule-compliance status, a bloc of five party "regulars" voted 94 percent of the time in favor of "flexible" rather than "strict" application of the rules, and usually succeeded in getting 65 to 75 percent of the CRC's twenty-five members to vote with them. As a result, only two states' draft delegate selection plans and only one state's final delegate selection plan were ruled non-compliant. Longley noted: "Typically, the CRC found a proposed plan to be in technical non-compliance, a sympathetic posture that perpetuated national authority without prompting wholesale intraparty conflict. That state parties largely avoided initial determinations of non-compliance suggests that they, too, sought compliance rather than confrontation."[39] A similar study of the 1980 CRC's posture toward the states has not yet been done. However, DNC staff sources say that the strict-constructionist, "party-reformer" bloc that Longley found on the 1976 CRC did not exist on the Carter-dominated 1980 CRC, even though the 1980 CRC found thirty-two states' draft delegate selection plans to be non-compliant, and forty-seven to be technically non-compliant.[40]

Interested Actors Sought as Coalition Partners in Disputes

DNC-state party conflict behavior during delegate selection disputes recalls the agency-clientele collaboration often employed during federal-state administrative disputes. For example, Title IX disputes between state university athletic administrators and federal education and civil rights bureaucrats have seen the former seek the support of alumni groups and collegiate athletic associations, while the latter have sought the backing of women's and equal rights groups.

There are times when delegate selection disputes cannot be prevented or dissipated by accommodation, and the DNC must stand up to a state party if the authority of its rules is to be preserved. During such confrontations, it is common for the disputant party organizations to seek to enlist the support of interested sub-party actors (such as presidential campaigns, policy factions, other state parties, and traditional Democratic constituent groups such as the Committee on Political Education [COPE], Americans for Democratic Action [ADA], and the Black Caucus) for their respective positions.

[38] Crotty, "Anatomy of a Challenge," 155–56.

[39] Charles H. Longley, "Party Reform and Party Organization: The Compliance Review Commission of the Democratic Party" (Paper presented at the 1977 meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association, Mt. Pocono, Pa., 10–12 November 1977).

[40] Elaine Kamarck, interview with author at Carter-Mondale headquarters, Washington, D.C., 29 August 1980; Muriel Murray, interview with author at DNC offices, Washington, D.C., 29 August 1980; and CRC Preliminary Report to the Credentials Committee, "History of Compliance, Delegate Selection Plans, 1980," mimeographed, DNC files.

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Iowa, New Hampshire, and Rule 10A

In 1977, New Hampshire Democrats induced the Carter White House to shift its stance overnight from support of the proposed thirteen-week window rule (Rule 10A) to sponsorship of language exempting New Hampshire's primary from the rule on the condition that New Hampshire Democrats "made a serious effort to delay the primary date."[41] They made it clear to the White House that New Hampshire would flout Rule 10A—and thus undercut the authority of the 1980 rules, several of which President Carter's representatives on the Winograd Commission had taken pains to stack in his favor. The exemption for New Hampshire was strongly opposed by a number of candidates and other interests who had come to grief there, including Congressman Morris Udall, who authored legislation clustering primaries and even flew to Detroit to testify in favor of 10A at a Winograd Commission hearing. But the backing of the White House, which had packed the commission so that about half were Carter supporters, pushed the exemption through.

Although the commission intended to deny similar exemptions for the Massachusetts primary and Iowa caucuses on the grounds that Massachusetts Democrats controlled their state government and Iowa Democrats determined their caucus dates by party rules, it was impossible to deny them after the proposal of special treatment for New Hampshire. Iowa Democrats exerted influence through the Carter White House, and Massachusetts Democrats did the same through Senator Kennedy's extensive connections. Eventually, the Winograd Commission was forced to add language to 10A allowing states whose 1976 delegate selection contests had occurred before the second Tuesday in March to hold them again prior to the first date inside the window.

The CRC subsequently exerted pressure on both states to submit delegate selection plans moving their contests inside the window, but relented in Iowa's case after Iowa Democratic Chairman Edward Campbell told White House aide Timothy Craft that his party would defy the rule. Craft then instructed the Carter votes on the CRC to vote to accept Iowa's plan at the commission's August 1979 meeting. That same meeting found Carter's supporters on the CRC opposing and defeating Kennedy's supporters on a similar motion to accept Massachusetts's plans for an early primary, though the latter ultimately prevailed and won an exemption from 10A at a later CRC meeting.[42]

More recently, the state parties of Iowa and New Hampshire have collaborated in lobbying the Hunt Commission to adopt language exempting traditionally early contests from compliance with 10A in 1984. As one Iowa Democratic staffer put it:

> We held hands with New Hampshire and ran together. A deal was cut, in a sense. We

[41] Adam Clymer, "Democrats Propose to Speed Primaries," *New York Times*, 12 September 1977.

[42] John Law (Iowa Democratic executive director), telephone interview with author, 11 June 1982. Also, "Dems Talk of New Vote Rules," *Detroit Free Press*, 11 September 1977; and "New Hampshire Still First Vote," *Wisconsin State Journal*, 10 August 1979.

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> decided the only way either of us could remain outside the window was to join forces. They had some votes they could get, and we had some we could get. Since neither of us might win if we competed for the same votes, we agreed to work together in each other's behalf.[43]

Iowa's role was to recruit the support of likely 1984 candidate Walter Mondale, who controlled about thirteen votes on the Hunt Commission, and who had favored confining all delegate selection contests inside the window. Mondale's spokespersons on the commission reversed their initial stance after Iowa's Edward Campbell convinced Mondale (a personal friend) that his likely victory in neighboring Iowa's caucuses would be more meaningful if those caucuses opened the race than if they were submerged in the pack somewhere inside the window. Mondale also was convinced to support an exemption for the New Hampshire primary, as a possible "no-win" situation for the other leading contender at the time, Edward Kennedy. Kennedy might lose in his neighboring state, as he had in 1980; or he might win by an unimpressive margin. Either could hurt Kennedy if New Hampshire's primary was not buried inside the window. Consequently, Mondale not only instructed his votes on the Hunt Commission to switch to support of Iowa and New Hampshire, but made personal phone calls to other commissioners, such as Colorado's Thomas Cronin, to lobby for exemptions for those two states.[44]

The New Hampshire Democrats, for their part, lobbied eastern interests represented on the Hunt Commission, such as Kennedy, who like Mondale controlled about thirteen votes on the commission, and organized labor, which had fifteen to seventeen votes. According to Thomas Cronin: "Governor Hugh Gallen and New Hampshire commissioner Walter Dunphy lobbied hard to get their early primary protected," and won the support of John Glenn, among others.[45] But Kennedy, who did not want exemptions for Iowa and New Hampshire, remained aloof to protect his standing in those states, while surrogates such as Morris Udall and labor representatives took the DNC's side against exemptions for early contests. Only when it became clear in test votes that Iowa and New Hampshire probably would win even without his support did Kennedy's staff approach Governor Gallen to offer the senator's support.[46]

Wisconsin and 2A: 1976

Another rule that has caused state parties and the DNC to compete for support is Rule 2A, which mandated closed primaries. In 1976, after the CRC found Wisconsin Democrats guilty of non-compliance and the DNC Executive Committee had ordered a caucus system to be installed there, Governor Patrick

[43] Maria Menne (Iowa Democratic party staff), telephone interview with author, 8 June 1982.

[44] Law, interview, 11 June 1982; Thomas E. Cronin to author, 19 April 1982.

[45] Cronin to author, 19 April 1982.

[46] Law, interview, 11 June 1982; Price, interview, 8 June 1982; and Elaine Kamarack, remarks during oral presentation of "What Next?"

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Lucey formed a coalition of interested presidential candidates, liberal labor unions, liberal activists, and states' rights advocates to exert pressure on the CRC in support of Wisconsin's appeal for a Rule 20 exemption from 2A. During the week prior to the 5 March 1976 CRC meeting, Lucey telephoned and lobbied each of the twenty-four CRC members who would vote on the appeal. Lucey administration papers indicate that these personal calls were augmented by the lobbying efforts of the United Auto Workers (UAW) political director, William Dodds; Kennedy aides Paul Kirk and David Burke and Kennedy's friend, Paul Corbin; *The Baron Report* publisher and McGovern aide Alan Baron; and Wisconsin DNC members Michael Bleicher and Midge Miller.[47] CRC sources say that the UAW's Raymond Majerus, the International Machinists' Union's John Heidenreich, the Communications Workers of America's (CWA) Michael Miller, and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees' (AFSCME) Mary Scheckelhoff also backed Wisconsin's appeal because they felt the Wisconsin primary could be an opportunity for liberals uniting behind Morris Udall to stop Jimmy Carter's momentum.[48]

Other lobbying assistance came from the presidential candidates themselves, each of whom Lucey called and asked for help. Those who responded were those who stood to gain from an exemption for Wisconsin's primary: George Wallace, who had finished second in the 1972 Wisconsin primary but who figured to win no delegates in caucuses run by Wisconsin's liberal party activists; and Morris Udall, who had the strongest organization in Wisconsin and badly needed to win a primary after finishing second in Iowa, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. Wallace had not only figured to do better in a primary than under a caucus system, but had been a frequent critic of the rules and their effect on states' rights. He had his CRC voice Drayton Pruitt argue in favor of and vote for Wisconsin's case during the March 5 debate.[49] Udall, who figured to win Wisconsin's caucuses but needed an attention-getting primary win, maintained close contact with Lucey prior to the March 5 meeting, sometimes by personal phone call or visit, and other times by staff through Udall's national campaign director, John Quinn, and Quinn's old law school classmate, Brady Williamson

[47] Lucey had staff-prepared profiles of the CRC's members in hand as he called to lobby each member. These profiles, which contain references to the lobbying role of Dodds and the others, were made available by Governor Lucey's aide, Brady Williamson. Interviews with author at La Follette, Sinykin & Anderson law offices, Madison, Wisc., 13 June 1977 and 9 September 1977.

[48] CRC member Anne Campbell, telephone interview with author, 11 November 1977; CRC member Justin Ostro to author, 29 December 1977; CRC member Donald Fowler, telephone interview with author, 6 December 1977; and Scheckelhoff, interview, 12 January 1978.

[49] A poll of the preference of 100 Wisconsin Democratic leaders found none who supported Wallace, but 14 who expected him to win the primary. Udall was their leading preference, and was favored by most to win the state. See "Democrats See Udall as Winner in Wisconsin, HHH as Nominee," *The Wisconsin Democrat* 2 (January 1976), 13; William Christofferson, "Primary Ruling Hurts Wallace," *Wisconsin State Journal*, 18 December 1975.

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(a Lucey aide).[50] The Udall campaign, in the words of its Wisconsin director, "took every opportunity to make its position known. . . ."[51] As one CRC member put it, the pressure on the CRC was "heavy and intense. There was never any doubt . . . that the Udall people saw Wisconsin as the one battleground where they could win big."[52]

Arrayed in opposition to the Wisconsin Democrats' coalition were the chairman and staff of the DNC, who worked with their own coalition of actors who would be adversely affected if Wisconsin selected its delegates by open primary. Chairman Strauss himself addressed the CRC just prior to Governor Lucey's statement, and warned against letting the politics of the nomination race influence their decision. During the meeting itself, DNC Executive Director Mark Siegel called CRC members out of the meeting to lobby them to hold firm. At the same time, the CRC's own staff and counsel testified that Wisconsin had not made the required "good faith effort."[53]

Helping the DNC exert pressure was the campaign of Senator Henry Jackson, which had ceased operations in Wisconsin when the CRC had ruled Wisconsin non-compliant in December 1975. By 5 March 1976, all of Jackson's campaign funds and time were committed to the New York primary, scheduled for the same day as Wisconsin's.[54] Consequently, Jackson joined Strauss in pressuring Graphic Arts International's Edward Donahue, the CRC member who held the decisive vote. Donahue, who Strauss personally spoke to just before the roll call on the Wisconsin question, had already promised Governor Lucey his vote only if it was needed, because he had a bill coming up the very next week before Senator Jackson's subcommittee.[55] Others who opposed an exemption for Wisconsin were candidate Jimmy Carter, who had no organization in Wisconsin and feared that Udall might gain if the primary counted, and the Michigan Democratic party, which had done far more than Wisconsin to earn its exemption. Carter started to lobby the CRC to hold firm, but stopped when an in-house poll of Wisconsin voters showed him comfortably leading Udall.[56] Michigan Democrats, on the other hand, fought to the end, warning in a letter to DNC officials read aloud at the March 5 meeting that:

If the CRC should now reverse itself completely and accept Wisconsin's efforts and its

[50] Morris K. Udall to author, 25 November 1977; John Quinn, interview with author, Washington, D.C., 19 August 1977; and Williamson, interview, 9 September 1977.

[51] Robert Bedard (Wisconsin Udall campaign director), telephone interview with author, 9 May 1978.

[52] CRC member Alex R. Seith to author, 3 January 1978.

[53] Transcript of the CRC meeting, 5 March 1976; and Mark A. Siegel, interview with author at the White House, 18 August 1977.

[54] R.W. Apple, Jr., "Udall's Hopes as a Progressive Pinned on Wisconsin," *New York Times*, 16 March 1976; Mike Miller, "State Primary Takes on New Meaning," *Capital Times*, 8 March 1976.

[55] Governor Patrick J. Lucey, interview with author at University of Wisconsin Hospitals, Madison, Wisc., 20 February 1978; and Robert S. Strauss to Patrick J. Lucey, 9 March 1976, files of Brady Williamson, Madison, Wisc.

[56] Lucey, interview, 20 February 1978; Siegel, interview, 18 August 1977.

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> primary, your credibility would forever be destroyed in Michigan and in other states that were subjected to equally hostile press criticism. Further, such action would raise serious doubts about the integrity and veracity of the Michigan Democratic leadership. . . . In order to protect our own reputation and the supremacy of the national convention's mandates, [we] would feel compelled to challenge any ruling upholding Wisconsin's primary. . . .[57]

Despite Michigan's and Jackson's support for the DNC's position, the Wisconsin coalition prevailed by one vote: 18 yea (the number needed to reverse a ruling); 5 nay; and 1 abstention. The vote, which saw the CRC's liberal "reformer" bloc vote unanimously for the exemption despite a combined record of voting 82 percent of the time for strict enforcement of the rules was, in the words of one CRC member, "based on candidate preference, pure and simple."[58]

Wisconsin and Rule 2A: 1980

The CRC's surrender in 1976 lent the DNC little credibility with Wisconsin in 1980, despite the addition of Rule 2B forbidding any exemption from 2A. Borrowing Governor Lucey's strategy, new State Chairman Joseph Checota set out in the autumn of 1979 to use the presidential campaigns to pressure the DNC into letting the open primary stand. First, the state party, heretofore a defendant, filed a cross-claim and joined the state of Wisconsin in suing the DNC to save the primary. Then, the party's central committee, after getting the backing of fifty of sixty-four county unit chairpersons and all but four Democratic officeholders, adopted resolutions stating their intention to choose their 1980 delegates through the open primary, and empowering Chairman Checota to ask candidates Carter, Kennedy, and California Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. to "neither seek nor accept delegates from Wisconsin . . . except those selected in accordance with the 1980 Wisconsin presidential preference primary."[59]

Checota wrote each candidate requesting such, and immediately drew a positive response from Governor Brown, who hoped to do well among independent voters in Wisconsin:

> I am proud to support Wisconsin's long tradition of free, independent voting. I pledge to abide by the results of the open primary, and to embrace only those delegates elected therein. I hope the other candidates will do the same.[60]

This well-publicized coup for Wisconsin drew immediate counter-pressure from

[57] Winograd to Wagner, in transcript of CRC meeting, 5 March 1976, 125–31.

[58] CRC reform bloc leader Phyllis Segal, quoted in Longley, "Party Reform," 16.

[59] See Kenneth Lamke, "Checota to Take Fight over Primary to D.C.," *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 6 September 1979; Mike Stamler, "Checota Says 'Voluntary' Dems Shifting," *Capital Times*, 20 September 1979; Democratic Party of Wisconsin press release, 2 November 1979, Democratic Party of Wisconsin (DPW) files, Madison, Wisc.; and Tim Curran, "State Dems Tell Candidates to Obey Open Primary Rules," *Wisconsin State Journal*, 4 November 1979.

[60] Governor Edmund Brown, Jr. to Joseph Checota, 9 November 1979, DPW files. See also Joseph Checota, letters to Brown, President Carter, and Senator Edward Kennedy, 2 November 1979, DPW files.

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DNC Chairman John White. On 15 November 1979, White wrote to all three presidential candidates in response to

> a letter you received from Joseph Checota, state party chair of Wisconsin, dated November 2, 1979. . . .
>
> As Chairman of this party I urge you to support the Rules of the Democratic Party. The Democratic National Committee, under authority given to it by the Charter and by the Convention, has sole responsibility for the passage and implementation of delegate selection rules.
>
> . . . To interfere would be to violate the spirit of the past decade of reform in the Democratic party. I urge you to let the courts and the DNC settle this matter.[61]

Even as White wrote, however, the leaders of Kennedy's Wisconsin campaign were lobbying Kennedy aides to agree to Wisconsin's request. On 12 December 1979, Kennedy wrote to Checota supporting his position and pledging to "vigorously contest the April 1 Wisconsin primary . . . and win every delegate I can."[62]

The only candidate who held out against Wisconsin was President Carter, who hedged but appeared to side with his DNC chairman by telling Checota that his request of support for the open primary "would not be answered in the foreseeable future."[63] Checota responded that the president's refusal to commit himself either way revealed intent to assure two chances to win. He told the press that Carter intended to await the primary returns so that his supporters on the Carter-controlled DNC could either acquiesce to Wisconsin's request or insist that the primary was unsanctioned, and that caucuses must be held. He sent a telegram to Carter stating that:

> Wisconsin Kennedy for President leaders fear you will attempt to replace delegates Senator Kennedy wins in our open primary with delegates you seek and win in caucuses. The Kennedy for President state chairman has publicly promised that Senator Kennedy's commitment to abide by the results of our primary will become unequivocal as soon as you agree not to seek or accept delegates from Wisconsin . . . except those selected in our open primary. . . . Please help us.[64]

But no response came from the White House, and the issue remained in suspense until 19 January 1980, when the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared for the open primary in its verdict on the state's lawsuit against the DNC. Checota immediately petitioned President Carter and the DNC not to appeal the decision, as it would be too late to institute a caucus system by the time the appeal was decided. DNC Chairman White's response was not promising. He said there still was plenty of time, commenting that the dispute was not over, and that the DNC intended to study the decision and would most likely appeal. However, a more positive note was sounded by the Carter Wisconsin campaign director,

[61] John C. White to President Carter, 15 November 1979, DNC files.
[62] Senator Edward M. Kennedy to Joseph Checota, 12 December 1979, DPW files.
[63] Donald Pfarrer, "Carter's Stance on Primary Hit," *Milwaukee Journal*, 11 December 1979.
[64] Joseph Checota, mailgram to President Carter, 13 December 1979, DPW files.

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who said: "We are studying it and probably will have a comment on it by the middle of the week. . . . The decision will be whether to support an open primary or not."[65]

Later that week, "political people at the White House" and Chairman White decided that the DNC should allow Wisconsin's open primary to stand for selection of 1980 delegates, and appeal the Wisconsin court's decision at a later date. White announced this decision to the DNC Executive Committee, which authorized the action despite protests from Michigan Democrats, and despite the fact that such an exemption violated Rule 2B.[66] Wisconsin had twice challenged Rule 2A, and won both times by outmaneuvering the DNC for the support of interested actors.

Idaho, Montana, and Rule 2A: 1980

The Idaho Democratic Party, which had complied with 2A in 1976, tried to replicate Wisconsin's strategy to gain an exemption in 1980. After consulting with Wisconsin leaders, Idaho Democratic Chairman Wayne Fuller wrote to President Carter, Senator Kennedy, and Governor Brown asking them to respect Idaho's wishes and to abide by the results of the state's open primary. Letters were sent to each candidate, with copies going to the CRC and John White. The principal organizers of each candidate's Idaho campaign were recruited to exert pressure on their respective candidates to agree. Brown and Kennedy quickly consented; but President Carter, whose control of the DNC made him the key objective, was swayed by counter pressure from the DNC. The Carter campaign told Idaho, as it had Wisconsin, that it would "consider the request," and delayed responding until lack of time caused Idaho Democrats to decide to abandon the primary and schedule caucuses.[67]

Montana Democrats, who also consulted with Wisconsin, successfully employed the same candidate-pressure strategy to gain an exemption for their open primary. "The major element in our approach," according to Senator John Melcher's aide Evan Barrett, "was to play on the avarice of the candidates."[68] The Montanans avoided public confrontation in favor of meeting informally with the leaders of the candidates' organizations in Montana. Their first step was to meet with the Kennedy organization. Barrett, an influential Montana Democrat, sat down with the chairman of the state Kennedy campaign and

[65] "Possibility of Closed Caucuses Lingers," *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 21 January 1980; Patricia Simms, "Open Primary Upheld," *Wisconsin State Journal*, 20 January 1980; "Democrats Ask Carter to Honor Court Ruling," *Green Bay Press-Gazette*, 21 January 1980.

[66] Kamarck, interview, 29 August 1980; Murray, interview, 29 August 1980; John Kole, "National Democrats Yield, State Keeps Primary in '80," *Milwaukee Journal*, 25 January 1980; Dorothy Bush, minutes of DNC Executive Committee meeting, Washington, D.C., 25 January 1980, mimeographed, DNC files.

[67] Fuller, interview, 26 May 1982; and Wayne F. Fuller to CRC Chairman Peter G. Kelly, 20 December 1979, DNC files.

[68] Evan Barrett, telephone interview with author, 5 June 1982.

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calculated the highest and lowest number of delegates that Kennedy might win in Montana. He convinced the Kennedy man that the difference was not significant enough to hurt his candidate. Once Senator Kennedy publicly came out in favor of the open primary, pressure on the state Carter campaign increased. As Barrett noted: "The Montana party is so small and so unified in its thinking on this issue that any candidate who refused to go along with the state party would be hurt competitively—word travels fast here." Consequently, when White announced to the DNC Executive Committee that the DNC would allow Wisconsin's primary to stand, he added: "The Montana matter is now awaiting a ruling in U.S. District Court in Washington. . . . In the event a ruling is not handed down by the June 3 primary date, it is probable that the DNC will do for Montana what we did for Wisconsin."[69] Like Wisconsin, Montana had outmaneuvered the DNC for candidate support.

Interests and Alignments During Rules Disputes

L. H. Ziegler and G. W. Peak have written that "federalism does not involve a struggle between the nation and the states, but rather a struggle among interests which have favorable access to one of the two levels of government."[70] Those favoring racial segregation have favored the rights of the states, many of which formerly institutionalized segregation, while blacks have favored the power of the national government, which has acted to end segregation.

The new federal structure of the Democratic party has its own set of interest groups, and they have behaved in much the same way. Presidential campaigns, policy factions, state and city party organizations, and party constituencies (such as COPE, ADA, and the Black Caucus) certainly are interested in delegate selection matters, as their inconsistent votes on the seating of the 1972 California and Chicago delegations revealed. Senator McGovern's delegates voted to unseat the Daley-led Chicago delegation (mostly uncommitted) for violations of Rules A-1, C-5, and C-6; yet they voted to seat the California delegation (mostly McGovern delegates) despite the Credentials Committee finding that California's winner-take-all apportionment of delegates had violated voluntary guideline B-6 of the McGovern-Fraser Commission rules. Indeed, prior to the convention, the McGovern campaign, which hoped to obtain Mayor Daley's five Credentials Committee votes on the California seating question, overlooked Daley's own violations long enough to meet with the mayor and his challengers to try to work out a compromise on the seating of the two Chicago delegations. When the attempt at mediation failed, the McGovern campaign unsuccessfully challenged the Credentials Committee's finding against California in

[69] "Montana: John White Statement," undated, mimeographed, DNC files. Also Barrett, interview, 5 June 1982; and Nancy J. Harte (Montana Democratic party staff), telephone interview with author, 26 May 1982.

[70] L.H. Zeigler and G.W. Peak, *Interest Groups in American Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 48.

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federal court before overturning that finding on the convention floor. Voting against McGovern's delegates in these disputes were delegates controlled by his principal opponents, candidates Hubert Humphrey and Henry Jackson, and American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) leaders George Meany and Alexander Barkan, all of whom supported the seating of Daley's delegates and opposed seating California's delegates.[71]

A dispute in which interested policy factions and party constituent groups played critical roles was the 1976 Rule 11 dispute between New York Democrats and the DNC over whether New York's at-large delegation had to fairly reflect the primary results. The September 1975 CRC hearing of this issue pitted the "regular" and "reformer" blocs on the CRC against each other, with intense outside factional pressure on "swing" CRC members, since a winner-take-all at-large delegation would enhance New York's convention influence. The decisive vote on this issue belonged to the mayor of Davenport, Iowa, who was running in a closely contested primary back home and had given her proxy to a member of the "regular" bloc. Needing only one vote to keep New York and the "regular" bloc from winning, the "reformer" bloc and friendly lobbyists monitoring the meeting succeeded in postponing the roll-call vote in the hope of persuading one of the "swing" votes to change. Then pro-reform CWA and AFSCME lobbyists called their contacts in Davenport and asked them to talk to the mayor. After hearing from the local CWA head (also a party officer) and from local members of the Women's Political Caucus, the mayor telephoned the CRC to change her vote to an instructed proxy on the New York question.[72]

In 1979, a DNC-New York dispute over another rule attracted the involvement of the Carter and Kennedy campaigns and other interested groups. This dispute revolved around Rule 17, which read: "But no slate may . . . receive preferential treatment . . . , and all slates must meet identical qualifying requirements for appearing on a ballot. . . ."[73] The question raised was whether New York's proposed delegate selection plan should require an "uncommitted" slate of delegates to gather 10,000 signatures (as it required the candidates' slates to do) before it could be placed on the ballot. The Carter campaign, which viewed the "uncommitted" campaign in New York as a stalking horse for Kennedy, had unsuccessfully lobbied New York's central committee not to adopt this plan. Having failed, the Carter campaign then used the CRC, where they controlled the staff and about half of the votes, to rule New York's delegate selection plan non-compliant with Rule 17. The New York party protested that in 1976 the CRC had decided the same question by holding only the candidates' slates, not the "uncommitted" slates, to this filing requirement. Many CRC members sided with New York, which had the backing of the then-unannounced Kennedy cam-

[71] Crotty, "Anatomy of a Challenge."

[72] Mayor Kathryn Kirschbaum to author, 29 November 1977; and Scheckelhoff, interview, 12 January 1978. Jules Witcover's *Marathon* (New York: Viking Press, 1977), 275, incorrectly associates this pressure on the mayor with the Wisconsin appeal.

[73] Commission on Presidential Nomination, *Openness, Participation and Party-Building*, 55–56.

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paign, several anti-Carter Democrats who hoped to draft someone other than Kennedy, and some DNC and state party officials angered by the White House's partisan use of the CRC, supposedly a quasi-judicial body. The White House, however, defused this coalition by persuading New York Democrats to yield on the filing question in return for other concessions. The filing requirements were declared non-compliant. The CRC's ruling was appealed to the party's Judicial Council, but not by New York Democrats. Morley Winograd, who chaired the 1980 Winograd Commission and was a CRC member, challenged the ruling to protest the partisan use made of the CRC.[74]

Indeed, the rules-conscious campaigns of Jimmy Carter are full of illustrations of the ways in which interests affect alignments in rules disputes. Just prior to the 5 March 1976 CRC meeting at which Wisconsin won an exemption for its primary, Carter switched from lobbying against the Wisconsin Democrats to lobbying for them, because his polls showed him leading Morris Udall in that state. Governor Lucey remarked: "We had Andy Young [Carter's CRC voice] helping us because he figured it would help Carter."[75] Then, prior to 1980, the Carter White House abandoned its position on proposed Rule 10A in favor of an exemption for New Hampshire, which it feared would defy and undermine the DNC rules being stacked in Carter's favor. Indeed, during Winograd Commission deliberations, White House aides got several commissioners to vote with them by using pressure from home state officials. Commissioner Frederick Banks of Mississippi, for example, was pressured to recover his proxy from Kenneth Bode, who opposed the White House on 10A and several other rules.[76] Finally, during the 1980 campaign, the Carter White House switched from support for Rule 2A to support for Wisconsin's and Montana's open primaries. Carter's interests in winning delegates prevailed over a "loophole-free" rule and the interests of the DNC.

Many other presidential campaigns have shown the same tendency to take and then switch stances, as changing interests dictate. Carter's turnabouts were no more abrupt than Mondale's abandonment of support for Rule 10A when Iowa's chairman pointed out that Mondale's 1984 performances in Iowa and New Hampshire would be magnified if those contests were held early. Equally, abrupt was Kennedy's announcement of his support for the Iowa and New Hampshire exemptions after test votes indicated that he could not prevent those exemptions. During the 1976 dispute over Rule 2A, Udall originally sided with the DNC, and told the *La Crosse Tribune* that "he, himself, supports the national party's stand in favor of closed primaries. . . . It is best, said Udall, if Republicans vote only for Republican candidates and Democrats for Demo-

[74] Douglas Kneeland, "Suggested Rule Change Viewed as a Way to Block Kennedy Draft," *New York Times*, 10 August 1979; Peter G. Kelly to New York Democratic Chairman Dominic Baranello, 17 September 1979, DNC files; and Winograd to Judicial Council Chairman James G. O'Hara, 4 October 1979 and 24 December 1979, DNC files,

[75] Lucey, interview, 20 February 1978.

[76] Richard Willing, "Democratic Reform Stirs Party Conflict," *Detroit News*, 16 April 1978.

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cratic candidates."[77] After finishing second in the first three contests, however, Udall saw that his interests lay with the Wisconsin Democrats. In his own words:

> As events were developing in February and March, it became obvious that Wisconsin was our best chance for a primary victory, and it therefore became apparent that it was in our interest to get the CRC to reverse itself. Accordingly, I was urged from time to time [by staff] to make calls, or to sign letters, to key people urging that an exception be made.[78]

Of course, Udall was joined by others in trying to influence the CRC in that case. In the end, the issue of whether Wisconsin merited an exception was swept aside before the pressure of the UAW, CWA, AFSCME, Machinists, Michigan Democrats, states' rights advocates, and of the Udall, Wallace, Jackson, and Carter campaigns. As one CRC member summed up the dynamics of that mid-campaign dispute:

> I guess I have got friends that talk to me about every candidate that is running on the Democratic ticket. And, there are those who have called me regarding, *A* it would be better if we had the primary in Wisconsin; I hear from *B* that the caucuses would be better for me; and *D* says something else. And then we deal with the rules and with the legality.[79]

Conclusion

It has been argued here that the Democratic party's federal relations will grow to resemble U.S. federal relations. Six general propositions have been drawn from U.S. federal experience that appear to describe and explain the conditions under which DNC-state party disputes are likely (and unlikely) to arise, the patterns of conflict behavior that disputants are likely to exhibit when such disputes arise, and the philosophy of limited governance the DNC has adopted to hold federal conflict to a minimum. Each of these propositions has been illustrated by multiple cases of DNC-state party rules conflict or cooperation.

On the basis of these propositions and supporting case studies, I have drawn several conclusions. Obviously, the traditional flow of power upward through the Democratic party structure has been complemented by an opposite, downward flow that transforms the course of power into a two-way street. Several of the DNC-state party interactions described above involved effective downward impulses from the DNC (see interactions 7, 8, 9, and 13 in the key to Figure 1).

Furthermore, several of these DNC-state party interactions recur frequently enough to suggest the existence of clear patterns of dispute behavior by DNC

[77] Jerome Rosso, "Udall Hopeful Primary May Aid His Candidacy," *La Crosse Tribune*, 7 December 1975.

[78] Morris K. Udall to author, 25 November 1977.

[79] Edward Donahue, in transcript of CRC meeting, 5 March 1976, 116.

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bodies, the state parties, and interested sub-party actors. Figure 1 portrays fifteen rules-related interactions observed to have occurred more than once between the same types of actors (for example, several state parties receiving a rule exemption from the CRC, or various presidential campaigns lobbying the Winograd and Hunt Commissions for favorable rules). Indeed, the web-like pattern of recurrent interactions shown in Figure 1 is both regular and complex enough to suggest a resemblance to intergovernmental relations (IGR), which Deil Wright has conceptualized in terms of the following characteristics:

- IGR involves not just federal-state relations, but "all permutations and combinations of relations" among national, state and local governing units. Officials of different governing units engage in recurring patterns of contact and exchange of policy demands, supports, and information.
- IGR therefore is formulated largely in terms of human behavior, as it is "humans cloaked with office" who determine relations between governing units.
- IGR is quintessentially policy-oriented: policy (goal-related rule-making, execution, and adjustment) is generated by interactions among all public officials.
- Authority in policy areas is shared, and subject to negotiation, rather than hierarchically distributed among units at different levels.[80]

The lively intra-party interactions described above involve thirty-one different "permutations of relations" among various units of national, state, and local party organizations, plus various sub-party actors such as elected officials and traditional party electorates. These "permutations" include not only the fifteen recurrent, patterned interactions illustrated in Figure 1, but an additional sixteen unique (non-recurrent) interactions that are excluded from the figure because they do not meet Wright's second criterion of "recurrent patterns of contact." Many of the actors involved in the rules disputes are simply "individuals cloaked with office" (such as DNC chairpersons, state and county chairpersons, CRC members, rules commission chairpersons, governors, union lobbyists, presidential candidates and their aides) who speak for their respective units. Their "combined interactions generate policy" in the form of delegate selection rules whose goal is the selection of presidential candidates who are both electable and representative of party. Finally, as the frequency, outcomes, and interaction patterns of rules disputes suggest, authority over delegate selection tends to be shared, and alternately cooperative or conflictual, between national party and state parties. Clearly, the Democratic party's rule-making, rule-implementation, and rule-adjudication process might best be conceptualized as a kind of intergovernmental relations affecting presidential selection policy.

The Democratic party has indeed undergone federalization—of that there can be no doubt. But it is also clear that the delegate selection disputes highlighted here are not just federal disputes between state and national parties, but also contests between competing interests and between competing ideas of democracy. The former can be seen in the behavior of the presidential cam-

[80] Wright, *Understanding Intergovernmental Relations*, 8–14.

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FIGURE 1

DNC-State Party Rules Interactions as Intergovernmental Relations



Key to Interactions Portrayed in Figure 1

Multiple Interactions

1) Wisconsin Governor Lucey solicits lobbying help of 1976 presidential candidates
1) *New Hampshire Governor Gallen solicits lobbying help to Mondale, Kennedy, Glenn*
2) Udall, Wallace lobby CRC on behalf of 1976 Wisconsin appeal
2) Jackson lobbies CRC against 1976 Wisconsin appeal
2) Carter campaign protests New York's 1980 "uncommitted" slate requirements to CRC

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paigns, labor unions, and other actors. As of the fall of 1983, several interested sub-party actors had already evaluated the impact of the 1984 Hunt Rules on their interests. Some would-be presidential candidates have decided not to run, and specific 1984 rules appear to have been considerations.[81] Most actors do not question that the rules affect their interests, or that the effort to shape their content and influence their application is worthwhile; they play the national party's game.

That rules disputes are also contests between competing philosophies of democracy is apparent in the content of the specific rules that have been the subjects of dispute—affirmative action, fair reflection of participants' voting preference, bans on open primaries and slate-making, and compressing the nomination race. Each state party objection to these rules could be (and usually was) framed in terms of democratic ideals as well as state traditions or party organization in-

[81] Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas has cited the effects of Rule 10A as an important factor in his decision to withdraw. "Bumpers Makes It Official: "He's Out," *Log Cabin Democrat* (Conway, Ark.), 6 April 1983. Perhaps Edward Kennedy also would not have withdrawn, had the critical Iowa and New Hampshire contests been forced to move to shared dates inside the thirteen-week window.

3) Mondale lobbies Hunt Commission on behalf of Iowa and New Hampshire exemptions to Rule 10A
3) Kennedy opposes, then supports, Iowa and New Hampshire exemptions before Hunt Commission
3) Carter White House lobbies Winograd Commission on behalf of New Hampshire exemption to Rule 10A
4) UAW's Dodds lobbies CRC members Donahue and Mikulski for Wisconsin 1976 appeal
4) AFSCME and Machinists' lobbyists pressure CRC for 1976 Wisconsin appeal
4) CWA and AFSCME lobbyists use Davenport contacts to change mayor's CRC proxy
5) New Hampshire and Iowa divide labor in lobbying Hunt Commission for exemption to Rule 10A
5) Montana Democrats consult with Wisconsin Democrats on 1980 candidate pressure strategy
5) Idaho Democrats consult with Wisconsin Democrats on 1980 candidate pressure strategy
5) Wisconsin Democrats unable to get another state to co-sponsor favorable DNC resolution
6) Wisconsin Democratic Chair Checota asks Carter, Kennedy, and Brown to support open primary
6) Idaho Democratic Chair Fuller asks Carter, Kennedy, and Brown to support open primary
6) Iowa Democratic Chair Campbell convinces Mondale to support New Hampshire's and Iowa's exemptions
6) Iowa Democratic Chair Campbell convinces Craft to order Carter CRC votes to support Iowa
7) CRC finds Wisconsin non-compliant in 1976 and recommends caucuses be imposed
7) CRC finds New York slating practices non-compliant and rejects delegate selection plan
7) CRC grants Montana Democrats Rule 20 waiver after 1976 closure legislation fails
7) CRC grants Michigan Democrats Rule 20 waiver after 1976 closure legislation fails
7) Idaho Democrats submit plans willingly to meet CRC standards of compliance with Rule 2A
7) Wisconsin DNC members Bleicher and Miller lobby CRC members for 1976 Wisconsin appeal
8) DNC Chair White asks presidential candidates not to support open primaries
8) DNC Chair Strauss collaborates with Jackson in pressuring Donahue for vote
8) DNC Chair White is ordered by Carter White House to let Wisconsin and Montana keep open primaries
9) DNC Chair White announces Wisconsin, Montana, and Michigan Democrats can use open primary in 1980
9) Michigan Democrats refuse White's offer and stick to caucuses
10) Illinois Democrats appeal 1972 Credentials Committee ruling to national convention
10) Michigan Democrats plan, then withdraw, appeal of 1976 Credentials Committee ruling on Wisconsin appeal to national convention
11) McGovern tries to get Cook County Democratic leaders and reformist challengers to compromise on convention seating
11) McGovern lobbies Cook County Democratic leaders for his Credentials Committee votes on California challenge
12) Wisconsin Democrats sue DNC, 1976
12) Wisconsin Democrats sue DNC, 1980
12) Montana Democrats sue DNC, 1980
12) Illinois Democrats sue DNC, 1972
13) Mikulski Commission writes Rule 2A aimed at ending open primaries in Wisconsin, Michigan, Montana, and Idaho
13) Mikulski Commission writes Rule 11 ending many states' winner-take-all primaries
13) Winograd Commission dumps Rule 11 clause permitting states' loophole primaries
13) Winograd Commission adds Rule 2B to Rule 2A to stop open primaries in Wisconsin, Michigan, Montana, and Idaho
13) Winograd Commission writes Rule 10A and provides loophole for traditionally early state contests
13) Hunt Commission retains Rule 10A and its loophole for traditionally early state contests
14) McGovern campaign lobbies Credentials Committee against 1972 challenge of California delegates
14) Humphrey and Jackson lobby Credentials Committee favoring 1972 challenge of California delegates
15) Carter lobbies New York central committee not to adopt plan favoring "uncommitted" delegates
15) Udall urges Wisconsin Democratic party to comply with Rule 2A, early 1976

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terests. Wisconsin, Idaho, and Montana Democrats argued that closed primaries were incongruous with stated national party goals of openness and participation (classical democracy); the DNC argued, and won Supreme Court assent to, the party's First Amendment right to determine who belongs to its association (revised democracy).[82]

Significantly, these additional aspects of rules disputes suggest that the DNC's assumption of legal authority over the delegate selection process has resulted in some DNC authority not only over state party practices, but also apparently over what notion of democracy will inform the party's inner workings, and over the competitive, delegate-seeking behavior of presidential candidates, policy factions, and party constituencies. This amounts to some increase in *party organization* control over the *party-in-government* and the *party-in-the-electorate* with respect to the nomination and delegate selection functions.[83] It is thus difficult to accept the thesis of "party decline," when in fact the Democratic party structure is nationalizing and developing a complex set of authority relationships in which state party organizations, presidential candidates, party constituencies, and party beliefs all have fallen under the influence of national party rules to some degree.

[82] See Democratic Party of U.S. v. La Follette, 101 S. Ct. 1010 (1981).

[83] V. O. Key and Frank J. Sorauf developed the widely accepted conceptualization of political parties as three distinct entities—the *party organization* (formal, voluntary organization), the *party-in-government* (elected officeholders bearing party label), and the *party-in-the-electorate* (party voters). See Sorauf, *Party Politics in America* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1980), 8-9.

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Government Corporations and Managing the Public's Business

JOHN T. TIERNEY

Among the more conspicuous developments in American public management in the past two decades has been the proliferation of government corporations. The organizational landscape of the federal government is now littered with these and other monuments to an increasingly widespread faith in the advantages of "third sector" organizations.[1] Although a few students of public policy and administration have devoted more attention to government corporations in recent years, relatively little is known about how these organizations are formed, and about how and why they behave the way they do.[2]

[1] Government corporations are also prevalent at the state and local levels in the United States. For the most comprehensive study of American sub-national public authorities, see Annmarie Hauck Walsh, *The Public's Business: The Politics and Practices of Government Corporations* (Cambridge,: MIT Press, 1978). Instructive studies of the politics of specific local authorities include: Dorothy Nelkin, *Jetport: The Boston Airport Controversy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974); and Jameson W. Doig, "Regional Politics and 'Businesslike Efficiency': The Port of New York Authority," in Michael Danielson, ed., *Metropolitan Politics*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), 111-25.

[2] See Amitai Etzioni, "The Third Sector and Domestic Missions," *Public Administration Review* 32 (1973): 314-23; Lloyd D. Musolf and Harold Seidman, "The Blurred Boundaries of Public Administration," *Public Administration Review* 40 (1980): 124-30; Ronald C. Moe, "Government Corporations and the Erosion of Accountability: The Case of the Proposed Energy Security Corporation," *Public Administration Review* 39 (1979):556-71; idem, "Federal Government Corporations: The Quest for a Theory" (Paper presented at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, Colo., 2-5 September 1982); Lloyd Musolf, "Policymakers and the Private-For-Profit Enterprises: Comsat, Fannie Mae, Amtrak, and Conrail" (Paper presented at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, Colo., 2-5 September

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Consequently, there is relatively little to go on in answering even the most obvious questions. Why does the federal government sometimes use the corporate form of organization? What are the supposed advantages of this form of organization? How do these perceived advantages hold up in practice?

If government corporations (or similarly designed government-sponsored enterprises) are to be a permanent and increasingly conspicuous feature in the constellation of federal government organizations, more should be known about what to expect of them. If realistic and informed expectations about these organizations can be established, it may be possible to minimize implementation problems and to avoid gross deviations from intended policy outcomes. In the process, some of the political disquiet that attends dashed public expectations may also be avoided. What follows, then, is a short primer on the politics and performance of U.S. national government corporations. It draws primarily on an examination of the creation and operation of five examples: the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the U.S Postal Service, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), and the Synthetic Fuels Corporation.

The Concept of the Government Corporation

Governments in mixed economies committed to full employment and stable growth employ a variety of instruments for performing the public's business—taxing, spending, regulating, and controlling organizational form (for example, by nationalizing industries or creating government corporations). The interesting question here is why the federal government of the United States has sometimes chosen the government corporation as its strategy of intervention rather than employing some sort of subsidy, tax expenditure, or coercive regulation. The typical answers involve three sorts of problems: risk, where private enterpreneurs do not see sufficient possibility of return on investment (as in the case of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation); scope (typically, large infrastructure investments), where the amount of capital to be raised and the area of activity to be covered are too great (the TVA, for example); and employment-maintenance or service-maintenance, where not only are economic returns not particularly promising, but alternative sources of service or employment are uncertain. This last category would encompass Amtrak, the Postal Service, and the like.

1982). See also National Academy of Public Administration, *Report on Government Corporations*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public Administration, 1981).

The Tennessee Valley Authority has been the subject of several useful analyses, including: Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949); and David Lilienthal, *TVA—Democracy on the March* (New York: Harper and Row, 1953). The reconstituted U.S. Postal Service is examined in John T. Tierney, *Postal Reorganization: Managing the Public's Business* (Boston: Auburn House Publishing Co., 1981). Less useful for present purposes but still worth noting (especially for those interested in rail corporations) is James A. Dunn, Jr., "Railroad Policies in Europe and the United States: The Impact of Ideology, Institutions, and Social Conditions," *Public Policy* 25 (1977):205–40.

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The most common rationale in textbooks and conventional wisdom for the establishment of government corporations is that they provide for the efficient and effective operation of "businesslike" enterprises, either owned or sponsored by the federal government.[3] The general criteria governing the establishment of government corporations were most clearly enunciated by President Harry Truman in his 1948 budget message:

> Experience indicates that the corporate form of organization is peculiarly adapted to the administration of government programs which are predominantly of commercial character—those which are revenue producing, are at least potentially self-sustaining, and involve a large number of business-type transactions with the public. In their business operations, such programs require greater flexibility than the customary type of appropriation budget ordinarily permits. As a rule, the usefulness of a corporation lies in its ability to deal with the public in the manner employed by private enterprise for similar work.[4]

Thus, the corporate form of organization is likely to be adopted in cases where government itself will be managing an economic enterprise (for whatever reason—historical accident, private sector default, high cost or technological barriers to private initiation, protection of "the public interest") and where there is a perceived need to confer on the managers and executives of the enterprise a considerable amount of flexibility or autonomy—not as much as private organizations have, but more than is common for most government agencies.[5] These differences of degree bear elaboration.

Most public administrators operate under a wide variety of constraints, especially compared to private business managers. The managers and executives in a traditional government agency ordinarily cannot unilaterally alter the organization's factors of production—inputs such as personnel, land, buildings, and capital. The various rigidities of the civil service system mean that a government agency has little flexibility in hiring and firing employees. A traditional government agency cannot pay any of its employees more or less than the amount set by Congress. The agency's purchase of goods and services must be

[3] The many businesslike enterprises the federal government has chosen to operate through government corporations include: maintaining balanced and adequate supplies of agricultural commodities and products (Commodity Credit Corporation); providing electric power (Tennessee Valley Authority); maintaining industrial operations in prisons and providing services and manufactured goods for sale to federal agencies (Federal Prison Industries); providing intercity rail passenger service (National Railroad Passenger Corporation, or "Amtrak"); and collecting, sorting, and delivering the mail (U.S. Postal Service).

[4] Quoted in Harold Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power*, 3d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 276.

[5] These intentions are usually quite explicit. For example, the conference report on the bill establishing the Synthetic Fuels Corporation indicated that the organization was to be "free of many of the constraints placed on such departments and agencies" and was "expected to function much like a private corporate entity such as bank or other financial institution." House Conference Committee, *Energy Security Act: Conference Report to Accompany S. 932*, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, H. Rept. 96-1104, 203.

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authorized and paid for by appropriated funds. Its earnings (if any) may not be retained by the organization. The list of such restrictions and constraints is lengthy.

Government corporations and quasi-corporate enterprises vary in their specific powers and constraints, but they commonly enjoy far more latitude than that accorded traditional agencies. For example, the corporations typically have separate personnel systems of their own, and may thus be exempted from all the civil service pay and employment restrictions. Some of the corporations are permitted to set their own employment policies and to engage in direct collective bargaining with their employees over wages, working conditions, and the like. Unlike traditional government agencies or bureaus, government corporations also typically have the power to act in their own names, to sue and be sued, and to acquire, develop, and dispose of real estate and other kinds of property.

One of the more striking differences between government corporations and traditional agencies is the way their activities are financed.[6] Government agencies are provided with funds through regular congressional authorizations and appropriations. These are usually accompanied by detailed specifications about the purposes and methods of expenditure. If an agency has any surplus funds at the end of the fiscal year, that surplus reverts to the U.S. Treasury, and funds for the next fiscal year come through another appropriation. Government corporations, by contrast, typically derive funds from their own revenues (which typically come from user charges) or by borrowing from the Treasury or issuing public bonds and notes. This fiscal autonomy generally carries a "price" of sorts, in that most government corporations, unlike traditional agencies, are generally expected to be financially self-sustaining (though some, such as the Commodity Credit Corporation, regularly fall short of that goal).

Another important feature (some would say the most important) distinguishing government corporations from regular agencies is that the former are theoretically freed of many of the direct controls of Congress and the White House. Government corporations are supposed to be "above politics"; their management and operation are theoretically insulated from untoward political influences, especially those of a partisan variety.

The Creation of Government Corporations

More is known about the publicly stated rationales behind the creation of government corporations than about the actual processes and politics involved in creating and operating these organizations. But an examination of the cir-

[6] By noting this and other distinctions between government corporations and traditional agencies, I do not want to imply that all the organizations within each category are alike. In fact, corporate enterprises differ along so many dimensions that its observers seldom agree as to which enterprises merit the label "government corporation" and which do not. Listings of government corporations therefore vary substantially depending on whose definition is used. Perhaps the clearest definitions and listings are those set forth in National Academy of Public Administration, *Report on Government Corporations,* vol. 2.

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cumstances surrounding the formation of five such organizations (the TVA in 1933, the U.S Postal Service and Amtrak in 1970, Conrail in 1973, and the Synthetic Fuels Corporation in 1980) provides some useful generalizations about the formation of government corporations and about the political appeal this organizational form holds for elected officials.

First, it is clear that the establishment of a government corporation is typically an action of high political visibility. It is a conspicuous and symbolic way for elected officials to appear to be "doing something" about a problem; they appear to be taking hold and decisive action. Establishing a corporation especially appeals to politicians when there appears to be crisis or some other alarming change in objective conditions. Such circumstances preceded the moves to create the Postal Service, Amtrak, and the Synthetic Fuels Corporation.

By the mid-1960s, the postal system was suffering from the cumulative stress of growing mail volumes and from its own retarded technological development; it was likely that these pressures would someday cripple the mail system or some part of it. In October 1966, Chicago's massive main post office broke down. For three days, the facility was paralyzed by a backlog of mail exceeding 10 million pieces. Railroad cars and trailer trucks full of mail choked approaches to the post office, thus further complicating the efforts of rattled Washington officials to divert to other cities much of the mail usually processed in Chicago. This situation helped to fuel already widespread notions that the assorted inadequacies of the old Post Office Department portended chaos and required changes.[7]

Amtrak was created by Congress in 1970 (and started up on 1 May 1971) in response to a long-term decline in America's system of private passenger rail lines. In the late 1920s, the railroads had dominated the public transportation market, carrying over three-fourths of all the passengers who travelled by common carrier. By the mid-1950s, trains were eclipsed by both buses and airplanes in the intercity passenger market. And by 1970 even the handful of trains still operating were candidates for discontinuation by railroad executives, who saw the passenger service as a costly drain on their slightly more remunerative freight business. The deteriorating situation took on the dimensions of a crisis when the Penn Central Railroad went bankrupt in 1970.[8]

Most recently, the creation of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation occurred under similar circumstances—important economic changes accompanied by a sense of crisis. For decades, the main obstacle to the development of alternatives to conventional fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, and coal) was the relative expense. Even as the economics of the overall energy situation changed in the 1970s, the govern-

[7] The Chicago post office collapse was only the most conspicuous manifestation of the ailing postal system's problems. Less obvious to the public but more worrisome to postal officials was the chaotic dispersion throughout the government of decision-making power over different aspects of postal operations. See Tierney, *Postal Reorganization*, 8–14.

[8] See Joseph R. Daughen and Peter Binzen, *The Wreck of the Penn Central* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971); James Dunn, "Railroad Policies in Europe and the United States"; and Ted Vaden, "Amtrak Plight: In Debt and Underused," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 29 May 1976, 1365.

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ment still refrained from adopting a synthetic fuels policy, because assorted opponents objected to the likely environmental effects and to government subsidies for huge private energy projects. But these objections diminished by 1979, when the cutoff of Iranian oil to the United States once again put Americans into gasoline lines and sent elective officials into a panic. When President Jimmy Carter then proposed that a government corporation be created to encourage the construction of synthetic fuel plants through loans, loan guarantees, price guarantees, and purchase agreements, Congress responded and had the Energy Security Act ready for the president's signature by early in the summer of 1980.[9]

Forming a government corporation to deal with critical problems such as these is attractive to elected officials because such organizations are different and newsworthy. In addition, they provide their sponsors and supporters with a welcome, well-publicized opportunity to claim credit for responding to a tough situation in a creative way.[10]

A second source of the government corporation's appeal to elected officials is that there has usually been a large reservoir of political capital to be tapped by the mere process of organization-building, at least before the new era of fiscal austerity and retrenchment in government. Franklin Roosevelt was confident that the massive projects to be undertaken by the TVA would eventually fire the public's imagination (as well as that region's economic development), and he let his optimism shine through when he promised that the TVA would bring a revival of the spirit and vision of American pioneers. Richard Nixon could promise that the transformation of the old Post Office Department into the new Postal Service would cure problems that had been festering for years in the postal system—knowing that the final judgment on that promise was years away and that, in the meantime, political credit could be taken as the public watched the old mail agency being outwardly transformed by a new name, a bold new logo, and bright new colors adorning offices, equipment, and vehicles.

A third way in which the creation of a government corporation appeals to elected officials is that it provides them with the opportunity to shift the responsibility for difficult or intractable problems onto someone else's shoulders. It is no coincidence that the legislative records attached to the laws creating these organizations are filled with pointed references to the independence these organizations are to be granted. The political calculus here is not difficult to understand. If all goes well later, the politicians can share in the glory. If all goes poorly, the polticians can point the finger at others who, after all, had independent responsibility for handling the problem. Thus, in 1980, legislators uncertain as to the costs and benefits of a new set of allocation decisions passed the

[9] See Christopher Madison, "You Know That Synfuels Are For Real When the Big Boys Enter the Picture," *National Journal*, 13 September 1980, 1508–1509; and Eric M. Uslaner, "Energy, Issue Agendas, and Policy Typologies" (Paper presented at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, Colo. 2–5 September 1982, esp. pp. 32–33).

[10] On the potential electoral advantages of "credit-claiming," see David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

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politically difficult task of awarding government-backed loans to the Synthetic Fuels Corporation.[11]

This rationale was no small part of the thinking behind the willingness of members of Congress to divest themselves of direct responsibility for the postal system. For years the post office had been a colossal headache to members of Congress. Citizens disgruntled over the slightest ineptitude or inconvenience complained to their congressional representatives. Moreover, contrary to popular belief, postal affairs offered little direct electoral benefit to most members, except for those in leadership positions on the post office committees. Apart from, say, the occasional chance to fight for keeping a small community post office, the postal system offered lawmakers little in the way of opportunities for enhancing their reelection chances. Even the supposed patronage attractions of the postal system held little appeal for most legislators, who had learned over time that the chance to appoint a local postmaster turned as often as not into a political liability, since disappointed office-seekers far outnumbered the one lucky job recipient.[12]

A fourth political attraction of the corporate form of organization is that it can be a way of performing a function through the government without having the costs show up in the budget. In 1969, the federal government began adopting a so-called unified budget, designed to be comprehensive in coverage. But it does not, in fact, reflect all of the federal government's outlays. Congress has excluded from the unified budget many government corporations and enterprises, authorizing "off-budget" outlays for (among others) the Postal Service, the Federal Financing Bank, the United States Railway Association, the Rural Telephone Bank, the Rural Electrification Administration, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, and the Synthetic Fuels Corporation. These "off-budget" organizations were projected to have net outlays of $15.7 billion in fiscal year 1983—an amount equal to 17 percent of the estimated unified budget deficit for that year.[13] This policy has obvious advantages for elected officials, who want to reap political benefit from making federal budget totals (or deficits) appear smaller than they really are.

Apart from these general political attractions of the corporate form, it is easy to divine additional factors that facilitate congressional adoption of proposals to create government corporations. Some are intuitively obvious, such as the presence of vigorous support from a resourceful group or constituency, and careful packaging of the legislation so as to make it politically appealing to members of Congress. Such factors, after all, facilitate favorable congressional action on any kind of proposal. But there are at least two other less obvious factors that may be just as important.

First, the chances of a proposal's enactment are better the more isolated and

[11] See Uslaner, "Energy, Issue Agendas, and Policy Typologies," 32–33.

[12] See Tierney, *Postal Reorganization*, 19, 24, 35–37.

[13] House Committee on Appropriations, *Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1983*, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1982, H. Doc. 97–124, pt. 9, p. 3.

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free-standing the policy area in which the new corporation would function. That is, the chances of approval will be better when there are no other federal agencies charged with performing even remotely similar tasks—and better still if there are no organizations of any kind, public or private, performing similar tasks. In the case of the Postal Service, for example, the hand of the corporation's proponents was strengthened by the absence of competing organizational interests inside the executive branch. Postal policy is sufficiently free-standing that no other agencies rose up in alarm over the potential effects of the reorganization on their activities. Moreover, the postal reorganization measure did not try to evaluate the organizational status of the post office or its functions at the implicit expense of other governmental programs. Postal reformers were explicitly seeking to remove the department from the president's cabinet and held out the promise of reducing the number of tax dollars devoted to postal activities. They wanted less, not more, attention from the president and members of Congress.[14] The case of Amtrak was different in form but similar in effect. Private railroads were going bankrupt even after having reduced passenger service to near extinction. These dying rail companies were not upset at the prospect of the government stepping in and trying to maintain the unprofitable service.

The second point is that the proposal itself has to have credibility and legitimacy. Elected officials must be able to argue convincingly (even if they do not themselves fully believe) that creation of the corporation is the best way to solve a problem or to manage a complex undertaking with efficiency and effectiveness, especially given the abbreviated decision time forced by the accompanying "crisis." The more plausibly one can present such an argument, the better the chances of legislative passage. For example, in the case of the Postal Service, it seemed perfectly reasonable that a reconstituted postal organization—infused with private business management techniques and freed from the caprices of political patronage and control—might well manage the mails better than the administratively tangled Post Office Department did. Similarly, although no one may actually have believed that the government could do a better job of running the freight railroads of the Northeast, permitting Conrail to get into the act seemed preferable (especially in light of the failure of the private rail companies) to letting the rail systems collapse into ruin, thereby leaving much of the nation's commercial and industrial infrastructure without access to rail service.[15]

There is another dimension to this point that bears mentioning. To win enactment, a corporation's proponents must be able to argue credibly that creation of a government corporation is necessary, legitimate, and desirable. But the

[14] See Tierney, *Postal Reorganization*, ch. 1.

[15] The total collapse of the freight railroads of the Northeast seemed a distinct possibility in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As rail earnings dropped and one road after another collapsed, railroad executives predicted a financial crisis and the total collapse of the Northeast's rail system. Under the pall of this imminent crisis, Congress produced the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (PL 93-236) which, among other things, created the Consolidated Rail Corporation, popularly known as "Conrail."

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ability to prevail with such an argument is likely to vary over time—not just with the specifics of each proposal, but with changing attitudes toward government intervention and toward commercial and industrial vitality, as well as with changing public confidence in the government's managerial capacities.

Although the great frequency with which government corporations were established in the 1930s would suggest otherwise, there is good reason to believe that it was much more difficult for President Roosevelt and his political allies to convince Congress and the public of the need for a government corporation than it is today. After all, because Roosevelt's were among the first such proposals, he had to battle the specter of "creeping socialism." He gamely promised that the TVA would be "a corporation clothed with the power of Government but possessed the flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise," and concerned with the Tennessee River Valley but working "for the general social and economic welfare of the Nation."[16] But in fact, as James Branscome has pointed out:

> For all the comfort these words gave the private power interests, Roosevelt might as well have said that he was creating a socialist river-damming project that would be used to barge children to integrated schools and supply electric power to the Kremlin.[17]

As decades passed, and as people saw that the creation of the TVA was not the penultimate step toward a socialist system—rather, that the TVA and other government corporations were actually doing a lot of good—the government corporation shed some of its "bogeyman" image. One finds little earnest reference to "creeping socialism" in more recent legislative or public debates over government corporations.

The problem today would seem to be of a different nature. Experience with government corporations may have shown observers that these organizations are not the institutional shock troops of the "Red Menace." But experience may also have shown them that the promises and expectations attendant to the creation of these organizations are often inflated or simply false. Services often are simply not provided at the promised levels of efficiency, effectiveness, and economy. And as people accumulate more and more reason to doubt the apparently serious claims of corporate proponents, it may again become more difficult to put together the popular support and winning coalitions needed to form these organizations.

Government Corporations in Action

As has been shown, the basic rationale offered for the creation of most government corporations is that these organizations are to perform certain businesslike

[16] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Muscle Shoals Development: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Request for Legislation to Create a Tennessee Valley Authority," 73d Cong., 1st sess., 1933, House Doc. 15, 1.

[17] James Branscome, "The TVA: It Ain't What It Used To Be," *American Heritage* 28 (1977):70.

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functions that require managerial autonomy—that is, freedom to make policy decisions without politically motivated intervention by Congress and the White House.[18] In other words, these organizations are to be "above politics," so that their managers and executives base their decisions on considerations of cost-effectiveness, efficiency, and the like—not on considerations of political expediency.

In practice, of course, the government corporation with unassailable autonomy does not exist, yet it persists in the mythology of governmental organization. The misconceptions surrounding government corporations encourage all sorts of misguided and unrealistic expectations of how these organizations will operate and what they can accomplish. Even people who should know better seem willing to believe that elected officials will be unable or unlikely to interfere in decisions about an organization's policies and practices if that organization formally enjoys the legal status of a government corporation.[19]

However, as the whole history of regulatory agencies shows, the president and members of Congress can find ways of making their preferences influential. Their latent powers alone, which even include the ability to alter the statutory independence of a government corporation, are often more than sufficient to influence successfully the affairs or direction of a government corporation. Moreover, there is certainly nothing inherent in the corporate form of organization that isolates those entities from effective intervention by elected officials or that otherwise prevents internal decisions from being made on the basis of political or organizational maintenance considerations, in addition to economic considerations.

It is nevertheless true that much of what people normally associate with "politics" can be kept out of these organizations. The TVA, for example, has historically been highly successful at making sure that its engineers, land buyers, and other employees are not appointed simply because they (or their relatives or friends) helped elect certain candidates to public office. Professionalism and merit are clearly the standards at the TVA.[20] Similarly, the reconstituted Postal Service successfully dismantled the old political patronage system for selecting postmasters. For decades, the key to postmaster selection had been the "political adviser system," under which a senator, a representative, or occasionally a local party chairperson from the president's political party was the adviser for each postal district in the country and effectively reserved the right to choose local

[18] According to James Q. Wilson, an agency enjoys autonomy when it enjoys sole jurisdiction over a coherent set of tasks, or when it is in a position to "act independently of some or all of the groups that have the authority to constrain it." James Q. Wilson, *The Investigators: Managing FBI and Narcotics Agents* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 165.

[19] See, for example, Amitai Etzioni's argument advocating the transformation of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration into a Food and Drug Testing Corporation, in the hope that "the new organization would be removed from the political pressures which hamper the effective operation of the FDA." See Etzioni, "The Third Sector and Domestic Missions," 319.

[20] For a full discussion of how an ethos of professionalism and nonpartisanship developed in the TVA during its first twenty years, see Lilienthal, *TVA: Democracy on the March*, ch. 17.

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postmasters when vacancies arose. Under the reorganized Postal Service, this system was replaced by a merit-based appointment process, under which performance, not patronage, was the byword.[21]

But to think of "politics" merely in terms of patronage, favors, and the like, is to think of it too narrowly. If the concept is expanded to mean disagreement over goals or conflict over the authoritative allocation of resources, then it becomes clearer why it is difficult to take "politics" out of these organizations, or to take their activities out of the purview of elected officials or other interested political actors. After all, as Harold Seidman has noted:

> Government corporations are organized to achieve a public purpose authorized by law. This fact is often forgotten. So far as purpose is concerned, a corporation cannot be distinguished from any other government agency. This view was vigorously stated by the United States Supreme Court in the case of *Cherry Cotton Mills* v. *U.S.* (327 U.S 561) when it held that the fact "that the Congress chose to call it a corporation does not alter its characteristics so as to make it something other than what it actually is, an agency selected by the government to accomplish purely governmental purposes."[22]

Thus, it is no surprise that "politics" is every bit as much a part of the government corporation's working environment as it is for a traditional agency. The actions and decisions of government corporations may affect the lives of citizens every bit as much as do the actions and decisions of other agencies. In some corporations, such as the Postal Service, the relationship may even be far more frequent, direct, and conspicuous than is found with most traditional agencies. Even if a corporation's activities are neither conspicuous nor of direct interest to large numbers of citizens, its functions are still likely to be important to some organized special interest. In either case, elected officials will keep themselves aware (or they will be made aware) of the corporation's actions and will step in to protect their constituents' interest if the electoral incentive is sufficiently strong.

Not surprisingly, then, the experience with government corporations is replete with cases of organizations whose presumed autonomy and insulation from external intervention have been breached by elected officials protecting their own political interests. The cases of Amtrak and the Postal Service provide examples.

It is no surprise that Amtrak's plight over the past decade has had as much to do with politics as with economics. When Congress created Amtrak, it provided for the passenger rail corporation to receive an infusion of federal cash each year until the system became self-supporting. But in order to get those appropriations each year, Amtrak had to maintain congressional goodwill by continuing many of the costly operations and practices that had sent the private passenger lines into bankruptcy in the first place. Trains were kept running through many congressional districts—certainly those of the relevant committee

[21] See Tierney, *Postal Reorganization,* 32–37.

[22] Harold Seidman, "The Theory of the Autonomous Government Corporation: A Critical Appraisal," *Public Administration Review* 12 (1952): 93.

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chairperson—even when the trains had few passengers and the actual costs of operation far exceeded the revenues from fares that were set artificially low. In short, Congress had established Amtrak under the guise of practicing "business-like" management of the passenger rails. But in ensuing years, Congress routinely intervened in ways that forced Amtrak executives to structure the organization's services and fares in line with political necessities, not with economic demands.

Politically motivated route selection and fare structures were only part of Amtrak's problems in its early years. The organization was also saddled with a legacy of expensive work rules and featherbedding. Congress had sharply limited Amtrak's freedom to bargain directly with the locomotive and train crews. These restrictions saddled Amtrak with obsolete work rules—such as the one set in 1919 giving a locomotive engineer a day's pay for every one hundred miles he went.[23]

Only after the untoward consequences of this political self-indulgence became clear—that is, only after Amtrak regularly showed alarming deficits, abysmal on-time performance, and distressingly low systemwide average speeds—did elected officials grant Amtrak executives more discretion and autonomy. Since 1978, Congress has finally agreed to remove some of the politicial baggage burdening Amtrak since its birth in 1971.[24] Congress has also taken similar steps to unshackle Conrail. Thus unburdened, Amtrak has improved its performance across the board, and Conrail in 1981 recorded its first profit.[25]

Close inspection of the Postal Service reveals a similar story. Ever since it was created, the Postal Service has been forced by congressional demands to provide an array of costly and unproductive services that the organization would not provide—at least not at the current low prices—if it were free to manage the system in a businesslike way. The supposedly "independent" Postal Service has been subject to a wide variety of externally imposed constraints on its ability to apply known managerial solutions to many of the mail system's operating and financial problems. Postal managers are not incompetent, prodigal, or stupid. They have the know-how to produce an efficient, cost-effective mail delivery system that would provide predictable and economically rational services. But postal managers and executives are not free to produce such a system. Their hands are stayed by Congress, most of whose members fear that the political costs of such a streamlining would be too great. So Congress continues to insist—under the watchful eye and steady pressure of the powerful postal unions, the users of special mail classes, and other assorted special interests—that the Postal Service maintain a collection of traditional mail services that meet the electoral needs of lawmakers but that do not reflect economic demand. It is hard

[23] *Washington Post*, 13 September 1981.

[24] The changes in attitude were formalized in two pieces of legislation: Amtrak Improvement Act of 1978, *Statutes at Large*, 92:923–31; and Amtrak Improvement Act of 1981, *Statutes at Large*, 95: 687–99.

[25] Musolf, "Policymakers and the Private-For-Profit Enterprises," 22.

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to argue that Americans need (though all agree it is nice to have) residential delivery to the door, six days a week. Nor do they need post officies at every rural crossroads, at least not when regular and satisfactory services can be provided by alternative methods at lower cost.

Clearly, the postal system, like Amtrak, is not merely an economic enterprise, but an important part of the nation's social fabric. The full value of, say, rural post offices cannot be assessed on a balance sheet; it is true, after all, that they are often the social heart and of isolated communities, gathering places for the exchange of news, and centers for the nourishment of local community identities. It is equally clear that Congress has the right and the obligation to see to it that interests are represented and the public's wishes heeded. I am merely arguing that it is fallacious to establish government corporations with the expectation or hope that these organizations will be above the political fray and that they will operate as a business would.

The problem of government corporations is twofold. First, these organizations do not produce widgets; rather, they provide, under governmental authority, services (such as transportation, mail delivery, electric power, crop insurance, and the like) that are important to some constituency, either large or small. They therefore have an inevitable political dimension. Second, because of the nature of their operations and because most of these organizations have no standard measure of performance (such as sales in a competitive market), they cannot behave as a business would. A business must be free to tailor its services to economic demands. If the Postal Service, for example, were operating as a business, it could easily keep rates down to a reasonable level for those who generate most of the mail, while providing reliable services responsive to their needs. It would do so, however, by curtailing traditional services now provided to non-paying constituencies or by instituting new or higher rates for a variety of services.[26]

It should not be inferred that no government corporation can operate free of congressional or presidential intervention in management decisions, or that no government corporation's managerial environment approximates that of a business. The empirical evidence from individual case studies, though growing, is still not extensive enough to sustain such an assertion. Still, it is likely that no government corporations exist whose actual operations reflect the full measure of political isolation and managerial autonomy portrayed in either the theoretical literature or the rhetoric accompanying the organizations' creation. Rather, there is a spectrum or continuum along which these organizations fall. The problem, then, is to identify those characteristics of a government corporation and its environment that may determine how much autonomy it will enjoy. What follows are five propositions that may be worthy of exploration in future case research.

First, it appears that formal legal status does not count for much in guaranteeing a government corporation real autonomy. However, what does seem to

[26] See Tierney, *Postal Reorganization*, chs. 2–3, 7, 9.

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make a difference is the degree of financial independence. If a corporation (whether wholly owned by the government or of mixed ownership) is at all dependent on federal appropriations (as are the Postal Service and Amtrak), its autonomy will be restricted. Conversely, if the corporation is self-supporting from operating revenues (as are the Communications Satellite Corporation and Federal Prison Industries), it will most likely enjoy greater autonomy. The more often a corporation has to go before Congress to plead its case or report on its activities in order to obtain funds, the chances of having its freedom constrained in some way will increase.

Second, a government corporation will enjoy more autonomy from politically motivated interference by elected officials if its tasks and functions are relatively inconspicuous to the general public. A corporation's vulnerability to authoritatively imposed constraints will be greater if the performance of its tasks is highly visible to the public at large.[27]

For example, the U.S. Postal Service is probably the most visible government organization of any kind in the United States, reaching every residence and office across the nation six days a week. It is unlike other government agencies, whose "products" or services are less visible, whose performances are less easily monitored, and whose effects on the public are less noticed. The Postal Service's performance is always and everywhere under scrutiny, its inefficiencies and failings readily apparent. People know whether their mail arrives late and whether the vase sent for an aunt's birthday arrived in pieces. Citizens also find it easy to monitor the costs of their mail service. Unlike most government services, mail delivery is purchased by individuals at retail counters through simple business transactions. The individual mailer, not the general taxpayer, shoulders the bulk of the costs. This means that citizens are much more aware of postal expenses (or at least of increases in postage rates) than they are of their increased tax outlays for the activities of the Commodity Credit Corporation or other less conspicuous and more autonomous corporations.

All of these factors make it difficult for the Postal Service to sustain enthusiastic support among the general public and thus maintain reliable support in Congress. Citizens tend to forget or take for granted the prompt and reliable mail service they generally enjoy, but will join in the popular castigation of the post office when a single check or greeting card is late in arriving. Moreover, citizens disgruntled over delayed letters, damaged parcels, or the high cost of postage have always tended to flood the offices of their congressional representatives

[27] The first half of this proposition may seem contrary to the notion that a public agency's vulnerability to "capture" by attentive interest groups is increased when the agency's activities have low visibility. See, for example, Marver Bernstein, *Regulating Business by Independent Commission* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), 86–95. However, two points bear mentioning on this subject. First, the concern here is with the authoritative imposition of constraints (that is, with purposive intervention by popularly elected officials), not with the subtle pressures from interest groups with whom the corporations are in alliance. Second, I have focused on authoritative intervention because of my impression that the most effective interest group influence on government corporations is exerted not directly, but via congressional importuning.

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with complaints about deficiencies in the postal system. Though there is nothing congressional caseworkers can do to speed delivery or restore a broken vase, members of Congress can and do respond collectively to make life difficult for the Postal Service by threatening changes in the organization's governing stature, by holding extra oversight or investigative hearings, by legislatively mandating that certain services be provided in specified manners, and so on.

Third, a corporation's autonomy or insulation from interference by elected officials will be greater to the extent that it can avoid being drawn into politically charged conflicts on salient and conspicuous issues. That is, when a government corporation gets drawn into the public spotlight because of its decisions or actions, it is likely to find its autonomy reduced—if not across the board, then at least on the issue of immediate concern.

For example, the TVA over the years has enjoyed a relatively low and tame national profile. But more recently the TVA has found its activities and programs subject to growing scrutiny in political forums. Some of this increased attention has been tied to specific events. For example, in the spring of 1975, the Senate Public Works Committee held its first oversight hearings on the TVA in some thirty years as a result of a controversy over the TVA's plan to buy the Peabody Coal Company.[28] Critics loudly complained that the public interest would be ill-served by the nation's largest coal purchaser (TVA) acquiring the nation's largest coal supplier (Peabody). In addition, environmentalists have been publicly critical of the TVA's vigorous nuclear power and strip mining programs and of its failure to comply with state and federal clean air regulations. (The TVA has long steadfastly refused to install stack "scrubbers" to remove sulfur dioxide from the smoke at its older coal-burning plants.) Finally, the TVA has been dragged into the public spotlight by the controversies over construction of the Tellico Dam and the Clinch River breeder reactor.

The point here is not that attachment to controversial issues is inevitably threatening to a government corporation's autonomy, nor that the absence of such maelstroms is a guarantor of corporate independence and policymaking freedom. But experience provides abundant reason to believe that the emergence of a controversy involving a corporation—even over something as seemingly insignificant as Postal Service plans to expand its Zip Code to nine digits—is more likely than not to result in congressional or presidential intervention.

Finally, congressional intervention in a government corporation's affairs will

[28] Within weeks of the Arab oil embargo in 1974, the price of coal on national markets tripled and quadrupled. The TVA (which was using on average over 715,000 tons of coal per week) apparently believed that it was relatively immune to these exorbitant price increases because it had many long-term contracts. But when some of its suppliers turned their backs on the contracts and sold their coal elsewhere at higher prices, the TVA was forced to buy on the open market at extraordinary prices. To cover these new costs, TVA raised its rates, thus inviting the anger and resentment of valley residents. In an attempt to get a grip on the unstable coal situation, the TVA announced it would offer to buy the Peabody Coal Company, which the Federal Trade Commission had ordered to be divested from the Kennecott Corporation. See Deborah Shapley, "TVA Today: Former Reformers in an Era of Expensive Electricity," *Science* 194 (1976): 815.

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be more likely when members of Congress stand to benefit electorally by intervening. A corollary to this point is that corporate autonomy will be less secure when the organization's political environment includes powerful and attentive interest groups that have the political resources to command congressional intervention.[29] Policy decisions and managerial initiatives of the Postal Service, for example, are particularly subject to congressional scrutiny and reversal. When the Postal Service has tried to replace small, uneconomical post offices with cheaper, alternate forms of service, the National League of Postmasters has prevailed on members of Congress to restrict postal management's ability to close offices. Whenever the Postal Service has tried to eliminate Saturday deliveries, the postal employee unions and some mail users' organizations have successfully beseeched Congress to prevent the Postal Service from taking such a step. Another, less celebrated, example involves a 1972 Postal Service initiative to save $210 million annually by requiring that in all new housing developments, homeowners would not be provided door delivery, but would receive either curbside delivery or delivery to a cluster box within 300 feet of the residence. The National Association of Homebuilders led the successful fight against this proposal, and persuaded Congress to block the policy's implementation.[30]

There are a couple of instructive lessons in these examples. First, understanding the limitations on the autonomy of government corporations can help explain many of the seemingly irrational policies of these organizations. To put it starkly, misguided and costly pratices are more likely to result from the directions of elected officials than from managerial stupidity or venality inside these organizations. Second, it should be clear that the creation of government corporations need not lead to the erosion of political accountability. On the contrary, political accountability is alive and well; popularly elected officials can readily direct the policies and operations of government corporations. Of course, government corporations are like traditional agencies in that politicial accountability may exact costs in their programs' efficiency and effectiveness. But presumably this is a trade-off that policymakers have chosen.

Other Operating Difficulties: Economy and Efficiency

Though managerial autonomy is important for the efficient and economical operation of a government corporation, it should not be overemphasized, since even secured autonomy by no means guarantees that a government corporation will run well. Thus, one final problem is to identify other factors or characteristics that seem to be sources of operating difficulties for some government corporations, especially for those large in scope and operations.

First, a corporation's chances of managing its operations with economy, ef-

[29] It is true, of course, that the presence of powerful interest groups among a government corporation's attentive publics will sometimes enhance its autonomy by forestalling congressional action that is mutually undesirable to the corporation and the interest group.

[30] See Tierney, *Postal Reorganization*, ch. 3.

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ficiency, and effectiveness are better if the organization and its mission are new, unfettered by the burden of an organizational legacy (such as outmoded technologies, obsolete work rules, and a bloated work force). In the case of the Postal Service, the new organization inherited upon its creation in 1971 a 200-year-old system that suffered from acutely retarded technological development. While other industries had been continually engaging in research and development to cut costs and improve operations, the old Post Office Department did not even have money from Congress to set up its own research and development department until after World War II. Even then, inadequate congressional appropriations and the low priority of the department stunted the development of new machinery, equipment, and physical plants. Clerks still stood before the familiar pigeonhole cases, sorting letters by hand at the rate of about thirty a minute. Antiquated facilities hindered mechanization; weak floors would not support heavy machinery, low ceilings ruled out overhead conveyor systems, and vertical buildings layouts defied any attempt at instituting more efficient horizontal mail-flow systems.

In short, by 1971 the postal system was squeezed by the inadequacies of its own technological underdevelopment and by circumstances beyond its control. Mail volume was rising, while the population was shifting to new centers outside the central cities, and long-established transportation patterns were changing. The collective stress of all these developments had presented the old Post Office Department with soaring costs and left it with little choice in handling the mail except to hire more employees. One postal official had conceded as early as 1959: "The idea is that if you have a mass of bodies, you can smother the mail and get it delivered by sheer weight of numbers."[31] Such was the philosophy behind the mushrooming of the department's payroll by 1970 to an all-time high of 741,216 persons. Such was the legacy received by officials of the new Postal Service as they set out to try to control costs and manage the mail system with businesslike efficiency.

As shown, Amtrak and Conrail faced similarly burdensome organizational legacies. Both inherited physical plants that had been deteriorating for decades. The existing rolling stock was antiquated and shabbily maintained. The track beds were in poor condition. The passenger and freight systems alike were suffering the effects of wholesale changes in the nation's travelling and shipping habits. Rail traffic was largely eclipsed by reliance on automobiles, trucks, and airplanes. Also like the new Postal Service, the railroad corporations bore the legacy of large, unionized workforces that were bloated and excessively costly, partly as a result of work rules that had long been obsolete.

Most other government corporations and quasi-corporations have been established free of the burden of an organizational legacy. In virtually every other case of public enterprise at the federal level, the organizations started out largely unconstrained by past practices and generally free of well-established

[31] Maurice B. Feimster, quoted in *Newsweek*, 13 July 1959, 23.

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expectations (inside and outside the organizations) of what they should do and how they should do it.

One need only contrast the experiences of the Postal Service and the rail corporations with that of the TVA to see what a difference a legacy of organizational inefficiency makes. Though the TVA's mission was by no means an easy one, the corporation enjoyed the freedom to innovate. The TVA's projects were carried out with state-of-the-art technology and, perhaps more importantly, TVA managers and executives were free to make choices about how to pursue the organization's goals. They were not reduced from the very start to crisis management; theirs was not a battle with a foregone conclusion.

It was this opportunity to to innovate and start its mission afresh that enabled the TVA to amass a record of accomplishments that made it the model government corporation, the yardstick against which less fortunately endowed organizations would fall unflatteringly short. The TVA's accomplishments by 1953—the end of its first two decades—were extraordinary. The corporation had tamed the giant and destructive Tennessee River with twenty dams. It had reforested 212,000 acres of land and produced 295 million seedlings in its nursery. It had grown into the nation's largest utility, selling power at the lowest possible price to people in a region that twenty years earlier was virtually untouched by the age of electricity.[32]

Part of the TVA's success in compiling its astonishing record must also be attributed to the fierce loyalty, support, and good will it enjoyed from its own employees and from the people whose lives it changed. That spirit was another advantage never enjoyed by organizations like the Postal Service and Conrail that were "fashioned from the ribs" of other organizations.

A second source of trouble for a government corporation, as for traditional agencies, is the nature of its goals and tasks. Most government corporations have goals that seem on the surface to be reasonably straightforward, especially when compared with traditional government agencies. But not all government corporations fare equally well on this score. Managing a huge workforce to get the mail to every home and residence in the United States six days a week is clearly a far more difficult and complicated set of tasks than operating a water artery, managing a crop insurance program, or handling the redevelopment of a stretch of Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C.

Finally, government corporations whose goals are multiple and contradictory can be expected to do a poorer job of meeting public expectations than a corporation whose objectives are less diffused. Government corporations are like traditional government agencies (and unlike private businesses) in that their goals are set not by the organizations themselves, but by persons outside the organization—usually Congress. Goals are often shaped, if not actually set, by pressure groups, other agencies, the courts, and even the news media. Partly as a consequence of this external source of organizational objectives, the goals of a government corporation may well be numerous. This situation may occur be-

[32] Lilienthal, *TVA: Democracy on the March*, chs. 2–3, 4.

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cause the coalition-building process at the time of the organization's creation required that many different interests be satisfied, or perhaps because additional goals have been handed to the corporation over time.

Multiple goals do not necessarily pose a problem for a government corporation, but they can if these goals conflict with one another. The legislation creating the TVA called on the new organization to provide, within the Tennessee drainage basin and its adjoining territories, "the maximum amount of flood control; the maximum development . . . for navigation purposes; the maximum generation of electric power consistent with flood control and navigation; the proper use of marginal lands; the proper method of reforestation . . . and the economic and social well-being of the people living in said river basin; and to provide for the national defense."[33] For several decades, the TVA was able to pursue all these goals without their being in perceptible (or at least not troubling) conflict with one another. In recent years, however, the TVA's job has grown more difficult as its enormous power generation activities throw it into conflict with its own conservation goals, thus inviting internal disagreements and harsh criticism from those to whom the conservation goals have also become more important.

The Postal Service case is even more instructive. Congress has saddled the Postal Service with a wide variety of economically irreconcilable social and political objectives: frequent, speedy, and predictable delivery to individual residences and businesses; universally available letter-mail services at reasonable and uniform rates; continuation of a large and expensive network of rural post offices; provision of hundreds of thousands of collection boxes; support of an enormous and well-paid work force; and, last but not least, the mandate to accomplish all this without incurring a deficit. Clearly, not all of these goals can be achieved, at least not simultaneously. But the Postal Service, as a governmental (which is to say, politically controlled) organization, has no choice but to attend to them anyway. This makes "businesslike" management impossible because there is no way, given the political pressures and the absence of a market for reconciling impersonally conflicting wants, that these competing goals can be reconciled or reasonable trade-offs among them negotiated.[34] To the extent that other government corporations face similar problems, they will be seen as falling short of what is expected of them.

Conclusion

Government corporations, by virtue of their public character, will almost always face competing goals and conflicting wants and expectations. Moreover, not only are the expectations surrounding a government corporation likely to be multiple, competing, and irreconcilable, but they are almost certain to be un-

[33] Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, *Statutes at Large*, 48: sec. 23, 69; or *U.S. Code*, 1976 ed., Title 16, sec. 8931(v).

[34] Tierney, *Postal Reorganization*, 181–82.

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realistic and inflated from the start by the rhetoric of enthusiastic proponents who needed to build a supporting coalition for the organization's creation. To persuade Congress, the president, and the public that the new organization is necessary, proponents often promise more than the new organization can be certain to deliver. This pattern is understandable and is certainly not unique to government corporations. Even so, the pattern is unfortunate, since it is so important, when designing new organizations or reconstituting old ones, for all concerned to have clear ideas about how these organizations can be expected to perform and what they can accomplish. Otherwise, it is impossible intelligently to anticipate implementation problems of possible deviations from intended policy outcomes. But as long as elected officials continue to view the formation of government corporations as merely a symbolic or electorally useful process—in short, as little more than a politically expedient strategy of intervention—the experience with government corporations will be disappointing. The failure of these organizations to live up to their advance billings is pernicious in that it further diminishes citizens' confidence in the government's ability to manage the public's business.*

* I would like to thank John Bailey, Jameson Doig, Robert Katzmann, Patricia Rachal, Kay Scholzman, and Susan Fallows Tierney for their helpful comments on various drafts of this article.

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Book Reviews

Memoirs *by Petro G. Grigorenko. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1983. 462 pp. $19.95.*

Inside the Soviet Army *by Viktor Suvorov. New York, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1983. 296 pp. $15.95.*

Former Soviet citizens, emigrés and defectors, have always been one source of information and understanding on developments within the Soviet Union. They have ranged from top Bolshevik leaders such as Leon Trotsky to the unknown if not "average" citizen. Books by such expatriates have varied from straightforward and informative (if subjective) accounts to invented tales pandering to presumed Western interests. Evaluating such sources is an essential, and often difficult, task.

The Grigorenko memoir is easy to characterize. It is an authentic and honest autobiography, a reflective reminiscence by a most unusual, indeed unique, figure. He is a former Soviet general officer and party member who gradually became disillusioned and moved from attempts to spark internal "Leninist purity" into local party activities to open and vocal dissidence in the name of democratic ideals. This transformation led to official reactions spanning the gamut from local discipline (including both petty local bureaucratic sniping and courageous friendly efforts to warn Grigorenko and to help him turn back from his path toward opposition), to incarceration in psychiatric wards, and eventually to exile abroad. Grigorenko's account includes particularly interesting commentary on life in the Soviet officer corps, especially in terms of bureaucratic and personal relationships—including with some prominent Soviet generals with whom he served. But his book is even more revealing of the officer corps and its milieu as it evolved from the 1930s into the mid-1960s. One is reminded that the Soviet system, and the Soviet Army officer corps, are made up of real people. There is both explicit and indirect insight into the way the Soviet military work and think. Grigorenko himself occupied an especially interesting niche as one of the innovators in the use of cybernetics in theoretical and practical application in the Soviet military establishment.

A quite different dimension of Soviet reality is represented in Grigorenko's later career as a dissident and political prisoner. It is clear from Grigorenko's account that in the

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latter half of the 1960s there was, in fact, substantial leeway for expression of dissidence—albeit with constant harassment from the authorities. Grigorenko details his extensive involvement with the main stream of dissidence in that period (and later in prisons and hospitals, from 1969 to his exile in 1977). Although it is of course written from the standpoint of a prisoner, Grigorenko's account includes interesting observations on the KGB, the psychiatrists who examined him, and others on the side of the Soviet establishment.

In short, Grigorenko's memoir is a substantial source contributing to our understanding of the Soviet system. It presents an unusually far-ranging and rich slice of Soviet life—seen from its author's perspective and with his biases of perception, but honestly presented.

The pseudonymous "Viktor Suvorov," and his book, are of a rather different species. "Suvorov" does at least exist, unlike a number of alleged defector officers represented as authors of "inside" books on the Soviet Army in the late 1940s and 1950s, such as the fictitious "Colonel Kalinov" and "Captain Krylov." He is not, as advertised by the publisher on the flyleaf, a former "high-ranking Russian officer," a claim the account itself belies. But he is a former Soviet tank captain with fifteen years service in lower troop command and staff positions. His career included service as a company commander in the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Suvorov's book *Inside the Soviet Army* is an interesting but seriously flawed source. (His earlier book, titled *The Liberators: Inside the Soviet Army* and published in 1981, is less ambitious and less contrived, concentrating on the author's own experiences in the mid-1960s and especially in the Czechoslovak occupation.) Evidently with unacknowledged assistance, the author has attempted to pronounce definitively on many aspects of Soviet military command, strategy, organization and doctrine about which he could not—and clearly does not—know. Some of this material is valid, some is slanted, and some is sheer invention. There is a clear bias to play up the Soviet threat; whether taken for political propaganda or commercial purposes, this bias is in any case ill-fitting with the parts of this book (and the earlier one) that show the Soviet Army at the troop level, with at least its share of human frailties and other shortcomings. The one redeeming value of the book is that there are many passages providing (or at least purporting to provide) a look "inside the Soviet Army" based on the author's personal experience. Many anecdotes ring true, as does the overall picture at this level. Yet even here at least some points are demonstrably untrue and many others raise unanswerable questions as to their validity.

"Suvorov" could have given us a valuable account based on his own experience, as is clear from parts of his book. Unfortunately, even those parts are not of certain reliability, and share the tainted nature of the balance of his exposé purporting to deal with Soviet objectives and strategy, the Soviet High Command, and the armed forces as a whole. The book may still be worth reading for its flavor of Soviet army life, but only with care and reservations; it is not suitable for academic reference.

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Conventional Deterrence *by John J. Mearsheimer. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1983. 292 pp. $29.50.*

While this book contains several interesting chapters, overall it is disappointing. The disappointment arises primarily from the fact that the book promises more than it fulfills. The best way to see the problem is to briefly summarize the argument of the book and then to note where it fails.

The first few pages of the introduction focus attention on the problem of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the defense of Europe and awaken in the reader's mind the expectation that the book will be primarily devoted to the problem of conventional deterrence in Europe today. Since so much has been written about the problems of nuclear weapons in that area, it would have been refreshing and useful to have had a book that is more concerned with the problems of conventional defense and deterrence. The second chapter is devoted to an extended effort to construct a theory of deterrence that is notable primarily for developing the idea that there are essentially three offensive strategies available—war of attrition, blitzkrieg, and limited aims. Even Mearsheimer seems vaguely dissatisfied with these distinctions, because he notes correctly that blitzkriegs and wars of attrition can be used for accomplishing limited aims (pp. 56–58 and p. 219, n. 21). He argues out of this problem by suggesting that the former two are designed to destroy the opponent's forces, while the latter aims at seizing specific territory. Nevertheless, one is left with the impression that the three categories are not equivalent.

The following two chapters are detailed discussions of why the Allies did not attack Germany between March 1939 and May 1940 and how the Germans finally developed a strategy for attacking the West between September 1939 and May 1940. These two chapters are interesting case studies based on thorough research, and they make the next chapter on the 1956, 1967, and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars appear skimpy by comparison. The sixth chapter, finally, turns to the problem of Europe today with a revision of an article that has appeared in *International Security* (Summer 1982). This is followed by a technical chapter on precision-guided missiles that has also appeared before in altered form in *Survival* (March–April 1979) and does not seem to belong here at all. A short ten-page conclusion constitutes the last chapter.

The major problem arises from the fact that the subject one was led by the introduction to believe would be the focus of the book in fact only receives twenty-three pages of text. Even more disturbing is the fact that there is little evidence of any connection between the rest of the book and this chapter. After noting that the Russians apparently plan a blitzkrieg strategy in the West, the author then presents a detailed analysis of comparative force levels, deployments, capabilities, and terrain difficulties in the European theater. His conclusion that the Soviets have a slim chance of carrying out an effective blitzkrieg at this time derives from what is basically a detailed military evaluation of respective forces and strategies and not from a consideration of any theory of deterrence that the first part of the book presented. In fact, chapter six can clearly stand alone, as it apparently did as a journal article.

Needless confusion also arises from the fact that the introduction suggests that twelve case studies were used—yet the book only discusses, at most, six of them in any detail.

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Also, the analysis of the Arab-Israeli wars seems so "actor-specific" that few generalizations emerge that one could apply to another time and place. I can sympathize with the author's problem of gathering information on these wars as well as on the North Korean invasion of South Korea, but then perhaps these conflicts should have been omitted and the study been focused on the problem of Europe. In the attempt to be broadly comparative, the author has in fact weakened the book and highlighted deficiencies in research that are not necessarily his fault. With sixty pages of footnotes and sixteen of bibliography, there is much research here but, unfortunately, it is very uneven and calls into question the comparative approach he attempted to use. Since all but thirty pages of the book are in fact relevant to the European setting, the material on Israel and references to other wars could well have been left out. As it stands, the book attempts too much and delivers too little on the crucial question of contemporary deterrence in Europe (or rather what it does deliver in chapter six is not related to the previous discussion in any effective way). As a result, I would recommend this book only to someone who was interested in the decision-making process on both the Allied and German sides in the early years of World War II.

PHILIP W. DYER
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 *by Zbigniew Brzezinski. New York, Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983. 587 pp. $22.50.*

It has become almost a matter of course for foreign policy officials, when leaving office, to try to lead or mislead historians by publishing apologia disguised as memoirs. Some breathlessly seek the first word so they can claim paternity for their administration's successes while blaming its failures on the foolish interference of less perceptive colleagues; they are, one assumes, writing prospectuses for their Second Comings.

That seems to be the purpose of Brzezinski's book, though it fails in its objective. Rather than proving the author's infallibility, it shows not only numerous errors and inconsistencies, but also that he spent an inordinate amount of time trying to oppose and undercut Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Moreover—and far more importantly—the book reveals the two-dimensional quality of the author's world view. Although at the outset of the new administration he claims to have advised Jimmy Carter not to put primary emphasis on relations with the Soviet Union, he instinctively tried, in dealing with specific problems, to shape America's foreign policy on the apparent assumption that almost all the United States's foreign policy headaches are caused by Russia's bloody-mindedness. Thus, his instinct was to try to force even local conflicts into the East-West mold. It was here that he most often collided with Vance, who saw the world in more complex terms.

Brzezinski's book reveals—more clearly, I am sure, than he intended—that, although he possesses an aptitude for devising ambitious strategems and even expressing them in resonant abstractions, he often bent the facts to suit the strategems, failed to adjust his schemes to conflicting interests and requirements, and lacked the reticence and subtlety to carry them out effectively. Thus, for example, when he sought to exploit U.S. relations

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with China as a counter to Soviet power, his naive vocal advocacy of "playing the China card" not only upset the Chinese but contributed to the current dangerous deterioration in U.S. relations with the Kremlin.

But Brzezinski's book is primarily interesting not as a collection of character studies or as an essay in foreign policy; its value is in documenting the fatuity of an institutional arrangement for shaping and conducting foreign policy that had already shown its mischievous shortcomings in an earlier administration. By appointing a national security advisor eager to advance his own views at the expense of the secretary of state, President Carter showed either his ignorance of recent history or his inability to learn from the mistakes of the past. Only a president who saw his options with clarity and was sufficiently experienced to make his own decisions could prevent the disastrous confusion implicit in that arrangement; Jimmy Carter was not such a president. Had he been, he would never have created such an operational monstrosity in the first place.

With the publication of this book, together with the memoirs of Vance and Carter, readers now have three sets of chronicles recounting the same events. That will undoubtedly add a holographic element for historians seeking to see the period in the round. At the same time, the disparate characters and backgrounds of the narrators should provide a field day for sociologists and for those historians who seek to interpret events through their own psychoanalytic lenses. Yet those scholars who may find the most value in these confessionals or apologia—call them what one will—are the historians of the future seeking to determine how the erratic policies of the Carter period helped pave the way for the fantasies and fanaticism now marking American policy during the Reagan era.

GEORGE W. BALL
Princeton, N.J.

Thinking about National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World *by Harold Brown. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1983. 288 pp. $17.95.*

Each year, the secretary of defense sends a report to Congress. It is long, dull, and ponderous. But it is also filled with important facts and projected American programs, and it presents the best rationales for U.S. policies. This book by a former secretary of defense, unfortunately, has the former characteristics without the latter.

It is hard to see for whom this book will be useful. It contains nothing new for professionals in the field. This does not seem to be its audience, but it is not lively or incisive enough to be read by large numbers of interested citizens. Brown covers many current issues, but the cost of discussing so many topics is superficiality—he provides twelve pages on energy policy, four pages on Japan, two paragraphs on why the U.S. needs hard-target kill capability, and so on through the familiar list. On none of these topics is there any sustained argument or careful marshalling of evidence. If readers already agree with Brown's position, they will think him wise; if readers disagree, they are likely to find the presentation convincing. On many issues, one gets conventional wisdom when some questioning or analysis would seem to be in order. For example, he writes: "The Soviet leaders

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see marginal or even significant slowing down in the rate of improvement of the material condition of the average Soviet citizen as less important than the expansion of Soviet power" (p. 26).

Although the subtitle talks of foreign as well as defense policy, the latter topic dominates. This may be appropriate for the secretary of defense (if other officials supply the missing considerations), but the lack of a political setting for the discussion is troublesome. It contributes to the apolitical presentation of the normal defense fantasies—such as concern for a Soviet invasion of Japan (p. 122), discussion of a Soviet-American conventional war waged at several points on the globe simultaneously (which might provide the occasion for a diversionary attack on Petropavlovsk by sea-launched cruise missiles) (p. 181), and discussion of limited nuclear war (p. 80). But within the confines of the world he sets out, Brown's presentation is solid. The policies he carried out while in office are explained and defended, some of the disagreements with Ronald Reagan's programs are elucidated, and the normal complaints about congressional interference are aired. While there is nothing new here, it is a handy summary of middle-of-the-road defense policy.

While in office, Brown's statements often showed a first-rate mind dealing with important questions. It would seem that freed from time pressures and bureaucratic and political constraints, he could produce a valuable book. But readers must still await such a volume.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

Paradoxes of Power: The Military Establishment in the Eighties *by Adam Yarmolinsky and Gregory D. Foster. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1983. 154 pp. $15.00.*

This is Yarmolinsky's book, as the preface—signed only by him—makes clear enough (although his nominal co-author is not without relevant credentials). More particularly, this is the sequel to his 1971 book *The Military Establishment*. A lawyer and sometimes professor along the Boston-Washington axis, Yarmolinsky first gained notice in the national security field as one of the top "whiz kids" in Robert McNamara's Pentagon, starting with the Kennedy administration and staying on for three years of the Johnson administration. He epitomized the arrogant self-righteousness of "the best and the brightest," exhibiting "Camelot" confidence that he and his band could make American democracy safe from its own military establishment—while occasionally brandishing those forces with intellectual *machismo* to accomplish some worthy international purpose.

Yarmolinsky has gradually mellowed. While remaining firmly on the left of center within the Ivy League version of Democratic liberalism, he now talks about paradoxes and problems whereas two decades ago he would have spoken exclusively ex cathedra. His four "paradoxes" (pp. 3–4) reflect the conventional wisdom and worries first emerging about a quarter of a century earlier, but updated now with somewhat moderated anguish

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and certitude. First, he posits that Nuclear weapons are useful only if they are never used. Second, the more military power a nation has, the more it must be constrained. Third, the military forces needed by the U.S. to maintain "international equilibrium" may be too large for its democratic mechanisms to control. Finally, he wonders how the U.S., "purportedly dedicated to peaceful purposes," can live with its large military establishment—or live without it?

One could question the premises embedded in these "paradoxes," such as the assertion that the Pentagon "plays a predominant role in national affairs" (p. 4). Yet Yarmolinsky uses these obiter dicta as convenient springboards for his thoughtful discussions of many concerns about American national security practices, mainly in terms of their domestic implications—for example, chapters focused on the impact of the military establishment on politics, government, the economy, and society at large.

This organized but non-systematic presentation omits numerous questions. The relationship between the nature and size of American military forces on the one hand, and the nature, size, and implications of external threats on the other, is not much pursued—aside from pointed barbs at the Reagan administration for exaggerating all dangers, not to mention barbs at the Reaganauts for numerous other allegations. Many references and one entire chapter reflect Yarmolinsky's enthusiasm for arms control (Paul Doty and Paul Warnke are thanked in the preface), but he does not say what ought to be done if even the best efforts fail to accomplish much—or if there are non-American reasons for failure.

Another problem here is a dated quality, treating issues from the 1981 and early 1982 headlines that attracted little interest later. Yarmolinsky shared the grievances felt by those of his political persuasion during the first year of the Reagan administration, but his book went to press before new movement and directions began emerging with the arrival of George Shultz (plus other personnel shifts and some personal learning) as of the late summer of 1982.

The essay style of this book suggests a 150-page editorial column. It is occasionally informative, sometimes stimulating if not provocative, and always readable. The experienced professional in this literature would learn nothing here, but could benefit from a fresh exposure to enduring questions. Neophyte students and interested citizens, if they wanted to make time for reading ten books covering all perspectives on American national security matters, should put this book on the list. But for every Yarmolinsky volume, one by Colin Gray or Edward Luttwak could provide useful balance.

VINCENT DAVIS
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Afghanistan and the Soviet Union *by Henry S. Bradsher. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1983. 324 pp. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $12.75.*

Books with two countries in their titles often present a simplified view of the area where the two disciplines intercect, a drawback that this book exhibits. The author, a journalist who has extensive experience in the USSR as well as exposure to Afghanistan, covers the same ground as many recent books by Afghan specialists. While readers will not find

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authority about the Soviet-Afghan encounter, Bradsher's Soviet perspective gives value to his analysis of the most recent events.

Bradsher's historical sketch is summary and does not warn the reader of the pitfalls of interpreting Afghan politics between 1950 and 1978. The central Pakhtunistan crisis is explained as a populist, irredentist movement that the Soviet Union exploited to the discomfiture of Pakistan and its American ally. If in fact Daoud Khan created the Pakhtunistan issue in order to build a stronger, more militarized government, then Soviet support for Afghanistan's military seems less inevitable. In his analysis of U.S.-Soviet competition before 1978, Bradsher implies that the United States failed to extend sufficient aid to Afghanistan, or underestimated its strategic importance. Yet which country gives more aid has not consistently affected the orientation of other countries (such as Egypt), and indeed in xenophobic Afghanistan the presence of Russians and Americans might have been a kiss of death for both countries' hopes of penetration. The strategic value of Afghanistan in the 1960s could hardly be underestimated. In the 1970s, when concerns about Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf increased, the cold war in overseas aid had largely petered out. The U.S. did not "lose" Afghanistan.

The writer does succeed in answering three questions expectably raised by such a book: whether the Soviets planned the 1978 "Marxist coup"; why the Soviets sent troops in December 1979; and what the prospects are for Afghanistan now. While recent literature has reviewed these questions extensively, Bradsher shows creditable judgment in his answers. The chronology of events leading up to the Saur Revolution in itself precludes the notion that it was directed from the Kremlin. The Soviets awoke late to the revolutionary potential in Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership lacked the will and ability to react to the volatile behavior of their ideological allies in the Third World. Moscow viewed the Afghan Communists as unprepared to make revolution, and as lacking internal unity or a viable means of control (neither the army nor the trade unions were effective nationally). Moscow was right, for the spontaneous revolution ran into trouble early.

The Soviets thus had to shore up a communism not of their own making. Bradsher expends much effort showing how the climate of world opinion and the experience of Angola, Ethiopia, and Aden all contributed to the Soviet decision to invade. This section of the book seems labored. Yet it is hard to believe that the Soviets did not foresee the difficulties they encountered, or that they countenanced them. Here Bradsher does not offer help.

Although the Soviet intervention failed in its probable original objectives, it may succeed in the long run by sovietizing the country. Since government control traditionally never extended outside the cities anyway, the Afghan regime can survive with Soviet military support. The urban citizens (2–3 million of them) can be fed by Moscow. Students—at the rate of thousands annually—can be educated in the USSR. This is happening now. The Soviets have an excellent record of success in creating new national elites. Hence Leonid Brezhnev's remark: "the revolutionary process is irreversible." Recent press reports highlight this process, but Bradsher anticipates them here.

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USSR in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System *by Marshall I. Goldman. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1983. 210 pp. $15.00.*

This is Goldman's contribution to the controversy over the prospects for Soviet society as it experiences an undisputed drastic decline in the vitality of its economic performance. His central question is what happens in a system that seems constitutionally unable to change when, as he sees it, significant change is indispensable for survival. Unfortunately, the issue remains as much a conundrum at the end of the book as at the beginning, but in between the reader is offered an informative review of the numerous political and economic problems confronting the USSR, and a capsule economic history of how it arrived at its current state.

Goldman intentionally uses the term "crisis" to suggest that whether the patient will survive is indeed an issue. He is not one for the "muddling-through" hypothesis, and asks whether the USSR will survive to the end of the century. His thesis is that as the outside world changes and as the task of economic management becomes more complex with modernity and size, the system created by Josef Stalin is becoming increasingly inadequate in innovative vigor, in satisfying consumer expectations, and in utilizing the capital and labor resources it has mobilized at such cost. Despite impressive economic growth over a long period of time, the Soviet regime has really never succeeded in modernizing the society, polity, and economy it controls. The system was established and functions in a way that has created vested interests blocking change, either from below or above. Though he does not specifically allude to this paradigm, Goldman's exposition suggests another cycle in the historical Russian tradition of strong government initiatives pushing economic development, creating in the process obstacles to a final escape from backwardness. There is in the Soviet experience something akin to Peter the Great's success and ultimate failure.

The ingredients Goldman assembles to support his thesis are thoroughly familiar to those who follow Soviet economic affairs, though he gives unusual weight to some recent phenomena that may be less well known, such as absolute output declines in key commodities (notably steel), worker disturbances, and food rationing. His overall conclusion is also strongly influenced by the Polish problem, which he sees the USSR as powerless to resolve. The prospects for quarantining the Polish disease and preventing its spread to other countries in Eastern Europe are not good, and the USSR may itself be vulnerable to challenges originating with consumer dissatisfaction.

Since the evidence he is looking at differs little from that most scholars of the Soviet economy scrutinize, the crucial question is whether he has the balance right. In my view, he does not; despite the obvious creakiness of the system, the Soviet regime is in a less parlous state than he suggests. Non-eligible improvements in economic performance are possible even within the constraints imposed by vested interests and by the political caution of the leadership. In particular, there are possibilities for significant ameliorative, if non-revolutionary, actions to improve agricultural performance and to revive worker incentives. Though little has happened during the first year of the Andropov administration, these changes are possible and likely, even if they must await a second succession.

In sum, on the big question it addresses, this book fails to satisfy. For all its insights, it is marred by overly simplistic formulations concerning the essential features of the

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system and a less judicious stance than is necessary in making considered judgments on so grand an issue as this.

ROBERT CAMPBELL
Indiana University

The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind *by Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider. New York, Free Press, 1983. 434 pp. $19.95.*

There are surprisingly few books that comprehensively examine trends in public opinion on specific types of political issues. *The Confidence Gap* is a very welcome addition to works such as Michael Schiltz's *Public Attitudes Toward Social Security*, Mildred Schwartz's *Trends in White Attitudes Toward Negroes*, Arthur Stinchcombe's and his associates' *Crime and Punishment: Changing Attitudes in America*, and Gladys and Kurt Lang's recent *The Battle for Public Opinion*. Lipset's and Schneider's data, methodology, and conclusions are impressive and interesting; they deserve widespread attention. The authors provide a complete synthesis of the enormous amount of survey data that track and help explain the recent decline of confidence in business, labor, and governmental leaders and institutions.

Much of the book's text and its many tables and figures are rough reading, but are well worth the effort. Among the many polls cited (including a few of possibly uncertain quality) are some conducted by approximately twenty polling organizations that are less well known than, for example, Gallup, Harris, National Opinion Research Center, Center for Political Studies/Survey Research Center, and the major television networks and newspapers, and that do not publicly report their data. The authors, no doubt, were able to obtain these data through their privileged positions and connections; certainly some regular means should be found for making such useful surveys available for academic research after they have lost their proprietary value.

The authors' methodology is an example of survey research near its best. They avoid emphasizing responses to single survey questions, preferring instead to examine responses to identical questions over time or several questions that together more accurately measure underlying attitudes. They are also attentive to changes and nuances in the wording of questions. It is somewhat disappointing, however, that no mention is made of differences or changes in survey methods—telephone versus personal interviewing—both within and across survey organizations. The statistical analysis is generally nicely done and neatly discussed, with the exception of the time series analysis, which is used to show that the public's confidence was affected by changes in national economic conditions. These findings may be unreliable because of auto-correlation (the required tests for this are not reported) and because of data points at unequal time intervals.

Lipset and Schneider adeptly organize and supplement the findings of the many studies that have examined the low levels of trust and confidence in American institutions, and they offer their own provocative conclusions. They describe a public that is not capri-

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cious; it responds in reasonable ways to events, the economy, other objective conditions, and especially the performance of institutions. Although citizens are dissatisfied, they are necessarily ambivalent. Business, government, and (most of all) labor and its leaders are disliked because they are powerful and self-serving, but each is still valued for specific reasons: business can be productive and serve the public; labor unions protect and benefit their members; and government provides a check on the power of business and can maintain free competition.

Is the decline in confidence and the public's ambiguity detrimental to American democracy? Is there a severe legitimacy crisis that neither the Carter nor Reagan administration has been able to end? Probably not, although national institutions are more vulnerable to major crises than in the past. Lipset and Schneider argue that certain underlying values have not changed, and that the public's ambivalence toward business, labor, and government can be resolved. The American polity does not require feelings of trust toward any of them; "rather, the system must show a proper counterbalancing of interests among the three" (p. 89). This conclusion is indeed unsettling. But the public has been able to feel positive about the country without having effective institutional leadership, because there has been this balancing and because most Americans feel they have personally fared well even when the country as a whole has been troubled.

The Confidence Gap is an ambitious book. Readers can hope that Lipset and Schneider (as they promise) and others will pursue similar studies of different political issues, which collectively will provide a full historical account of public opinion in the United States.

ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO
Columbia University

Governments Under Stress: Political Executives and Key Bureaucrats in Washington, London, and Ottawa *by Colin Campbell. Buffalo, University of Toronto Press, 1983. 388 pp. $24.95.*

The organization and staffing of central government agencies have rarely been studied comparatively. In this volume, Colin Campbell has made an ambitious effort to fill a part of that gap. Drawing on 265 interviews with senior officials in Washington, London, and Ottawa during the period 1976–79, the author undertakes to describe the prevailing organizational arrangements and personnel roles at the executive center.

The study is divided into four main parts. In Part I, Campbell surveys the arrangements for setting strategic priorities and generally coordinating interdepartmental affairs. This discussion is devoted largely to White House staffing under Jimmy Carter, the prime minister's office and cabinet office in Britain, and the prime minister's office and privy council office in Canada, with brief accounts of how Carter and the prime ministers of the time used their machineries. Part II presents a chapter on each country that reviews the machinery for coordinating economic policy, an area that produced notable stresses in each country during the 1970s. Part III turns to a discussion of the three chief devices

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for everyday central control—budget-making, management improvement studies, and personnel management. Part IV shifts gears to offer a statistical summary of officials' attitudes, communication patterns, and personal backgrounds.

The strength of this book is the descriptive detail it offers about Britain and Canada in comparison with some fairly well-known characteristics of the American central executive. Presidents have comparatively large staffs, but they have nothing to match the fifty to sixty senior officials experienced in government and working closely with the political leadership in Ottawa and London. For just about any topic Campbell chooses to look at—from the coordination of economic policy and interdepartmental committees to the training of higher civil servants—the U.S. operation looks amateurish.

The weakness of *Governments Under Stress* is that it has tried to do too much and cannot give in-depth attention to the many topics it covers. One sign of this problem is the uneven coverage given to the three countries. Canada is the nation Campbell knows best, and here the discussion deals with a range of developments from the late 1960s to the 1980s, including details on personalities and Ottawa infighting that are best left to aficionados of Canadian politics. Treatment of the United States is at the other extreme and borders on the superficial. With little historical background, for example, interviews in the Carter administration in 1979 are taken as somehow representative of central staffing in Washington. Discussion of economic and fiscal policy coordination pays much greater attention to Stewart Eizenstadt's Domestic Policy Staff and Michael Blumenthal's problems in the Treasury Department that it does to trying to understand the roles of the Federal Reserve Board, the Council of Economic Advisers, and informal coordinating devices that have evolved over the years. Campbell makes mention of the Reagan administration without really investigating how it has coordinated itself. In many ways, the coverage given to British topics is the most satisfactory, even though there were fewer interviews in London (forty-one) than elsewhere. The difference appears to be that in Whitehall, unlike in Washington, Campbell was talking with people who had thought deeply about their governing arrangements.

In addition to offering organizational description, Campbell seeks to argue that there are four more or less distinct administrative styles, depending on how far functions are centralized or delegated to line departments and how far jurisdictions are separated or allowed to overlap and compete. In an all too brief conclusion, the author begins to make good use of these familiar distinctions by arguing the conditions under which a given style will more or less make sense in the three national institutional settings. But these themes—like that of government "stress" in the title—are not pursued in any substantial depth. The resulting recommendations are often homilies, dicta, or some combination of the two. Jimmy Carter, of course, did just about everything wrong. For example, he should have appointed persons "who had more experience in Washington and were more representative of areas of the United States other than the South and the eastern seaboard. He should also have chosen more Catholics" (p. 348). I would not dispute with the new Professor of Philosophy and Politics at Georgetown University; still, it always seemed to me that it was Harvard University professors that were underrepresented.

HUGH HECLO
Harvard University

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Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies *by Ian Budge and Dennis J. Farlie. Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1983. 226 pp. $29.95.*

This is a book for anyone interested in elections. After almost four decades of research scholars have learned a great deal about the characteristics of voters and their motivations, have linked election outcomes to the condition of the country, and have even devised parsimonious and elegant rational choice models of voters' decisions. They have become skilled analysts of voters and voting, but have progressed only slightly in systematically explaining differences among elections. This book is a seminal effort to redress the imbalance.

The key to their research is what Budge and Farlie describe as saliency theory. It is unexceptional to observe that elections differ in terms of the issues over which they are fought. Accepting this, analysts have accounted for elections by linking issues with the way candidates and parties are evaluated. Implicit in this analysis is the notion that voters consider their preferences and the parties' positions on the issues and choose between or among them. Budge and Farlie, using these same variables, describe the process in a novel way. Issues, in their theory, are fairly long-lived conflicts. The specific points in dispute change frequently, but the general issue that gives rise to the particular dispute is persistent. Over the long term, there is also a stable relationship between the issues on the public agenda and the posture of the parties. (Democrats, for example, handle unemployment and social welfare problems; Republicans are more skillful dealing with inflation, excessive taxation, and so forth.)

The variable quality is the salience of the issues. Not only are some issues normally less important, but there are inter-election differences in the issues that excite the most dispute. This waxing and waning of issues decides elections because the competence of a party does not extend to all issues. Committed partisans always see their party as more able. The uncommitted voters, on the other hand, accept the common wisdom of the differential competence of the parties, and tend to vote for the party regarded as better able to handle the issue or issues most salient in the election. For example, when inflation and a weak national defense are the most important problems, there is a pronounced tendency for the voting to favor Republicans. In short, according to the saliency theory, a party wins by reinforcing its base vote with the support of persuadable electors who have been attracted by a campaign fought over issues on which the party is regarded as particularly competent.

The theory has great appeal. It recognizes the tendency of parties to talk past their opponents by emphasizing issues on which they feel strongest. The theory recognizes the persisting link between parties and issues and offers an obvious research design for testing the theory. Finally, it directs research away from modeling the vote, to a predictive explanation of election outcomes. The ability of their theory to explain data from several countries further enhances its appeal. Twenty-three democracies are the focus of their analysis. Western Europe and the Anglo-American countries provide most of the cases, but Japan, India, and Israel also provide data. The richness of the data is a critical component of their contribution.

This book, however, is not free of problems. The prose is occasionally very British, and,

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as a result, turgid reading for an American. There is also an unfortunate frequency of basic explanations of technique and method. Even more striking is a section toward the end of the book in which the authors analyze their data in a way that leaves the theory only modestly better than "at-hand" methods for predicting elections. My own modest and reasonable re-working of the data improved the strength of their finding.

These difficulties notwithstanding, *Explaining and Predicting Elections* is an important book. It offers new conceptualizations of the role of issues in elections and a new research problem. Budge and Farlie have established an important research agenda.

JOHN R. PETROCIK
University of California, Los Angeles

The Japanese Diet and the U.S. Congress *edited by Francis R. Valeo and Charles E. Morrison. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1983. 212 pp. $12.00.*

Given the dearth of published works on the National Diet of Japan, this volume will be welcomed by specialists of Japanese politics and of comparative legislative behavior. This is the first time that experts from both the United States and Japan have come together to analyze their respective national legislatures.

On the Japanese side, the essays by Koichi Kishimoto, Hiroshi Yamato, and Koji Kakizawa are the most informative. Kishimoto and Yamato analyze the structure and procedures of the Diet and the effect of the party system on the legislature's role in the policymaking process. Kakizawa traces the intricacies of the budgetary process and explains recent changes in this process.

Unfortunately, all of the Japanese contributors seem to be taking the wrong perspective. The authors are constantly evaluating the Diet's power in terms of its formal constitutional authority or in comparison to the U.S. Congress, the world's most influential national legislature. With the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) long-term control of a Diet majority and the party's tight discipline during formal voting, as well as with the existence of a highly competent national bureaucracy, the government's dominance over the Diet is a matter of common sense. A more interesting perspective is to ask why despite the above factors the Diet constrains the government and the ruling party as much as it does. Such an approach would lead one to emphasize the severe time limits placed on the government to get its legislative program through the Diet, the operation of an informal "unanimity" rule on most procedural questions, the problem of managing conflict within the LDP and the bureaucracy, as well as between the LDP and the opposition, the establishment of basic policy parameters as a result of government statements made in the Diet under the pressure of opposition questions, and the increasing policy expertise of key Diet members without bureaucratic backgrounds from both the LDP and the minority parties. None of these issues is adequately treated in this volume. Consequently, one gets the mistaken impression that the Japanese Diet is very weak, whereas in reality it is one of the more influential legislatures when compared to those in other parliamentary systems.

The articles on the U.S. Congress are analytically sharper than those on the Japanese Diet, a reflection in part of the greater maturity of scholarship on the former institution.

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The American contributors give perceptive accounts of the evolution of legislative-executive relations by examining changes in party organizations, the growth of the legislature's professional staff and support organizations, the growing involvement of Congress in the budgetary process, and the increasing congressional interest in foreign policy issues.

Although the comparison between the Diet and Congress could have been more systematic and analytical, this collection suffers from a more serious shortcoming. By bringing together numerous experts and legislators from both nations for the conference on which this volume is based, the organizers had the rare opportunity to address directly the question of how differences in the two legislative systems affect the management of relations between Japan and the United States, especially regarding the complex economic and security issues that currently strain the alliance. The editors, however, regretfully missed this opportunity.

MIKE M. MOCHIZUKI
Yale University

Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence *by G. Bingham Powell, Jr. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982. 270 pp. $25.00.*

G. Bingham Powell presents a systematic comparison of the political process in twenty-nine democratic countries since the late 1950s. Using statistical correlation and regression analyses, Powell compares three dimensions of political performance—citizen participation, government stability, and political order. The indicies chosen to measure these dimensions are, respectively, voting turnout, length of executive tenure and maintenance of a legislative majority, and riots and deaths resulting from political violence.

The point of this multivariate analysis is to build new causal explanations, and refine existing ones, that outline the general interrelationship of these three performance dimensions and account for the specific differences in them across the various democracies. Powell constructs his causal models by considering the performance dimensions against the background of the twenty-nine nations' social and economic environments, their constitutional settings, and their political party systems.

The results of this painstaking analysis prove to be rewarding. What emerges from the various statistical studies is a variety of subtle explanations, at times in accord with pre-existing theories of comparative politics or the reader's intuitions, and at times at odds with them.

For example, in developing a causal model of voting turnout, the author's initial consideration of economic, social, and constitutional factors suggests that small population size, higher levels of economic development, ethnic homogeneity, and proportionally representative parliamentary systems encourage citizen participation. While this initial observation is hardly startling to most students of comparative politics, Powell, expanding his model by considering the role of political parties and the relationship of this variable to those already considered, reaches a conclusion that provides a deeper under-

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standing into the nature of citizen participation. Specifically, he concludes that the real effect of economic, social and constitutional factors in voting turnout is indirect; it sustains the development of party systems and the choice of voting laws that, in turn, do get voters to the polls.

Similar explanations and numerous insights are offered in his analyses of the other measures of political performance. Nevertheless, there are two major inherent limitations to this type of analysis that are both readily apparent to the reader and frankly admitted to by the author. First, a theory that reduces political reality to so few, albeit well-chosen, variables, necessarily excludes other salient elements of the political process. Factors such as the role of leadership in shaping political performance, for example, are omitted. And second, although statistical analysis facilitates rigorous comparisons, its inability to measure important factors, such as political culture, results in conclusions lacking a certain subtlety and, what is worse, may lead to spurious correlations. For example, in assessing the effects of constitutional structure on political performance, Powell notes that different constitutional patterns are found in given geographic and cultural areas. As a result, he admits that "it is difficult to be sure if a particular type of constitutional arrangement performs as it does because of the incentives and limitations on behavior that it encourages, or because a given cultural background shapes both constitutional choice and political performance" (p. 73).

Despite these limitations, Powell's study contributes greatly, both substantively and methodologically, to comparative politics theory. His scholarly example and insight provide a font of ideas for future work in this area. What is more, Powell's concluding assessment that, in general, the democracies have lived up to their promise of freedom, competition, and responsiveness, is an inspiration to those who ponder over, or live within, such systems.

WILLIAM J. LONG
Columbia University

The Battle for Public Opinion: The President, the Press, and the Polls During Watergate *by Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang. New York, Columbia University Press, 1983. 353 pp. Cloth, $32.00; paper, $12.50.*

This is the first and, quite probably, will be the only detailed attempt to examine the interplay of the media, public opinion, and elites involved in the phenomenon called Watergate. The Langs appear to have read and to have included almost everything written about Watergate by participants and scholars, as well as all the relevant public opinion polls. They even report several unpublished studies, some of which they devised and executed. In smoothly written, carefully organized chapters, they lead readers chronologically from the first disclosures of the break-in through President Gerald Ford's unconditional pardoning of Richard Nixon. Each chapter recounts the events that transpired, then describes the media content (more impressionistically than quantitatively) and (less often) explains its causes, and finally traces public opinion. Occasionally connections are suggested among events, media content, and public opinion.

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Particularly notable are the two concluding chapters. In the first, "Continuity and Change," the Langs consider whether Watergate has produced basic changes in people's political orientations. More provocatively, in their chapter entitled "Public Opinion and the Resolution of Crisis," they try to put Watergate in comparative and historical context. They discuss similarities and differences in the roles and influences of public opinion and the media in Watergate and two kinds of crisis events: resignations of prominent public officials (for example, Kakuei Tanaka in Japan, John Profumo in the United Kingdom, and LBJ); and what they call "crises of confidence" (the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, the Dreyfus Affair, and the abdication of King Edward VIII).

As to their conclusions, the Langs downgrade public opinion: "The public never was an active participant in the campaign against Nixon" (p. 307). They attribute indirect effects to the media: "By the way they highlighted some events, by the context within which they framed these events, by the language they used to track developments, by linking news they reported to symbols familiar to the audience, and by the persons they singled out (or who offered themselves) as spokesmen in the controversy, the media certainly influenced the way the public—and politicians as well—thought about and defined the underlying issue" (p. 303). In the last analysis, though, it was neither an alleged hostile press nor public opinion but political insiders that drove Nixon from office (p. 301).

This is a restrained, cautious book. It sticks to its poll data, but the polls are not always illuminating. They provide limited demographic breakdowns and tell little about the reasons behind people's responses. Its conclusions are sometimes expressed so circumspectly as to be vapid, as in: "It is also difficult to believe that the premature loss of political idealization will not have rubbed off on the impressionable young in some way somewhere along the line" (p. 254). The author rarely speculate. For example, what might have been the "personal influence" effects of the Public Broadcasting Service's nightly rebroadcasting to its high status viewers of the Senate Committee's hearings, and accompanying them with comments and analysis from authoritative constitutional scholars (most memorably William Van Alstyne and John Kramer)? So I am not convinced that the claim on the dust jacket of "fresh insight into our understanding of the interplay between news media and public opinion in the political process" is justified.

Nonetheless, graced by Glenna Lang's appropriately somber cover, this methodical, sensible work recalls recent events in American political life that too many people seem willing, even eager, to forget. One can only hope that the publisher will give the book the widespread promotion it warrants.

DAVID L. PALETZ
Duke University

Too Hot to Handle: Social and Political Issues in the Management of Radioactive Wastes *edited by Charles A. Walker, Leroy C. Gould, and Edward J. Woodhouse. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1983. 209 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $5.95.*

The search for a policy to govern the disposal of radioactive waste illustrates the problems inherent in technologically complex public issues. The complexity limits effective public

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participation and poses a conflict between democratic values and rational efficiency. Uncertainty regarding the probability and effects of radioactive leakage limits the factual basis for decision-making. The general interest in disposing of the waste often stands in opposition to the particular interests of those who are less than eager to see their "back-yards" used for reprocessing or burial, or of those with a financial or bureaucratic interest in a specific solution.

These issues are analyzed from a variety of perspectives in this volume. The first three chapters provide a technical summary, including the nature of the wastes, the evidence regarding health risks, and the ten solutions that have been proposed. All of the alternatives, from burial on a remote island to satellites laden with high-level wastes, are risky; the nature of the risks are largely unknown. These uncertainties have resulted in forty years of hesitation and a succession of "definitive plans."

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 deal with the social and political questions, focusing on the nature of and the influences on public attitudes, determinants of perceived and acceptable risks, and the politics of nuclear waste management. It is here that the contributions of this volume lie. Perhaps most important is the combination of ignorance and strong opinions that characterizes the public debate. In their discussion of public attitudes, Stanley M. Nealey and John A. Hebert note that most individuals do not understand the basic technical issues. Many "anti-nuclear" citizens hold the misconception that nuclear weapons could be fabricated from civil nuclear waste without reprocessing (p. 103).

The issue is complicated by the statistical nature of the risks. Damage may result from sabotage, impact from a meteor, and poor design or construction. Each mechanism has its own probability and uncertainty. Paul Slovic and Baruch Fischhoff, however, find that "intelligent people systematically violate the principles of rational decision making when judging probabilities . . . and otherwise attempting to cope with uncertainty" (p. 115).

Given the volumes of radioactive waste currently in very temporary storage (some of which is leaking) and the absence of a clearly preferred solution, some public body must choose from among the alternatives. In his analysis of the politics of nuclear waste management, Woodhouse lists the myriad bodies that claim partial jurisdiction. Numerous executive and congressional agencies and committees are involved in decision-making. States add additional layers and complications, and forty municipalities have enacted statutes to regulate the transportation of wastes.

Given the poor environment for rational decision-making, a single body with authority to determine the best available solution to the nuclear waste problem might be suggested. The histories of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, however, demonstrate the ease with which such groups are captured by narrow interests. During their tenure, these committees did not even recognize the existence of the problem. Regulations were not enforced, and industry was allowed to take short-cuts.

Given the conflict that this issue and the broader problem of nuclear power have engendered, it is difficult to foresee a solution. Opposing views are strongly held, and Nealey and Hebert conclude that "decision making on radioactive waste . . . should not be delayed in the false expectation that . . . a consensus can be built" (p. 110). However, given the nature of the controversy and the political institutions, this advice is not likely

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to be taken. Perhaps the most important policy lesson is that when government becomes immobilized by technical uncertainty, the temporary "fix" can become permanent.

GERALD M. STEINBERG
Hebrew University, Jerusalem

The Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular Support *by George C. Edwards III. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983. 276 pp. Cloth, $16.95; paper, $8.95.*

This is a book that examines in a thorough and quite readable way the relationships among the president, the press, and public opinion. It is not a book about the presidency in general. Rather, it is a work that explores and explains how incumbents of that office constantly seek public support, and it examines several important issues attendant to that search. Although there is some material of interest to presidential scholars, its primary appeal undoubtedly will be as a first-rate text for undergraduate courses on the presidency and on public opinion.

With this limitation in mind, the author has done a remarkable job. He has organized a tremendous amount of material—scholarly literature, poll results, newspaper accounts—to present a comprehensive account of the manner in which presidents are affected by and therefore attempt to understand, manipulate, lead, and use public opinion. Moreover, he explores the components and indicators of public opinion that are relevant to presidential performance—such as polls (with particular care paid to the bases and meanings of approval ratings) and election results (both presidential and congressional).

Central to this constant wooing of public support, of course, is the president's relationship with the press. Edwards's discussion of this material exemplifies the strength of the book as an undergraduate text (as well as its limited appeal to specialists). One is introduced to the notion of the adversarial relationship between the press and the White House, and meets the White House press corps and the press secretary's operation. Edwards explores the typical issues of dispute between the press and the president, such as leaks, and superficial and biased coverage. All of this leads up to an interesting case study of the press coverage of President Jimmy Carter's 1979 "national malaise" speech, in which Edwards follows the nuances of that coverage day by day for the week following the presidential address. In sum, the examination of presidential-press relations, as well as the treatment of most issues in this book, is skillful, clear, and thorough.

Naturally, this is not a work without flaws. Some will find it annoying that mundane and readily apprehended observations are followed by a seemingly endless supply of examples. For example, the revelation that presidents control information by lying is followed by more than thirty examples related in rapid succession in the next three pages. (Talk about an embarrassment of riches!) Again, with the possible exceptions of some interesting material on presidential coattails and public approval ratings of presidents, specialists in presidential studies will find little reward for time spent with this volume.

Quibblings aside, however, one cannot deal adequately with the modern presidency without examining how presidents seek to establish and maintain public support and

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thereby enhance their "power to persuade." To enable undergraduate students to understand this process, one could do no better than to use this well-crafted text.

W. THOMAS WANDER
University of Oklahoma

The Presidency and Public Policy: The Four Arenas of Presidential Power *by Robert J. Spitzer. University, Ala., University of Alabama Press, 1983. 189 pp. $18.75.*

Discussions of presidential power have too often rested on the specific attributes of the individual in the office and are assumed to characterize the entire administration (in other words, "strong" versus "weak" presidencies.) This characterization occurs despite strong evidence that in virtually every other application leadership is situationally defined. Fascination with the "great man" theory of history as applied to the presidency received a shock with Vietnam and Watergate, but the true faith is hardy. People who ought to know better are already expressing disappointment with the absence of charismatic presidential candidates in the forthcoming Democratic primaries.

The author has provided a significant corrective to the "great man" theory or "rugged individualism" approach to assessing presidential performance. He demonstrates that in one major arena of activity, the president's domestic legislative program, the likelihood of success is determined more by policy type than by factors such as the president's party ties, political skill, or ideology.

Spitzer bases his refutation of conventional wisdom on an aggregate analysis of 5,500 proposals in the presidential annual domestic legislative programs over a twenty-year period, 1954 to 1974. To these proposals he applies the typology of distributive, regulative, constituent, and redistributive policies. The relationships among the policy types, their political environment in Congress, and likely legislative outcomes are illustrated by a series of case studies of important presidential proposals. The 5,500 proposals are then examined for trends and patterns related to the typology. Finally, 165 cases are selected for more detailed analysis.

The evidence indicates a strong distinction between distributive and regulatory policies on the one hand, and constituent and redistributive policies on the other. Presidents have a very limited impact on distributive policies such as public works, where the congressional patterns and interest groups are well organized. In regulatory policy, the political costs of involvement are high for both Congress and the president, such as in energy supply issues. The president has a low success rate, and a brokering role is his most politically feasible contribution.

In redistributive policy, such as housing, the president has a major leadership role. The president submits the most proposals and has more successful legislation in this area than any other. Focussing on this arena will enhance the perception of a president as a strong legislative leader. Constituent policy is a relatively calm arena in which the president has the highest success rates, such as in civil service reform.

Of course, many policy proposals are not pure types. Spitzer's use of the typology will

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enable one to predict the outcomes and strategies associated with mixed types. For example, increasing the redistributive elements in a distributive policy proposal will enhance presidential influence, while disaggregating a proposal toward the distributive type will enhance Congress's role and diminish the president's influence on the outcome.

Some might argue that Spitzer's typology demonstrates the obvious, but it has been neither obvious nor even emphasized in much of the scholarly writing on the presidency. When added to the thoroughness and skill with which this book is written, the typology is a significant contribution worth the reader's careful attention and assimilation.

DOROTHY B. JAMES
American University

Brandeis: An Intimate Biography of One of America's Truly Great Supreme Court Justices *by Lewis J. Paper. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1983. 442 pp. Cloth, $18.95; paper, $8.95.*

Lewis Paper has written a distinguished, full-bodied account of the life of Louis D. Brandeis, America's first public interest lawyer. His role as a Supreme Court justice is not overemphasized, but is seen in the perspective of his many other interests and activities. It is Chapter 16 before the author reaches the famous fight over Senate confirmation of Brandeis's nomination to the Supreme Court. Prior to that, there is a full account of his warm family ties, and the emergence of the public advocate who took on the transit, gas, and railroad companies, promoted savings bank life insurance, invented the "Brandeis brief" to justify social legislation, and became an activist Zionist leader.

While the published literature on Brandeis is massive, Paper has relied mostly on primary sources, including nineteen manuscript collections, interviews with Brandeis's surviving daughter, and all eleven of his surviving law clerks. The result is the humanizing of Brandeis, as well as insights into his relations with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and others of that period.

Holmes and Brandeis were the Court's great duo, the legendary dissenters. As Paper shows, their personal relationship was close; they would often ride back and forth to the Court together. But though they lived only a block apart, they seldom saw each other socially. Holmes's wife, in fact, did not like Brandeis. Neither did Justice James McReynolds, and apparently for the same reason. He almost never spoke to Brandeis in the nearly quarter century they served on the Court together, and declined to sign the collegial letter on Brandeis's retirement.

Paper's biography of Brandeis is of course not the first. Alpheus Mason's fine study, *Brandeis: A Free Man's Life*, was published in 1946. Mason's early writing about Brandeis had led to a close friendship between the two men; when Mason proposed writing his biography, Brandeis, without authorizing it, made his recollections and private papers available. He did this, Paper reveals, against the advice of Felix Frankfurter, who for some reason did not regard the Princeton University professor as qualified for the work. However, subsequently Brandeis did yield to the extent of giving his Court papers to Frankfurter with the surprising instruction that Mason was not to see them, even after his death. Years later, Frankfurter made the papers available to others, but not to Mason.

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It is well known that after Brandeis joined the Court he found it possible to continue advising presidents and shaping government policy through his young friend Frankfurter. Paper covers fully the Brandeis-Frankfurter connection, which he regards as overplayed by Bruce Murphy. Conceding that in the post-Watergate period Brandeis's manipulations through Frankfurter and financial support for him would be unacceptable, he regards the relationship not as employer-employee but as "emotional and intellectual." In Brandeis's own words, Frankfurter was "half brother, half son" (p. 257). Nor does Paper find any direct evidence that either man made an effort to keep the relationship secret. He directly refutes Murphy's suspicion that because of Frankfurter's role in the Sacco-Vanzetti case Brandeis felt it necessary to disqualify himself from voting on their plea for a stay of execution.

Paper selects only a few of Brandeis's major decisions for full discussion. One is the wiretapping case, *Olmstead* v. *United States* (1928). Brandeis was shocked, not only by the invasion of privacy, but by the fact that federal agents had violated state law. He was able to convince Holmes, thus stimulating the latter's famous condemnation of wiretapping as a "dirty business."

Paper's claim that Brandeis was responsible for Franklin Roosevelt's selection of William O. Douglas as his successor is challenged by Eliot Janeway, who professes to know that it was Jerome Frank. And it was Charles Warren, not Charles Beard, who wrote the 1923 article relied on by Brandeis in *Erie* v. *Tompkins* (1938).

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT
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Policymaking and Politics in the Federal District Courts *by Robert A. Carp and C. K. Rowland. Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1983. 203 pp. $17.95.*

Jerome Franks, in his still-popular 1949 classic *Court on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice*, pleaded with our court watchers and scholars to de-emphasize their penchant for concentrating on what he termed "the upper court myth" in favor of the trial court level. He regarded the latter as not only in crying need of careful analysis and evaluation, but also quite appropriately as the key level in primary judicial-policy formulation. The ensuing decades have fortunately seen a good deal of what he counseled, although much more needs to be done—*pace* the understandably continuing fascination with the Supreme Court (to which I avow a *mea culpa*). Carp and Rowland's recent tome represents a major contribution to the kind of work on lower tribunals (here exclusively federal) that Judge Frank had in mind.

It is not so much a major contribution in terms of its findings and conclusions—which do not represent overriding surprises to the cosmos of informed assumptions and educated guesses by students of the judicial process—than it is in their careful massing and identification of patently reliable and convincing statistical data in what is not only an impressive but indeed a staggering array of behaviorally sophisticated models, charts, graphs, figures, and tables. Equally impressive, and of course a prolegomenum thereto, is the authors' commendable acquaintance with the extant literature in the field. In those

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two aspects, *Policymaking and Politics in the Federal District Courts* (actually there is some apposite discussion of the circuits as well) renders a distinct service to our knowledge of the world of policy and politics that federal trial judges fashion and in which they function. Calling the proverbial spade a spade, the authors thus demonstrate convincingly that the personal and political backgrounds of the men and women who sit on the bench do indeed influence their rulings, and that it is simply absurd to deny, let alone wish away, the very real "stream of tendency" (surely there must be a happier term!) that informs judicial decision-making (p. 6).

The proof lies in the results of their remarkably thorough and widespread research, based on no less than 27,772 federal district court opinions, issued by fully 1,000 judges during the forty-four year period from 1933 through 1977, couched in terms of the "liberal"–"conservative" dichotomy as applied to 20 (sometimes only 19) issue dimensions ranging from "race discrimination" through "voting rights cases." It is an impressively arranged research model *cum* catalogue that, as the authors themselves suggest, would have made their basic point even more convincingly had they been able to include President Jimmy Carter's staggering total of almost 300 "highly partisan and ideological" (p. 52, n.4) appointments—152 of these under the Omnibus Federal Judgeship Act of 1978, the balance as a result of normal attrition. With indisputable logic and proof, they point to Carter's, Lyndon Johnson's, and Richard Nixon's appointees as the most ideologically committed, far more so than those of Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and Gerald Ford, to draw a comparison with another contemporary trio of presidents.

Several other significant specific conclusions are drawn by Carp and Rowland as a result of their research. First, in their forty-four year test period (1933 to 1977), Democratic federal district court judges were, not astonishingly, circa 7 per cent "more liberal" than Republicans; the former were also more so than the latter on 19 of the 20 dimensions examined, the sole exception (ranging from one to four percentage points) being "voting rights cases." Second, the appointees of Democratic presidents have been consistently more "liberal" than those of Republicans. Third, variances in "liberal propensity" from one circuit to the next have been more pronounced than perhaps anticipated, with the most liberal, the First Circuit, scoring about seventeen points higher on the liberal scale than the Fourth Circuit, the nation's most conservative—at least during the period studied. Not surprisingly, the District of Columbia is very close to the score of the First Circuit. Finally, as the southern district courts became more urban in character and as the number of the region's jurists increased, the voting pattern became increasingly progressive.

One may express the genuine hope that the two talented author-researchers will ultimately continue their significant studies to include the appointments of the two most recent presidencies. *De minimis*, the results ought to buttress the basic dichotomy so ably and interestingly articulated in this appealing and important work.

HENRY J. ABRAHAM
University of Virginia

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Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality *by Michael Walzer. New York, Basic Books, 1983. 345 pp. $19.95.*

Why, in our political community, can money lawfully buy television sets but not votes? Why not solve the riddles of distributive justice by giving everyone the same share of money, with all goods up for sale? The answer, according to Michael Walzer's provocative and important new book, is that to know what some goods have come to mean in our culture—education, for instance, or political office, or medical care—is to know that money is often an irrelevant criteria for their distribution. Instead, each of these goods carries with it a distinct and autonomous set of criteria, according to which it is justly distributed. Thus we share an understanding, however imperfect, that need, not wealth, is the relative criterion for distributing health care, that political offices are merited by talent, not by blood, and that basic schooling is available to all, not the hereditary few.

Capital in our society often betrays a tendency to violate this autonomy of distributive patterns—money assumes the status of "dominant good," and success in this one regard spills over into purchased success in every other sphere. To vindicate the autonomy of distributive spheres is thus to resist the tyranny and domination wrought by the conversions of capital in our society (or the dominant position of blood or caste in others) in the name of what Walzer calls "complex equality," with different talents rewarded in different spheres, but with no one person or persons (short of superhumans) accumulating success in all spheres.

Critical to Walzer's theory is the notion that we do share common understandings about the norms for distributing particular goods. But it can be argued that we disagree that offices or schooling can properly be distributed according to race (with affirmative action and busing) or health care according to money. Walzer is certainly aware, however, that conventions admit of dispute, and that different interpretations of a common tradition are possible. But what he focuses on are disputes that take place within and testify to a shared moral world. For example, with the case of affirmative action in the United States today, there is a shared conception that careers should be open to talents and that equal consideration is owed to individual candidates. Other societies have other norms regarding political offices (some represent groups as groups). But it is telling for Walzer that proponents of affirmative action do not invoke with any frequency alternative criteria of distribution (such as group representation). In the name of remedying past and present discrimination, they argue only for a limited and temporary exception from the candidate rights of individuals they implicitly affirm as the norm to be restored. Walzer disagrees with the necessity of the remedy (remedies that violate no one's rights, such as national commitment to full employment, have hardly been tried). But this kind of disagreement still affirms a common evaluation in this community of what jobs and job qualifications are.

By contrast, Walzer believes it is impossible for philosophy to adjudicate between the "justices" of separate political traditions. To this extent, his theory is "radically particularist," and partly relativistic. But, within a community constituted by shared social meanings, he argues it is possible to reach moral conclusions and to distinguish the more evocative from the less inclusive interpretations of our common values. *Spheres of Justice*

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is an important contribution to our coming into clarity about the substance of our common life.

JEFFREY B. ABRAMSON
Brandeis University

Supreme Court Activism and Restraint *edited by Stephen C. Halpern and Charles M. Lamb. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1982. 436 pp. $32.95.*

The debate over the judicial role in America is apparently timeless and inexhaustable. Since the last major collection of essays was published a decade ago, there have been important books and articles rearguing longstanding issues in the modern context. This new volume is not an adequate reflection of the best modern arguments. Its fifteen essays are organized into three groups, reflecting historical perspectives, normative perspectives, and behavioral perspectives. The latter essays are the most interesting, because they advance new data and employ somewhat more precise methods to test well-worn historical and normative propositions.

An outstanding contribution is Bradley C. Canon's "A Framework for the Analysis of Judicial Activism." Canon, carefully parsing the many dimensions of activism and restraint, identifies six criteria commonly used to designate decisions as activist or restrained—majoritarianism, interpretive stability, interpretive fidelity, the distinction between substantive policy and democratic process, the specificity of judicial policy, and the availability of an alternative, nonjudicial policymaker. Careful definitions substantially diminish uncertainty about the application of these dimensions to specific cases. On each dimension, certain kinds of judicial actions are deemed "highly activist," "somewhat activist," or "non-activist." Fourteen modern cases are categorized along these dimensions to show their application. Canon skates on very thin ice, however, when he assigns numerical weights on each dimension to each case. But he recognizes the artificiality of that exercise and uses it only to show that the most "activist" of his fourteen decisions sustain their rankings regardless of how the cases are weighted.

Harold J. Spaeth and Stuart H. Teger advance persuasive evidence that even when the Court appears "deferential" on federal and state regulatory policy, on civil liberties questions, and on issues of access, individual justices are guided by personal policy preferences. Activism and restraint by the Court is, therefore, principally the aggregate result of justices' preferences on issues. These findings tend to be confirmed by Anthony Champagne and Stuart S. Nagel's study of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Louis Brandeis, Harlan F. Stone, and Felix Frankfurter; but they add that justices' activism may be modified by their role on the Court (whether they are chief justice or an associate) and by the presence of other justices who share their views, thus encouraging dissent.

Gregory A. Caldeira and Donald J. McCrone analyze the Supreme Court's decisions invalidating federal and state statutes. They conclude that the Court has become steadily more active in striking down state laws, that the invalidation of federal and state legislation tends to be cyclical, and that periods of activism do not coincide neatly with periods

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of electoral realignment. But their argument that activism may precede realignment is not inconsistent with an argument, made elsewhere by this reviewer, that courts, as an element in majority party coalitions, may shape internal coalition policy in a way that provokes or at least contributes to critical elections.

Other essays—especially those by Charles Lamb, Marvin Shick, Lino A. Graglia, Arthur S. Miller, Henry J. Abraham, and Stephen Halpern—tend to reargue, in the modern context, such long standing issues as the definitions of activism and restraint, the democratic nature of Supreme Court policymaking, the Court's policymaking capacity (including its modern equity orders imposing detailed, positive duties on government), the Court's role in protecting or advancing liberty, and so forth. Joan Roelofs's Marxist interpretation of the Court's modern activism follows, not surprisingly, the Marxist line in other subdisciplines, but it is a useful reminder of that line in the judicial literature. She appears unclear whether the Warren Court was a deliberate tool of capitalism or only inadvertently aided it. But she is clear that the desegregation, civil liberties, and reapportionment cases "nationalized" rights, thus advancing policies without a proper base of mass support and removing them from popular control. The Court's doctrines, she argues, also favor geographic over functional (such as economic class) governance and centralize governmental functions (such as criminal justice) in a way that facilitates the suppression of radical movements.

Too much of this volume, on balance, reargues issues that have been better developed elsewhere. But there are several useful and a few exciting essays. Perhaps that is all that can be expected on a subject repeatedly considered for two centuries.

DAVID ADAMANY
Wayne State University

Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated: Economic Analysis and U.S. v. IBM *by Franklin M. Fisher, John J. McGowan, and Joen E. Greenwood. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1983. 443 pp. $25.00.*

In January 1969, on the last day of the Johnson administration, the U.S. Department of Justice brought an antitrust suit against International Business Machines, alleging monopolization of the computer market. The case was important and controversial from beginning to end. It droned on "forever." Pretrial maneuvering took up six years, and the actual trial extended for seven more years. The trial was still in progress in January 1982, without a decision as to IBM's guilt or innocence having yet been rendered by the District Court judge, when the Justice Department agreed to dismiss the case, concluding that "the case is without merit."

This book, written by three economists who were consultants to IBM on the case, provides a critique of the government's economic arguments in the case. In many ways, this effort is like "shooting fish in a barrel." The government's case was very badly managed, and much of its economic argument was poorly conceived. Time after time, the authors provide telling refutations of the government's case.

But, alas, the book is seriously flawed. For one thing, it is not a balanced presentation;

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it is strictly "the case for the defense." Thus, in the author's eyes, IBM can do no wrong. There are few ambiguities in IBM's actions, and only the government's arguments are flawed. The authors never tell how the government might have presented a sensible case. And they do not cite any of the recent academic literature on the computer industry (such as William Brock's *The U.S. Computer Industry: A Study of Market Power*) that tends to be less sanguine about IBM's behavior.

Even more seriously, the authors' argument concerning the exercise of market power is simply wrong. Repeatedly, they claim that "it is the ability of a firm to *raise* prices or market inferior products while excluding competition that constitutes monopoly power" (p. 99; emphasis added). And much of their evidence is marshalled to show that IBM was effectively constrained by its rivals, so that it could not raise prices. Hence, they conclude, IBM did not have monopoly power.

The flaw in the argument is that, contrary to the authors' assertions, standard economic theory predicts that a monopolist tends to *maintain* a price above that which an otherwise similar competitive industry would change. It determines the price through a "thought experiment" in which it starts, say, at the competitive price and then begins to raise the price. A higher price will have two effects—a smaller number of units will be sold, but there will be a higher profit margin on each unit that is still sold. The profit-maximizing monopolist finds the correct trade-off point between these two offsetting effects and then selects and maintains that price. Once the monopolist has selected that price, it is not in its interests to try to raise the price further, since it will lose too many sales (that is, to firms that produce substitute, but not identical, products).

Thus, even if readers accept the authors' claim that IBM could not have profitably raised prices at the particular times specified by the authors, this evidence by itself does not refute the claim that IBM had (and was exercising) monopoly power. IBM may have already raised its prices to the monopoly level, at which point it could not profitably raise its prices any further. In this respect, the authors have repeated the "cellophane" fallacy. In an earlier antitrust case, the government charged that Du Pont had exercised monopoly power in the production and sale of cellophane. The Supreme Court concluded in 1956 that Du Pont did not have a monopoly because the relevant market was all flexible wrapping papers and not just cellophane, as was indicated by the extensive possibilities for substitution by users of cellophane. But, as many commentators have since pointed out, if Du Pont was a profit-maximizing monopolist, it indeed should have raised its price on cellophane to the point at which some substitution was occurring; to have stopped short of that point would have meant passing up profitable price increases.

Accordingly, much of the book fails to be convincing. But the book does provide much useful information about IBM, computers, and the trial. And the authors' general conclusion—that antitrust cases should have a solid and sensible economics foundation—is surely correct.

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Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs *by Peter H. Schuck. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1983. 262 pp. $25.00.*

What and how good is the remedial framework within which citizen claims of misconduct by government may be heard by the courts and within which relief, in appropriate circumstances, may be awarded? This is the overarching question raised by this admirably comprehensive, yet lucid and incisive new book.

To be sure, generations of law scholars have entertained the question of judicial control of governmental action. So stated, the problem is neither new nor newly recognized. In fact, according to a critique of traditional administrative law teaching and scholarship that has itself become quite standard in recent years, the importance of the courts as controller of governmental action is overstated and certainly overstudied.

What is most distinctive about Schuck's analysis is his emphasis on remedy in general and on compensation in particular. Tort liability as such for government misconduct has fallen—as teachers of tort, administrative, constitutional, and civil procedure law know only too well—between the stools. Yet no one who reads the advance sheets, or for that matter who has spoken with the street-level public officials of whom Schuck speaks, could quarrel with his insistence that the damage remedy be reexamined.

Schuck's critique of public tort liability is devastating. While virtually none of the criticism he levels at the current "system" is strikingly original, he weaves them together brilliantly. The elements of the status quo practically spell perversity, chiefly the exposure of public officials to a personal liability bound to chill the risk-averse into self-protective measures that ultimately disserve the public. This is essentially the portion of the book that appeared, and was received with acclaim, in the 1980 volume of *The Supreme Court Review*.

It follows from Schuck's critique of the law in this area that a greatly expanded entity-based tort liability is the path to reform; but he reaches this conclusion with perhaps a bit too much haste. Is it so clear that damages against *anyone* should be the presumptive remedy for government misconduct? Powerful arguments have been made to the contrary. Schuck recognizes that if officer-based liability suffers from individual overdeterrence, strictly entity-based liability risks eliminating individual deterrence altogether. Still, his sketch of ways in which governments *might*, in reaction to adverse judgments, induce street-level officials to conduct themselves properly does not constitute much assurance that they *will*. Even less does his quick survey of disciplinary models promise individual accountability. Yet doubts about the actual deterrent and accountability values of entity-based liability are the real stumbling blocks to the legislative reform that Schuck so strongly favors. Finally, Schuck does not address (but at least does not purport to address) the question of defining the scope of governmental liability. It is tempting and perhaps justifiable to reserve that question for another day, but one should not be misled by Schuck's consistent references to government "misconduct," "wrongdoing," or "violation of the law" into supposing that the substantive measure of government liability is a simple or uncontroversial matter. When, after all, do expressions of dissatisfaction with government programs state a cause of action in tort? When, if at all, might the government be asked to pay for the perfectly justifiable (hence not wrongful) infliction of injury on its

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citizens? Such questions become only more immediate as the changes Schuck urges are put into place.

Part III presents an insightful and remarkably balanced account of the limitations of structural injunctive relief by courts as an adjunct to the general deterrence remedy of damages. It could easily stand alone as an important entry in the growing dialogue on judicially imposed structural reforms. Perhaps this section should have stood alone and ceded its place in this volume to the liability-related questions unanswered or perfunctorily answered. But if *Suing Government* does not do perfect justice to the practical complexities of developing the remedial system of the future, it has cleared the ground for that work and has sketched the outlines of future construction more effectively than any other recent contribution I know.

GEORGE A. BERMANN
Columbia University

Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims *by Jerry L. Mashaw. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1983. 238 pp. $25.00.*

Mashaw's book is much more than an analysis of the Social Security Disability Insurance program. It is an attempt, in the tradition of Max Weber, to develop a theory of administration that highlights the virtues of bureaucracy—primarily its ability to produce just decisions—as a counterweight to the dominant scholarly tradition in which bureaucracy is always the "bad guy." The book is also a masterful blend of synthetic criticism (of an enormous range of literature in public administration, organizational theory, economics, political science, sociology, and administrative law); empirical analysis (of a large and important social welfare program); and theory building (in the realm of models of justice and models of decision-making).

The book begins by noting that a disability benefit program (and presumably by extension, any social welfare program and perhaps any regulatory program) might plausibly be built on any one of three models. The first, bureaucratic rationality, focuses on maximizing the correctness of its decisions and minimizing both errors and other costs, such as delay, invasions of privacy, and opaqueness of the process to claimants. The second, professional treatment, seeks to maximize service to clients. The third, moral judgment, seeks to define values and assign entitlements on the basis of comparative evaluations of what is deserved; here, adjudication, which gives priority to the value of "fairness," is an example. But, Mashaw says, "over time the internal imperatives of bureaucratic rationality have triumphed" (p. 45), so that one wants to know how this triumph is to be explained, and whether it is a good thing.

Since the title of the book already tells a lot, I won't be giving away the punch line if I quote Mashaw's conclusion that "bureaucratic rationality—at least as practiced by the SSA [Social Security Administration] . . . is a promising form of administrative justice" (p. 222), whose promise is to "exercise power on the basis of knowledge" (p. 209). Mashaw is far from being a Pollyanna on the subject, however, notwithstanding his parting fantasy

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of a "superbureau" that could be "the political symbol of bureaucratic competence that can inspire, direct, and defend reform that is also instrumentally significant" (p. 225). Chapters 3 and 4 (about constraints on bureaucratic rationality), and Chapters 9 and 10 (on proposals for reform), are sober analyses, and his own suggestions for greater claimant participation and advocacy representation are carefully thought out.

Still, one thing troubles—Mashaw's underlying assumption that there is such a thing as a "correct decision" in the area of disability, or for that matter, in the other areas where he might suggest that bureaucratic rationality should serve as the dominant mode of decision-making. Disability, determination, welfare eligibility, and regulatory rules are fundamentally moral and political decisions—decisions about the allocation of rights to social aid, exemptions from the imperative to work, and entitlements to use state power on someone's behalf. In the case of disability, Congress chose to resolve this political dilemma by taking refuge in "objective medical criteria." But no amount of rhetoric about correctness, rationality, or objectivity can deny that these are value decisions. Mashaw recognizes that there are "obstacles" to instrumental rationality in the case of disability (Chapter 3), such as ambiguity of statutory goals or problems in getting factual evidence; but he treats these as hurdles that might be overcome with better administration. Bureaucratic rationality derives its legitimacy from its "claim to correct implementation of otherwise legitimate social decisions" (p. 26). Given such a separation, which puts politics in the legislature and correct execution in the agency, the bureaucratic model of justice may make sense—but that is a lot to give away.

DEBORAH A. STONE
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Sporting Woman *by Mary A. Boutilier and Lucinda SanGiovanni. Champaign, Ill., Human Kinetics Publishers, 1983. 289 pp. $21.95.*

"Sports gatherings are political gatherings," stated E. B. Williams (*Washington Post*, 24 June 1983). Old hat, perhaps, for the cognoscenti, but not for someone like this reviewer who skips the sports pages, leaves the television set during sports telecasts, and knows nothing about teams, leagues, batting averages, pitching records, and other arcane matters. Nonetheless, having read this book, I now find Williams's dictum bad news, especially for women.

Public sports policy has been controlled by the male sports establishment. Although 800 pieces of sports-related legislation have been introduced into Contress since 1950, few of them have been enacted. As in other industries, powerful lobbies work to retain exemption from anti-trust laws. Only the relatively poor overall showing of the United States in the Olympics finally led the President's Commission on Olympic Sports to recommend more government regulation. But the authors see this as merely making amateur sports another gambit for lobbyists. Nor are local sports free from political controls. The authors suggest that political scientists study such local factors as: the use of taxes to fund stadiums; the part played by real estate and commercial interests in locating such facilities; and the money invested in and profits made by television coverage, all of which in-

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fluence local sports policy. They make the same appeal to women, who must be able to identify and influence the bureaucracies that create sports-related policy, locally as well as nationally. For someone who remembers the olden days, it is hard to get used to the idea that sports and athetics are an industry not too different from other industries, and to note how similar the discrimination against women in this industry is to that in other industries.

Internationally, the Olympics—as illustrated, among other events, by the killing of eleven Israeli athletes in Munich in 1972 and by Jimmy Carter's 1980 boycott of the Moscow Olympics—are, like war, the continuation of politics by other means. The political use of athletes as, in effect, proof of national superiority becomes almost bizarre as applied to females when it requires official proof of sex. Mitigating the bias against women has been the success of women in Austria, Bulgaria, and the Netherlands—where they contribute half of all gold medals won—that has led other countries to improve their scores by concentrating on developing women among whom there is more room for improvement.

The lack of implementation of Title IX of the Higher Education Act of 1972 (no school has as yet lost federal funds for noncompliance) does not disturb the authors. Even if every jot and tittle had been meticulously enforced, nothing would have changed. The male sports establishment was still strong enough to retain and control any adverse effect the law might have had. Success of the law would instead have meant a capitulation by women to the male definition, structure, and ethos of the male sports world, including emphasis on revenue production from spectator sports and the reproduction in female sports of the inequities endemic in male sports.

Four feminist sports policies are: liberal (the most optimistic), which makes the most specific proposals; Marxist, which emphasizes class deprivation and sees revolution as necessary for the attainment of equality; radical, which wants new sports created or existing ones modified to incorporate women's experience; and socialist, which seeks to integrate Marxist and radical positions, but is more patient, cautious, humble, and optimistic. A major issue that engaged women in sports had to do with separatism versus integrationism—should they continue their separate course by way of the Association of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW), formed in 1970, or join the established National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)? This issue has since been resolved with the disbanding of the AIAW. But if experience in many parts of the world is any guide, integrationism rarely gives adequate weight to women's goals; males talk more, louder, and with more authority. And usually win.

JESSIE BERNARD
Washington, D.C.

Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Turnout, 1870–1980 *by Paul Kleppner. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. 238 pp. $26.95.*

This book begins with what Kleppner calls a "high order anomaly"—based on what survey-based analyses have shown about social and attitudinal predictors of the vote,

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trends over the last century should have produced increasing voter mobilization. Yet since the 1840s, aggregate turnout rates show a long-term decline in the level of voter mobilization. He uses a variety of aggregate data (from national, state and local levels), as well as survey data from more recent years to describe more precisely the contours of this anomaly and to attempt an explanation of it.

Kleppner offers a clear picture of trends with moving time series of party-vote and turnout figures. The difference between presidential and off-year turnout is used to make estimates of the size of the "core" electorate and the "marginal" electorate, and to demonstrate the shrinkage over time of the former and growth of the latter. When the trends are examined simultaneously, there are connections: "As competition has declined and party-vote instability has increased, turnout has plunged" (p. 27).

The "Era of Citizen Mobilization" during the last half of the nineteenth century is described by Kleppner in ways consistent with his previous work and that of Richard Jensen, Walter Dean Burnham, and other historians and political scientists (he dismisses the arguments of Jerrold G. Rusk and others about the relationship between corruption and turnout rather offhandedly). Nearly full mobilization, especially in the "Metropole" (roughly the more developed eastern and northeastern states) was because of the congruence of partisan and ethno-religious divisions.

The realignment of 1894–96 changed this system in many ways. By restructuring geographical bases of cleavage, it reduced competition in many areas, especially in the Northeast and the South. The "system of 1896" also eroded old coalitions (for example, by weakening the link between "wets" and Democrats) without replacing them with strong new socioeconomic (or ethno-religious) bases for party attachments. Kleppner argues that, in combination with new personal registration requirements, the decline of party competition is the best explanation for the decline in turnout. Though the realignment of the 1920s and 1930s shattered the regional cleavages that characterized the "system of 1896," it effected only an "incomplete" new class-based alignment and produced a temporary and relatively mild increase in the size of the marginal electorate. Finally, in recent years (1964–1980), trends in electoral participation have declined ever more steeply (except among blacks) at least partially because of changes in age distribution, feelings of political efficacy, and partisanship. The strong period effects found in the voting trends of this period are thus explained in terms of the decay of parties, which is in turn linked to social changes.

Among the strengths of Kleppner's book, in fact, is this careful attempt to suggest and establish connections among social and demographic trends, issues of policy, coalitional attachments to parties, and turnout levels. His overall argument is reminiscent of E. E. Schattschneider's notion of the bias of the cleavage structure.

Among the book's few weaknesses is a lack of graphic presentation of the data, which would have made some points more intuitively clear. More bothersome is Kleppner's attempt, despite his sensitivity to context, to use current cross-sectional relationships (such as between education and vote) as plausible predictors of turnout in past eras. And although survey data are obviously available for the most recent eras and not for the earlier ones, replicating some of the aggregate analyses performed for earlier periods would have allowed more for straightforward comparisons between past and present levels of turnout.

Overall, however, this is a careful and intriguing study of electoral turnout. While there

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are no surprises here (the research is consistent with other work in political science and history), the integrative nature of Kleppner's data analysis and arguments makes the book an immensely useful one.

KRISTI ANDERSEN
Ohio State University

Science Policy from Ford to Reagan: Change and Continuity *by Claude E. Barfield, Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1983. 142 pp. Cloth, $13.95; paper, $5.95.*

As the bland title does not quite convey, this is a sympathetic but not entirely uncritical account of the Reagan administration's approach to science policy, contrasted with that of both the Democratic and Republican administrations that preceded it. The major continuity is reflected in the willingness to provide public support for basic research (more heavily now via the defense agencies) and for applied research and development in defense and space. The change has come in the refusal of the present administration to pursue the efforts initiated by Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter to promote public-private cooperation in civil technology, especially in the energy sector.

On some issues, as Barfield points out, the administration has been ready to rise above principle. In deference to congressional opposition, it has not dismantled the Department of Energy (DOE), although it continues to request approval for the transfer of energy research and development (R and D) programs to the Department of Commerce. It has agreed to continue the $3.2 billion Clinch River fast breeder demonstration—as a favor to Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker, and over the opposition of Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman (who, as a congressman, denounced the "nuclear breeder lobby"), the Heritage Foundation, and a bipartisan DOE advisory panel. While support for research on fossil fuels, conservation, and solar alternatives has been drastically cut back, funding for research on nuclear power—hardly an infant industry—has been increased; the requested support in the fiscal 1983 budget would absorb no less than 66 percent of all energy R and D.

Barfield's critique of the Reagan approach to science policy is limited. He taxes the administration for its inconsistencies, urges that Clinch River be terminated, and argues that conservation research should be supported because the building industry is too fragmented and unaccustomed to doing research to be trusted to achieve the savings conservation can bring. He recommends that the administration develop some coherent idea of what it intends to accomplish before proceeding with any transfer of energy agencies. He raises the question, without trying to suggest answers, of what effects on other national priorities will result from the decision to give the major role in R and D to the Department of Defense.

Had he looked at the actual results of the Reagan policy, Barfield's critique could have been rather more telling. A case in point is DOE's decision to drop support of a utility-sponsored project to develop a commercial facility for generating electricity from a mixture of coal and oil. As the price of oil declined, the utilities gave up the project. The

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idea has not been abandoned everywhere, however. In Japan, the unrepentant bureaucrats of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) have encouraged a variety of companies to pursue the same goal with investments of hundreds of millions of dollars. Supply-side theory may insist that if something is worth doing, private industry will do it without prodding; but the Japanese seem to think otherwise. That is one reason Japan is challenging the United States in virtually every area of new and old technology.

Similarly, although he presents the rationale behind the Reagan administration's approach, Barfield fails to assess its validity. He can hardly be unaware that both the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health make allocations by field with the advice of scientists, and that project support is provided by peer review. Nevertheless, he cites without criticism the notion of Milton Friedman (who opposes public support even for basic research) that "the scientific ability of really able people is being diverted from the goals they would like to pursue themselves to the goals devised by government officials" (p. 132). Bureaucratic fallibilities are duly noted, but the short time horizons of businessmen are ignored. Economic rationales are embraced as if they were the only conceivable justification for public policy, and as if environmental and other considerations were unworthy of consideration on their own terms. Government-sponsored programs in the private sector are said to be counterproductive—except of course in defense. Even President Reagan may be having second thoughts about this narrow, negative perspective on the role of government, if his recent discovery of the need to protect the environment and improve high technology industry and education is any indication.

SANFORD LAKOFF
University of California, San Diego

Science and the National Environmental Policy Act: Redirecting Policy Through Procedural Reform *by Lynton K. Caldwell. University, Ala., University of Alabama Press, 1982. 178 pp. Cloth, $17.75; paper, $7.95.*

Lynton Caldwell, one of the first political scientists to study environmental policy, has written an excellent and timely analysis of the effects of the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA is the law that created the Council on Environmental Quality, declared a national policy for the environment, and mandated that environmental impact statements (EIS) be drafted for major governmental actions. Caldwell provides a reasoned, balanced evaluation of NEPA's impact. Although it is not quantitative, the study draws on evidence from a rich variety of sources, and argues that NEPA has helped reduce the government's contribution to environmental degradation. A drafter of NEPA and a consultant to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Caldwell does not portray himself as an objective observer. He is clearly proud of the law, and in several parts of the work defends the act against attack and criticism. In all cases, his defense is sound and persuasive.

Essentially, the EIS requires federal agencies to think before they commit resources to major actions. The EIS requirement resulted in a major substantive policy change. It

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reduced the number of unwise projects undertaken by government. The EIS requirement fostered the growth of environmental analysis units in federal resource development agencies. Although these organizations are not equally effective, each provides a new institutional capability for thinking. This capacity for environmental "thinking" did not exist before NEPA.

Caldwell's book is fairly recent and includes comments on the fate of NEPA under President Ronald Reagan. He notes that "as of early 1982 there has been little to suggest that it will be positive" (p. 138). The virtual destruction of the Council on Environmental Quality and the gutting of EPA's Office of Federal Activities (EPA's EIS review unit) indicates that the success Caldwell observed in the 1970s may not be repeated in the 1980s. For that reason, this work comes at an important juncture in the history of American environmental politics. With the resignation of the entire political level of the EPA in the spring of 1983, a profound attack on the values expressed in NEPA has been firmly resisted. Caldwell's work reminds readers of the basic facts of social and economic life that make NEPA necessary, as well as of the essential needs that created environmental politics. The importance of this study is that it goes beyond a simple analysis of the impact of a procedural reform, and addresses basic issues such as the relationship of science to society and the political control of technology. The author discusses the type of science that needs to be developed if environmental impacts are to be analyzed. He details the difficulties Americans are having and will continue to have as they struggle to develop a new environmental science.

Throughout the book readers are kept aware of Caldwell's advocacy, and his belief that we are in the midst of an environmental crisis. "I cannot agree," he notes, "with optimists who believe that our environmental problems are under control. . . . The most realistic assessment of our circumstances is that a beginning has been made" (pp. 144–45). *Science and the National Environmental Policy Act* assesses one of the small but critical procedures that have been devised to protect the biosphere.

This reviewer is in fundamental agreement with Caldwell's perspective on the environmental problem. Whatever readers' views are on this issue, they will find this work provocative and stimulating. It is without question a major contribution to the literature of environmental policy.

STEVEN COHEN
Columbia University

Scarce Natural Resources: The Challenge to Public Policymaking *edited by Susan Welch and Robert Miewald. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1983. 288 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $12.50.*

Natural Resources: Bureaucratic Myths and Environmental Management *by Richard L. Stroup and John A. Baden. San Francisco, Pacific Institute for Public Policy Research, 1983. 148 pp. Cloth, $25.00, paper, $9.95.*

The vast increase in the number of books published in the social sciences in recent decades has improved the diversity of views represented, but it also has discouraged a

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common dialogue. These two books—both from publishing houses (and, with the Stroup and Baden book, from a right-wing institute) that were founded in the last twenty years—reflect this mixed result. In addressing similar issues of national policy about land, water, agriculture, energy, and environmental quality, they present differing perspectives, but do not really engage competing views in argument.

Stroup and Baden add to the growing public choice and property rights literature that attempts to apply microeconomic concepts to non-market behavior. While resisting the excessive formalization and jargon sometimes found in neoclassical economics, the authors heavily rely on that field's traditional assumption that individuals and organizations seek to maximize their own self-interest. They argue that the federal presence has harmed the public interest by making public servants do the wrong thing, and by leading businesses astray as well. Stroup and Baden believe that well-defined and enforced property rights in an unfettered market would better handle these matters than has the political process.

The Welch and Miewald book is a collection of thirteen chapters, most of them by political scientists. The book's first half (titled "Theoretical Approaches to Resource Policymaking") discusses classical, modern and post-modern political theory, historical perspectives, and comparisons between bureaus and between the United States and pre-literate, communist, and West European societies. Its second half has five case studies of resource issues. The authors seem more oriented toward description and process than toward prescription and results. However, the view seems to emerge that a situation of scarce resources would require more government rather than less.

Government and the market each have their advantages and disadvantages as ways to allocate resources, and the best solution is likely to be some combination of the two. These books tend to confuse the issue by portraying the choices as mutually exclusive, idealizing one option while ignoring or caricaturing the other. Thus, the Welch and Miewald book devotes little attention to the market as a means of resource allocation—a surprising omission given the prominence of markets in the natural resources field, where they extend even to some areas of U.S. public ownership, such as the competitive leasing of energy resources. Perhaps a greater involvement by economists in the book would have supplied more realism here.

In their affection for markets, Stroup and Baden cannot for their part be accused of ignoring the government alternative, but their vigorous effort to discredit politics leads them to distort bureaucracy beyond recognition. Consider this typically breathtaking statement: "It is, after all, obvious that despite reasonable intentions, bureaucratic entrepreneurs in the Forest Service, the BLM [Bureau of Land Management], the Bureau of Reclamation, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs have consistently and systematically subsidized the deterioration of environmental quality" (p. 102). The book shows nothing of the kind. It does show that sometimes government has damaged the environment, and sometimes the market has protected it. But in their highly selective use of examples, the authors fail to weigh the favorable impacts of government and the unfavorable impacts of the market. For example, they repeatedly flay the BLM for chaining pinyon-juniper habitat, but do not mention that private ranchers have also engaged in this practice, or that the BLM has drastically reduced it since 1970.

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To this reviewer, it seemed that certain strengths of each book corresponded to weaknesses in the other. The useful empirical material in the Welch and Miewald book is not covered by a consistent theoretical approach; the other book strongly emphasizes theory, but does not back it up with convincing evidence. Thus, in fixing on self-interest as a motivation, Stroup and Baden seem not to realize how ambiguous it is as a source of predictions. Moreover, they ignore the growing evidence from political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and economics that other motivations such as habit, loyalty, shame, pride, envy, altruism, fraternity, and compassion are important not only in nonmarket situations, but often in the marketplace itself. They also do not even begin to acknowledge the large social science literature concerning the many forms of outside accountability to which bureaus are often subject. In fact, many of the a priori assertions made by Stroup and Baden are contradicted or qualified by evidence found in the other volume.

The Stroup and Baden volume is the better produced of the two, although it lacks a real conclusion, and two chapters written by an assistant are not well integrated into the rest of the book. The Welch and Miewald volume has more than its share of garbled passages (p. 62), misspellings (p. 139), omitted references (p. 147), and errors ("Echo Peak," p. 177), and the editors have not managed to tie it together as a unit. However, several of the chapters stand easily on their own. Lester W. Milbrath reports on an unusual survey of environmental attitudes in four nations, while Jeanne Nienaber gives a summary of a larger study usefully comparing the growth of seven different natural resources bureaus, and Helen M. Ingram and Dean E. Mann offer a helpful assessment of a wide selection of different policy instruments. The case studies of the politics of agricultural commodities (by Don Hadwiger), soil conservation (by William P. Browne and Kenneth J. Meier) and regional conflict over coal taxation (by Uday C. Desai and Osbin L. Ervin) are sound and in some places quite penetrating.

The growing popularity—despite its demonstrated defects—of the public choice-property rights approach suggests that those not satisfied with it had better redouble their efforts to reach consensus on relevant, testable theory, or do a better job of explaining why such theories are beyond reach. It must be admitted that the Welch and Miewald volume makes little progress in synthesizing and applying theory; in fact, there is little connection between the book's theoretical half and its case study half. Political scientists should not be blind to insights brought from other fields such as economics; but they can insist that these theories grapple with the existing literature, and that they be genuinely interdisciplinary rather than dominated by any single discipline. The extent to which these two books talk past one another helps explain why today's gap between public choice-property rights theory and political science evidence is so large. These competing approaches have something to offer one another, but given the ongoing proliferation of books like these and the consequent fragmentation of intellectual life, I see little prospect that this will happen.

CHRISTOPHER K. LEMAN
Resources for the Future
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Environmental Diplomacy: An Examination and a Prospective of Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Environmental Relations *by John E. Carroll. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1983. 382 pp. $22.50.*

Believing that Soviet-American competition is the central issue of world politics and that strengthening or at least maintaining its strategic position should be America's overriding concern, Americans tend to overlook the significance of policy issues arising out of the representation of private or local domestic interests abroad. In contrast, the overriding concerns of Canadian foreign policy are trade, the defense of domestic industries, fish, and, increasingly, the environment. This difference in orientation is, perhaps, best reflected in the organization charts of the U.S. State Department and Canada's Ministry of External Affairs. In the U.S., the Office of Canadian Affairs is a low-profile unit located in the Bureau of European Affairs. In Canada, the Bureau of U.S.A. Affairs is the preeminent division of the ministry.

This excellent volume provides succinct case analyses of over twenty Canada-U.S. transboundary environmental disputes. Each case analysis carefully delineates the causes of the conflict, the interests involved, the participants, the role played by bilateral diplomacy and the International Joint Commission (IJC), and the current status of the dispute. Although the scope of this volume includes the entire period following the establishment of the IJC in 1911, Carroll regretfully concludes that most of these disputes, old as well as new, are still present. Furthermore, he demonstrates that conflicts of interest over the exploitation of transborder common-property resources matter a great deal. One cannot read this volume without concluding that what is or is not done about acid rain or even upstream development on the Flathead River, for example, may have a more immediate effect on the lives of a larger number of Americans than will anything that is likely to happen, say, in Poland.

At the same time, Carroll demonstrates that diplomacy has not and probably cannot deal satisfactorily with these issues on a case-by-case basis, and concludes that most could be resolved locally, but that what is needed for their local resolution is a framework of "clear rules, known to a great number of people in both nations, by which the two governments and all other actors will play. Such rules would clearly set out the governance of all types of transboundary environmental issues and how all parties are to discharge their duties. Institutional mechanisms will perforce need to be established to implement such a goal" (p. 301).

Carroll does not endorse a specific framework. However, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the fair and efficient resolution of environmental conflicts are already well established in the literature: a definitive assignment of property rights; the elaboration of institutional arrangements that would allow interested parties to obtain local remedies; and joint compensation to correct the maldistributive consequences that would result from greater reliance on private and local remedies.

According to the author, the negotiation of this kind of framework ought to be the main objective of Canada-U.S. environmental diplomacy. Unfortunately, tradition and lack of attention commit the U.S. to dealing with environmental disputes on a case-by-case basis. Organizational interest on the part of the Ministry of External Affairs—managing these kinds of disputes is after all its key mission—probably also commits Canada

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to the status quo. However, Carroll suggests that the acid rain issue may be important enough and serious enough to cause both countries to rethink their positions. I sincerely hope he is right. The U.S. does not now have a Canada policy; it should.

FRED THOMPSON
Columbia University

The Logic and Limits of Trust *by Bernard Barber. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1983. 190 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $9.95.*

Despite the centrality of the notion of trust for modern social theorists from Emile Durkheim to Niklas Luhman and Talcott Parsons, Barber argues in this slim but highly stimulating volume, it has rarely been defined unambiguously. Barber distinguishes at least three major dimensions: a sense of the basic stability of the present and future national and moral order; technical competence; and fiduciary responsibility. When these distinct meanings are not held apart, sociological analysis is led astray. When public opinion polls documented a lack of trust in President Jimmy Carter, for example, what was involved seemed largely a judgment as to his competence. In contrast, similar judgments with regard to President Richard Nixon did not seem to question his technical competence, but rather his lack of political and moral responsibility.

Barber argues that this failure to make needed analytical distinction when using the notion of trust also counts for the tendency of democratic-elitist theorists such as Gabriel Almond, David Easton, and Parsons to attribute evidence of dissatisfaction among the American electorate to alienation from political values and institutions—when it is equally possible to read this evidence as an indication that major parts of the electorate are deeply committed to such values, but judge present incumbents to fall short of responsible democratic standards. What is interpreted as irrational withdrawal may in fact be realistic distrust. Even if it may be granted that effective government requires considerable trust by the electorate, distrust in regard both to competence and to moral responsibilities of the governing may be an essential ingredient of a participatory vision of democratic politics.

In addition to the dialectics of trust and distrust on the political scene, Barber analyzes these in four other institutional settings—the family, business, the foundations, and the professions. In each case, he concludes that exclusive reliance on trust is not enough. Abuses of power or lack of competence can never be prevented solely by trustful reliance on authority, but need to be complemented by other social control mechanisms. Barber argues that although insiders are disposed to feel that if they are only trusted the institutions they dominate will operate on an optimum technical and moral level, it behooves the outsiders to have a measure of rational distrust if incompetence and abuse are to be checked.

Barber has the rare ability to move in a seemingly effortless way from high-level theoretical considerations to concrete examinations of the workings of institutions. This ability serves him in good stead here. My main complaint is that, given the small size of this work, he has often not been able to give his subjects the full treatment they deserve.

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As a result, readers get a series of highly significant observations that, however, fall short of full and exhaustive treatment. Given the rich harvest Barber has gathered, it may be ungrateful to be asking for more in almost every chapter. Yet had the author been willing to expand his treatment a bit, he would not have been forced in places to resort to undocumented obiter dicta, such as "the decline of trust has resulted in an increasing divorce rate" (p. 27).

LEWIS A. COSER
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Reason in Human Affairs *by Herbert A. Simon. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1983. 115 pp. $10.00.*

In this small book, Herbert Simon outlines the limits of the Olympian model of rationality and attempts to mark out the processes and supports that maximize the reason possible in human affairs. He claims to make no new scientific contribution in this work. His goal is to recall and synthesize—an important contribution in a period when knowledge has become so fragmented among the various disciplines and the past is too often ignored in the pursuit of the novel.

Simon begins his analysis by showing the sheer impossibility of any person simultaneously considering all the values open to him or her at any one time. He makes the case (as he has earlier) for the value of the pragmatic trial and error approach to choice-making. He next confronts the notion that competition and the survival of the fittest may provide another kind of rationality to human processes. Working within the natural selection framework, he admits that those species that survive show a certain adaptability to a niche. But even nature's rationality is bounded. That niche to which an organism is adapted is not the only possible one, and that adaptation is not the final "best" one. He also demonstrates, taking the case of the "altruistic gene," that even self-sacrifice may have a positive survival value for closely related individuals.

His third chapter is especially valuable as a critique of the libertarian philosophy that is once again flourishing in the United States. People are not Leibnizian monads, he points out, but individuals raised in cultures that shape what they are, how they act, and how much they obtain. The greatest determinants of the potential affluence of a newborn child are the decade of its birth, its native land, and the status of its family. (I would add its sex.) Most beliefs are gained not through direct experience, but by paying heed to credible and legitimate sources in society. Moreover, institutions do not limit rationality, but provide frameworks for stability and information processing that make some rationality possible. Market structures, for example, reduce the actor's need for comprehensive information, and adversary proceeding in the courts focuses attention on the more relevant data. Politicians and political organizations focus attention and limit the alternatives about which citizens have to make decisions at any one time. Under these circumstances, rationality for citizens consists less in making up their own minds on each issue than in listening to political experts they trust.

For all its virtues, Simon's essay is disappointing in some ways. In his critique of con-

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temporary Social Darwinists, he does not dig as deeply as Lester Ward did in dealing with the Social Darwinists of the 1880s. In Simon's discussion of altruism, for example, the use of the extreme case of the altruistic gene (such as one that causes the individual to be sacrificed to the benefit of the group) loads the case against the kind of altruism relevant to human affairs. Limited other-regarding acts short of self-sacrifice (such as respecting the life of others, sharing in the gathering of food, care for the young) may well increase the chance of survival of those groups in which many individuals show these qualities. Moreover, the very phrase "survival of the fittest" has in it a hidden moral evaluation that Simon does not adequately address. Roaches, despite their long life on this earth, are superior in nothing that matters to human beings. The very qualities that give some persons an edge in intra-group competitions for leadership positions (such as ruthlessness and a predisposition to resort to violence in times of crises) may well have extra-group results (such as war and the deaths of the most able young men) that work against the group's survival.

At a more basic level, Simon gives us only a cursory and limited discussion of the role of emotion in human choice-making. Simply accepting the traditional view that openly emotional arguments are suspect, he ignores the whole psychoanalytic and literary tradition that shows that coldly given views may be even more dangerous—disguising appeals to motives such as ambition, malice, or the need to avoid emotional and cognitive uncertainties in the world. His discussion of intuition and creativity, moreover, misses the relevance of character structure to that enterprise. Simon argues that intuition is based on the accumulation over a long period of time of a reservoir of "data pegs" on which new stimuli can be hung. But he ignores the work of psychoanalysts such as Lawrence Kubie and Elliot Dole Hutchinson, who point out the importance of the ability to take psychological risks (to step out into the unknown) and the cognitive ability to "break set" to creativity in individuals.

Most important, Simon does not really delve into the distinction Sigmund Freud made between instrumental and substantive irrationality. The possibility that human beings may be guided by strong drives of which they are not aware, with results they never even try to calculate, is a possibility of great potential significance to the management of human affairs. In these days of nuclear posturing, that kind of deeper irrationality may guide men and women who can make marginal, pragmatic adaptions—while refusing to take countenance of the direction in which they are heading.

BETTY GLAD
University of Illinois, Urbana

The Border That Joins: Mexican Migrants and U.S. Responsibility *edited by Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue. Totowa, N.J., Rowman and Littlefield, 1983. 254 pp. Cloth, $26.50; paper, $17.95.*

H. L. Mencken once stated: "For every complex problem there is always a simple answer—and it is always wrong." This quote was cited by Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., in the final essay opposing the adoption of various forms of foreign worker programs to redress

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the current problem of illegal Mexican migration to the United States. His argument, stated simply, is that such programs benefit employers, allowing them to reduce costs and enhance control over labor, while at the same time denying job and income opportunities to the most vulnerable and marginal groups in society where unemployment is highest. Briggs directly refutes a widely held view expressed in the preceding essay by Edwin P. Reubens that alien workers complement the U.S. labor force by filling low-level, unskilled jobs that American workers, with access to other means of support and compensation such as foodstamps and unemployment benefits, will not take and do not want.

The two analyses, outlining the parameters of the domestic policy debate and the alternatives available for national decision-makers, form an appropriate conclusion to a book that attempts to outline the philosophical, historical, and political dimensions of a contentious and pressing issue in U.S. public policy. This book does not pretend to be a policy guide to the issue of illegal Mexican migrants in the U.S. Rather, consistent with the broader aim of the Maryland Studies in Public Philosophy, the volume provides a discussion of the philosophical framework, the historical precedents of temporary and guest worker programs in the United States and Europe, current labor patterns in the United States and Mexico, and the conflicting economic analyses and proffered solutions of Briggs and Reubens. It is an ambitious task, and the book demonstrates some of the benefits and limitations of such an undertaking.

The eight essays outline the complexities of the issue while suggesting certain guideposts for the policymaker. But the essays are uneven, and the disciplines of politics and philosophy are sometimes awkwardly and uneasily united. The first essay, by Judith Lichtenberg, on national interest and responsibility is a tortuous exercise in philosophical reasoning and poorly constructed English. For example: "It is obvious that what is and is not reasonable depends on the particular case, especially on the necessitousness [sic] of the claim" (p. 18). She does raise, however, a few important points that help lay a foundation for the subsequent articles. In an interdependent world, which some economists are beginning to define as one global economy divided into scores of political units, national interests extend beyond state borders and must be defined with the interests of certain other nations in mind as well. Mexican migration, caused by high rural unemployment in Mexico and job opportunities in the United States, is one of the most graphic examples of the problems and responsibilities of interdependence.

James W. Nickel focuses on the question of human rights, which he argues transcend the sovereignty of nation-states. According to Nickel, governments alone have the financial resources and administrative capacity to fully uphold and implement programs securing fundamental rights to survival and a decent life. Presence in a national territory, rather than citizenship, is sufficient claim on government resources.

The two middle sections of the book provide good analyses of the historical precedents and the current situation. Manuel García y Griego, August Schumacher, and Lourdes Arizpe demonstrate that migration is caused by a combination of "push" and "pull" factors. The "pull" factors are the higher wages and expanded opportunities in the United States. The "push" factors have appeared because of Mexican government policies promoting technologies and economies of scale that resulted in the steady impoverishment of the rural population. W. R. Böhning sees comparable "push" and "pull" factors

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in Europe, and argues that the European experience can provide lessons for the United States.

This book should be read by the appropriate U.S. policymakers. It would contribute to a more productive national policy debate and ensure that important questions are asked and past and alternative experiences are considered. The attempt to infuse public policy with a more ample philosophical and historical content is an important undertaking and is crucially needed in the United States. The book falters somewhat in its early philosophical definitions. But it is a solid contribution to what one hopes will be more efforts to bring this type of analysis to other issues in public policy.

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Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45 *by Wayne S. Cole. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1983. 698 pp. $26.50.*

As Wayne Cole rightly observes, the shift from traditional isolationism to wholesale multilateral participation in world affairs constituted a major watershed in the history of American foreign policy. Cole, the author of three earlier books on the prewar isolationists, may know more about this epic transition than anyone writing today. This volume represents the culmination of a lifetime of research. It examines both domestic issues and foreign affairs, although its emphasis is clearly on the latter. Much the greater part, roughly 90 percent, details the titantic battles between Franklin Roosevelt and his noninterventionist opponents before the attack on Pearl Harbor; the war years receive only sketchy treatment.

The individuals Cole focuses on—Hiram Johnson, William Borah, Robert Taft, "Young Bob" La Follette, Gerald Nye, Charles Lindbergh, and a host of others—did not disapprove of all foreign activity; they were not "isolationists" in the literal sense. They did seek, however, to take the profits out of war, and they were determined that America would never again fight overseas except in response to direct attack. They insisted that their compatriots remain completely free to decide for themselves "when, where, how, and whether the United States should involve itself abroad" (p. 7). Most particularly, they refused to be bound by prior commitments to allies or international organizations. And in pursuit of these objectives, they repeatedly clashed with Roosevelt's increasingly urgent efforts to aid the British, the French, the Chinese, and eventually the Soviets in resisting the Axis aggressors.

Cole portrays the isolationists of the 1930s as foreign policy projections of a rural and small-town America that was rapidly disappearing. As such, theirs was destined to be a losing cause, as industrialization, centralization, and urbanization progressively strangled their pristine nineteenth-century world. Alarming events abroad in the 1930s and early 1940s accelerated their demise, as did Winston Churchill's magnificent example and the courageous tenacity of the beleaguered British people.

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But central to the ultimate triumph of an interventionist perspective, Cole writes, were the "bold and innovative" policies, the "impressive political skill and artfulness," and the "inspiring leadership" displayed by Roosevelt (pp. 320, 333). Cole's FDR is "the supreme political master" (p. 320), whose sensitive antennae enabled him to avoid the problems Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon would later face in leading a divided nation to battle. His "all-aid-short-of-war" tactics proved the "near-perfect formula" (p. 298) in gradually winning public acceptance for his views. Faced with such a formidable adversary, the individuals who millions had praised as noble spokesmen for peace a few years earlier were by 1941 seen as partisan, unsavory, and even subversive.

Although Cole is exceptionally laudatory toward Roosevelt, he treats the isolationists with sympathy and understanding, respecting their beliefs even as he concedes that their vision of America's responsibilities in the world was fundamentally antiquated. At the same time, he is oddly non-judgmental in his handling of many specific episodes. One wonders about his views on isolationist opposition to American participation in the World Court, or on the convoluted policies advocated by both the administration and its critics with respect to the Spanish Civil War. After three and a half decades of study, Cole surely possesses opinions on the impact neutrality legislation had on events abroad, or about the isolationists' share of responsibility for the outbreak of war. One finishes his book wishing Cole had been less reticent in sharing the insights of a lifetime of research. For what some will label a definitive history, this volume is strangely silent on many of the larger questions a study of isolationism might raise.

With 556 pages of text and over 100 pages of notes, Cole's book may truly be described as encyclopedic. In fact, it could easily have been pared back 20 to 25 percent by eliminating unnecessary details and the at times disconcerting repetitions. A ruthless editor could have made this important volume leaner and ultimately far more usable.

ROBERT M. HATHAWAY
Washington, D.C.

Landmarks Preservation and the Property Tax *by David Listokin, et al. Piscataway, N.J., Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, 1982. 229 pp. $20.00.*

When a building is designated a landmark or incorporated into a historic district, its economic value is likely to be affected. Since the property tax is intended to be a tax on economic value, there is a presumption that assessors ought to take landmark status into account when establishing tax liability. This study was sponsored by the New York Landmarks Conservancy and carried out by the Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, to find out how landmarked buildings are actually taxed, to discuss the difficulties inherent in their tax treatment, and to make recommendations for improved procedures. While the study pays particular attention to tax experience in New York City, it also includes a detailed compilation of information on laws governing the tax treatment of landmarks in all fifty states. Moreover, the book takes up economic and administrative

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issues that will be relevant wherever landmarking occurs. The authors justifiably assert that their findings are widely transferable.

Three issues are treated in detail. The first is the empirical question of how landmark designation actually affects property value. In Chapter 2, the authors review the considerable literature on this subject. They point out that in theory the effect could go either way. By inhibiting redevelopment to a "higher and better use" and mandating certain types of maintenance, landmark designation can easily *reduce* property value. On the other hand, by conferring prestige and (in association with a historic district) protecting the neighborhood, designation can also *increase* value. In fact, both effects have been found, the latter primarily in historic residential districts. The authors point out, however, that inherent difficulties render existing empirical studies suspect. For example, it is not clear that designation per se exercises an independent effect on value; a given building may have value because it dates from 1810 and has particular architectural features, rather than because it has been designated a landmark. The question is difficult to settle because it is often impossible to find properties otherwise comparable to landmarks that might serve as controls, since landmarks have been designated precisely because of their unique features.

The second issue, how assessors, in fact, deal with landmarks, is covered in Chapter 3. Even when the law clearly requires that assessors take landmark status into account, it is not always clear that they do so, or if so, exactly how. The authors studied in detail six cases that were contested in New York City, but admit that they were "often unable to pinpoint the specific influence of designation on the assessment actions taken" (p. 75).

The third issue is how assessors should apply their techniques in evaluating landmarks for taxation. The three standard procedures are the cost, income, and sales approaches. The authors correctly point out that landmarked properties raise difficult problems under all of these. For example, the sales approach evaluates a given property by finding a closely comparable one for which there is a recently recorded sale price. But since landmarked buildings are often unique, comparable properties are unlikely to exist, much less to have been sold recently.

In Chapter 4, the authors work their way through these difficulties, pointing out how assessment procedures should be modified at each step to deal with designated landmarks. They do not, of course, claim to have resolved all the difficulties inherent in evaluating this eccentric class of properties. Indeed, one of their recommendations is downright misleading. In applying the cost approach, the aggregate value of a parcel is calculated by adding up independent estimates of site value and improvement value. In the case of a landmark, however, the authors cite the Metropolitan Club on Fifth Avenue and 60th Street in New York City as an example, arguing that the appropriate figure for the land is not its value in the highest and best use but its value in the use to which it is actually constrained. This approach is theoretically plausible, but practically unobtainable. The value of land in a given use can be independently estimated only from data on sales of land for that use. It is most unlikely that land on Fifth Avenue near 60th Street will be sold today for the purpose of putting up a four-story, neo-Italianate, landmarked clubhouse!

Landmark Preservation and the Property Tax is well documented, as befits a mono-

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graph dealing with statutory law and administrative procedure, and it contains an excellent annotated bibliography. However, there are editorial debits as well. Although the book is nicely illustrated with photographs of New York City landmarks, two of them are misidentified because their captions have been exchanged (Collonade Row and 311 East 58th Street). On the map of landmark locations (p. 72) one is missing (number 6) and two are misplaced (numbers 3 and 5). These errors may seem trivial. More serious is the poor quality of the writing. The prose is excessively burdened with jargon, for example: "the dynamics of this interface is not fully captured by the assessment at current use charge" (p. 119); or "the Costonis and ERA [Economics Research Associates] investigations . . . speak to various scenarios of impact" (p. 46). It does no credit to their profession when social scientists produce a book devoted to the preservation of culture that pays so little heed to the preservation of the English language.

JAMES HEILBRUN
Fordham University

Federal Narcotics Enforcement: Reorganization and Reform *by Patricia Rachal. Boston, Auburn House, 1982. 170 pp. $19.95.*

This well-told tale of the creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) offers a discouraging picture of another federal reorganization failure. Unlike so many reorganizations for political-bureaucratic power or cosmetic purposes, Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 was "a serious, well-intentioned effort to change the way federal narcotics agencies were performing federal functions . . . [that was expected to] end vexing bureaucratic rivalries and significantly upgrade the effectiveness of the federal government's drug enforcement program" (p. 7). Like almost all other federal reorganizations, however, this one was a top-down effort without an in-depth analysis of how the major organizational units operated in the field.

President Richard Nixon's war on drugs was being undercut by a highly fragmented federal drug enforcement effort, where overlapping jurisdictions created intense bureaucratic rivalries. He opted for a single lead agency in the Department of Justice and created the Drug Enforcement Administration out of three units from that department and 700 narcotics agents and supporting personnel transferred from the Customs Service, which is an agency of the Treasury Department. What emerged was not the more efficient and effective narcotics effort promised to Congress in the reorganization proposal, but rather a bureaucratic-political nightmare.

The reorganization was almost defeated in Congress after the Customs Service, incensed at the transfer of its agents and its authority to what they considered to be a much less capable organization, defied the president and used congressional committees and the labor unions in what became an open battle. Later, Customs employed all of its bureaucratic wiles to undercut the DEA. The DEA itself contributed to the failure through its inept management. The end result was great bureaucratic activity and turmoil, particularly at the higher echelons, with little or no change in the behavior of the field staff who engaged in narcotics enforcement.

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Bureaucratic politics and bad management together might be used to explain the failure, but Rachal seeks a deeper explanation. She finds that there was neither an in-depth implementation analysis to develop information about how enforcement was carried out, nor any effort to involve anyone but the highest executive officials in the planning. No one asked about the key tasks and procedures at headquarters and in the field, or about whether managerial and technical talent was available for implementing the reorganization. In particular, those at the top knew little about how the narcotics agents (the "street-level" bureaucrats) actually operated and, hence, had no basis for alterating the behavior they sought to change. A host of implementation studies have shown again and again that policy gets made at the delivery level by the street-level bureaucrats. But, like so many reorganizations before it, a handful of people who did not do their homework—the detailed implementation analysis—fiddled with organizational boxes and forced a reorganization from the top without much consultation.

Rachal's conclusions that reorganizations need more "bottom-up" involvement and that without detailed implementation analyses "the chance of producing a meaningful alteration or improvement in the output of an organization will be poor" (p. 152) seem irrefutable. But two factors mitigate against more involvement and analysis. The first is that the greater planning participation and the seeking of information about reorganization can unleash bureaucratic forces that smother the effort at infancy. The second is that the detailed implementation analysis is likely to uncover uncomfortable truths about conflicting objectives, inadequate managerial and technical talent, organizational conflicts over turf and status, and the lack of proven techniques to do the job, be it narcotics enforcement or classroom teaching. The evidence likely will point toward slow, undramatic changes, discouraging both to the political executives who want fast visible action and to Congress, which expects to hear about wondrous rapid increases in efficiency and effectiveness after the reorganization. It is small wonder, then, that reorganizers at the top keep things to themselves and above all, do not look down to lower bureaucratic levels. If such behavior continues, I would posit an iron law of public agency reorganization—everything that can possibly go wrong under Murphy's Law will go wrong twice.

WALTER WILLIAMS
University of Washington

The Logic of Organization: A System-Based Social Science Framework for Organization Theory *by Alfred Kuhn and Robert D. Beam. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1982. 495 pp. $22.95.*

This book is based on a broad view of organizations as social systems. It is animated by the neo-positivist dream of a unified social science that characterizes much of the late Alfred Kuhn's previous work. Social systems are defined as "the production of joint effect by two or more persons" (p. 17). Organizations as systems are constituted by three functional elements: the acquisition of information about the system's environment (the detector function); the activation of a goal, preference, or inner tendency (the selector function); and the capacity for adaptive response (the effector function). The rationality

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of this systems conception of organizations is based on differentially valued transactions that involve an economically rational or utilitarian calculus of "effective preferences" (pp. 195–98). The core theme of the book is "that a certain managerial logic pervades large organization" (p. 348), a logic that places the authors in the company of Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, Peter Drucker, James Burnham, and Kenneth Boulding.

Half of the book (the 180 pages of Part I) is concerned with definitions and concepts. It is an impressive inventory of how the authors view organizational phenomena, but it does not tell anything new once the systems approach is granted. Part II is designed to present the theory, that is, presumably a set of interrelated propositions. But, in effect, readers are still being treated to an interminable series of definitions, analogies, and descriptions interspersed with cybernetic examples and illustrations (see, for example, p. 257 ff.). At best, one may talk about model construction, but it is so abstract and general that not much useful insight seems to be derivable from the effort. For example, how does one deal substantively or empirically with the hypothesis that "the degree of coordination required among the subsystems of an organization is a direct function of the degree of systemness of its product" (p. 256)? Even Chapter 12, which is supposed to be an application of systems theory, consists mainly in the construction of a simulation model (including axioms and twenty-five theorems) based on the conceptual tools of structure, decision-making, affiliation, and authority (p. 395). There is a comparison between "Type A" organizations, based on a "competitive motivation model" and "Type J" ("cooperative motivation," pp. 435–45), but it does not tell much beyond the well-known dichotomies of mechanistic-organic, formal-informal, Theory X–Theory Y (or Z), closed versus open systems.

Apart from the high ratio of abstract conceptual material to concrete propositional content (which I suppose is what "logic" is all about), the book suffers from a complete absence of a critical or reflexive consideration of its premises and conclusions (such as they are). Systems analysis is today one of the dominant approaches in organizational theory. Systems theory and systems engineering are also central ingredients in the technocratic consciousness that is being re-activated by the unmanageability of many organizations and the crisis character of their environments. This book does nothing to shed light on the limits and problems of systems theory and to situate it in the larger historical and political context of the 1980s. With the exception of the discussion of lagging productivity as a problem for organizations and the presumed advantages of Japanese managers in this respect, there is no reflection on the ideological bias involved in conflating systems theory, organization theory, and the managerial perspective (see, for example, the theorems on the disintegrative effects of hostility [p. 402]). Thus, despite the great effort that obviously went into it, this book is a disappointment.

WOLF V. HEYDEBRAND
New York University

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Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State *by Linda C. Majka and Theo J. Majka. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1983. 346 pp. $24.95.*

This ambitious book only partially succeeds in its mission. As its title indicates, it concerns farmworkers and their attempts to deal with agricultural employers and the involvement of the state (meaning, in this case, the government) in these relationships. As a historical account of the lengthy struggle of farmworkers to organize, it is the best book currently available (and were it available in paper, I would unhesitatingly adopt it for appropriate classes). Most other efforts, primarily by journalists, are of the "gee-whiz" variety, so overwhelmed by Cesar Chavez's organizing successes that they lose the ability to engage in critical analysis. The Majkas also fall prey to the Chavez charisma. Admitting a few critical words about the continuous dismissal of the United Farm Workers (UFW) leadership by Chavez, they do not recognize that Chavez's initial organizing successes permitted successive purges of most of the leadership, so that what remains in the UFW is largely "a family affair."

Perhaps because they have depended heavily on secondary sources, the Majkas provide a comprehensive historical treatment, beginning with the Chinese and Japanese entry into agricultural labor in the last century, continuing through the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and the organizing efforts of the Communists during the 1930s, up to the long struggle to establish the UFW.

The authors make an important contribution to the literature by placing the farmworker struggle into a larger context of class relationships. They draw on old and new theoretical orientations of scholars such as John R. Commons and Selig Perlman, on the one hand, and André Gorz, Serge Mallet, and Stanley Aronowitz, on the other. The authors demonstrate the similarities between struggles for recognition by industrial workers and their agricultural counterparts. While much of the literature on this topic has emphasized the exceptionalism of agriculture, the Majkas stress the commonalities and the way in which farmworker struggles have focused, not narrowly on wage issues, but on control issues. By control, the Majkas refer to conditions auxiliary to material benefits that affect everyday relationships between workers and their employers.

Although the Majkas pose this issue well, they do not acknowledge Chavez's inconsistencies in addressing the very control issues for which they give the UFW credit, such as the failure to institutionalize the hiring halls and thereby diminish the power of the labor contractors, and the business of pesticides and their dangers.

It is on the subject of the state that the Majkas produce interesting but only partially satisfying discussion. The government is seen as the critical agency serving capital accumulation by providing a continuous supply of cheap labor through its immigration policy. The state also serves as an important mediator in class relationships, as exemplified in the adoption of California's path-breaking Agricultural Labor Relations Act. The weakness of the argument is that readers are left more with a sense of the importance of the personalities of the principal actors rather than with a sense of an instrumentalist, structuralist, or some other kind of a state. Despite the problems with this argu-

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ment, I believe this to be the best book yet published on U.S. farmworker struggles and organization.

WILLIAM H. FRIEDLAND
University of California, Santa Cruz

Politics and Health Care Organization: HMOs as Federal Policy *by Lawrence D. Brown. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1983. 540 pp. Cloth, $33.95; paper, $16.95.*

Reading Lawrence D. Brown's volume brought to mind my experiences with the novels of Thomas Mann. At times, one feels compelled to wade through the volume but the intellectual rewards readily justify the effort. Brown analyzes the creation and implementation of federal policy designed to foster the spread of health maintenance organizations (HMOs). These organizations are prepaid group practices in which health care providers deliver a wide range of contractually specified medical services to an enrolled population for a fixed price.

Brown commences by placing HMO policy development against the backdrop of certain trends, particularly the rise of rationalizing politics. Such politics seeks not to abolish major government programs but "to trim their rough edges, improve their effectiveness and efficiency, and contain their costs" (p. 11). Hence, the HMO policy emerged largely from a belief that these organizations could enhance the economy and efficiency of the medical sector. Having set the stage, Brown first assesses the skills and resources needed to build and manage HMOs, as well as the available evidence concerning their performance. He then analyzes in depth the politics that shaped the HMO law and the bureaucracy's response to it. Finally, Brown addresses the more general lessons suggested by the program's experience.

The volume yields rich rewards for students of health policy in particular and of the policy process more generally. Among other things, Brown artfully shows how HMOs, as complex organizations, are extremely difficult to develop and how they pose "peculiarly severe management difficulties" (p. 76). These factors help explain why the program, which featured grants, loans and loan guarantees, failed to spark appreciable growth in the number of HMOs. More fundamentally, Brown argues that even if the number of HMOs grew substantially, this development would not necessarily promote higher quality care, greater access to medical service, or cost containment. While acknowledging that the program registered some achievements, he concludes that "the HMO-building strategy was not a plausible candidate for federal policy" (p. 440).

Students of public policy and American politics are, of course, well versed in tales of policy woe. The more unique and provocative component of Brown's study lies in its assessment of the primary source of the problem—economics-based policy analysis. In this view, "HMO policymaking was one of the rare instances in which policy analysts were granted their claim to be heeded attentively" (p. 470). While these analysts tended not to hold advanced economics degrees, they emphasized the terminology and theories of economics in advocating the program. Such concepts as "incentives," "competition," and the

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"market" shaped their advocacy. Brown masterfully demonstrates how the conceptual baggage of economics led analysts to ignore the complexity of institution building in the health care sector and to misjudge prospects for program success. While taking primary aim at simplistic applications of economic models, Brown also expresses doubt about the utility of two other modes of policy analysis—the comparative approach, which seeks to draw lessons from other Western democracies, and studies of implementation.

Brown's thesis is on the whole well documented and persuasive. The volume does, however, suffer from a few modest shortcomings. For instance, his discussion of the limits of implementation analysis as a means of anticipating problems seems oblivious to some of the useful literature on the subject that became available in the late 1970s. Then, too, Brown's sensitivity to the relevance of political structures (such as the separation of powers, federalism, and privatism) for the feasibility of a strategy occasionally lapses. In this regard, Brown criticizes and cautions against overselling the HMO concept. But the enormous fragmentation of power in the United States virtually assures that strategies will be simplified and oversold as advocates attempt to win support for them.

These peccadillos pale beside the substantial contribution of the volume, however. It is a splendid example of how case analysis can be creatively used to suggest more general propositions about the operation of the policy process.

FRANK J. THOMPSON
University of Georgia

The Political Economy of Aging: The State, Private Power, and Social Welfare *by Laura Katz Olson. New York, Columbia University Press, 1982. 272 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $12.50.*

America's Old Age Crisis: Public Policy and the Two Worlds of Aging *by Stephen Crystal. New York, Basic Books, 1982. 232 pp. $16.50.*

These two books are major additions to the literature in the now-burgeoning field of political gerontology. In fact, the arguments and data put forth in them make it fully understandable why there has been such tremendous interest in this new field: demographic trends, vastly increasing public and private expenditures, enormous discrepencies in wealth and poverty among the aged; and the creation of entire industries working for and benefiting from the aged.

In their approaches, the books vary considerably. Olson's is an avowedly radical interpretation of what it means to grow old under capitalism. The book is intended to uncover structural causes behind what Olson sees as the current crisis in old age policy. In the opening chapter, she contrasts her own radical view with those of free-market economists and "liberal accommodationists." The radical perspective finds the problems of the aging imbedded in the larger social structure in which monopoly capital controls wealth and power, creates the enduring problems of the majority population, and devises social policies that meet its needs while nominally improving the condition of the intended beneficiaries. This discussion is followed by a historical chapter in which Olson traces the development of monopoly capital, the forced retirement of workers, the rise of private

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pools of pension capital, and the development of policies directed toward the aged. From there, she applies her overall argument to income maintenance, health care, housing, and human services programs.

Olson is able to buttress her structuralist argument with a wide array of supporting material that she has included in *The Political Economy of Aging*. Nonetheless, there remains the problem—endemic to mega-theory interpretations of numerous events covering scores of years—that these and other data are subject to interpretations that Olson downplays, dismisses, or ignores. Thus, her substantive critique of Social Security finds that income inequalities of workers are perpetuated in retirement, that low income workers retire (or are retired) earlier than higher income workers and thereby receive actuarily reduced benefits, that couples must subsist on a single benefit if the wage earner becomes eligible for benefits before the spouse, that divorced homemakers are in potentially dire financial jeopardy, and that the funding of the system through a payroll tax with a wage base is regressive insofar as earned income is concerned and totally ignores other forms of wealth.

It is perfectly appropriate to point out these shortcomings in the system and to note generally that the system does little to redistribute income. One need not, however, adopt the political economy approach as the sole means for understanding how this state of affairs came about. Nor is it quite fair to conclude this discussion by saying that these inequities "are usually viewed by social analysts as violations of the social insurance philosophy of the system rather than as questions of social adequacy" (p. 74). Any number of analysts have noted that Social Security fails, both by itself and in conjunction with Supplemental Security Income, to deal effectively with the adequacy question. Olson is correct in saying that most analysts have not adopted the political economy perspective in accounting for this failing; instead, many have argued that major changes in the insurance and equity aspects of the program would undermine its political legitimacy. That may be false consciousness, but it may also be the legacy of American exceptionalism with a heavy dose of interest-group liberalism.

Her discussion of Medicare and Medicaid raises the same issue once again. As she says, these programs represented "the failure of the state to support even a modest health care program for the general population" (p. 134), and they were superimposed on the existing health care delivery system under the control of a variety of non-governmental parties. These arguments are made as well by Theodore Marmor in *The Politics of Medicare* and by Judith Feder in *Medicare: The Politics of Federal Hospital Insurance*, but they find reasons other than those of political economy to account for Lyndon Johnson and the Congress selling out to organized medicine. In her discussion of human services, Olson is correct in observing that private firms have generally left the field to others because of limited profit opportunities, but are now entering with the promise of increased governmental funding of home-based health and social services for the elderly. And it must be noted that she beautifully captures the interest-group liberalism aspects of the $300 million elderly nutrition program in a section entitled "Feeding Gerontologists."

Stephen Crystal's book will satisfy a wider audience than Olson's. The obvious reason is that he has not rested his arguments on such a broad and controversial base. Rather, Crystal argues that the current policy array results from mistaken assumptions about the aged, political compromise, and conflicting goals. The product of all this is an amalgam

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of programs that are ineffective, inequitable, and inefficient and which have created what Crystal refers to as "the two worlds of aging." The elderly are more affected by government programs than are any other age group, and the largest of these programs have aided the broad spectrum of older persons far more than they have widows, the minority elderly, and the very old who rely heavily on the relatively small means-tested programs. The massive entitlement programs—most notably Social Security and Medicare—working in conjunction with private pensions, individual and group health plans, and home ownership, have exacerbated rather than corrected income and health status differences among the elderly. Crystal does not devote nearly so much attention as Olson to accounting for what series of factors have generated the shortcomings and discrepencies he sets forth. He has, however, carefully documented status differentials within the aging population and the cumulative though unplanned manner in which public policy has helped generate them.

In addition, a major contribution of *America's Old Age Crisis* lies in Crystal's discussion of the interrelations among public policy, demographic trends, and family support systems. Of particular importance is his documenting the limitations of what families have in fact done on behalf of their older members and what they can be expected to do in light of population aging and labor force trends. Officials concerned about spiraling governmental expenditures targeted on the elderly and those who see in the family the most humane and caring environment for assisting the impaired and low-income elderly are currently calling on families to take a greater role in care of the elderly. Marshalling survey and census data, Crystal shows that the love, reassurance, and social support that the elderly want and can expect from family members does not extend to financial support, shared living arrangements, and even to some aspects of psychological support.

These two books will provide the reader with a firm grounding in contemporary aging policy. Very considerable amounts of material are mobilized documenting the heterogeneity of the older population, revealing the prevailing mythologies about the aged, and demonstrating the ways in which existing policies reinforce rather than remedy both inequities and inadequacies. This holds for Olson as well as Crystal, although there are very real strains in trying to account for the corpus of age-related policy in the terms of political economy.

ROBERT B. HUDSON
Fordham University

Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir *by George Reedy. Fairway, Kans., Andrews and McMeel, 1982. 159 pp. $12.95.*

Not history, not biography, not political analysis, says the author (though it partakes of all three), this book is "an exercise in exorcism" (p. ix). In the clearer light of fifteen years' hindsight, one wonders how was it that Reedy was earlier attracted, held, and dominated for fifteen years in the service of another man who repeatedly displayed—even flaunted—such an array of unattractive—even repulsive—traits. Reedy's answers may have been so dispassionately composed for his own peace of mind; they also make a pene-

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trating, revealing, witty, incisively written character study of a bafflingly complex public figure. George Reedy was a well-placed first-hand observer. He joined Johnson's staff in 1951. The impressions he sorts out here were mostly formed before LBJ became president. Their relations thereafter cooled; they were not on speaking terms, Reedy says, when Reedy left in 1966, though he returned briefly in 1968, still unable to say no to Johnson.

Sixteen short chapters make up the book. The first nine are unsparing. "The Potemkin Village," the opener, relates Johnson's capacity for arranging facts to serve some present purpose, not by any conscious mendacity—"the man never told a deliberate lie"—but by willing "what was in his mind to be reality" (p. 3). Like Potemkin, Johnson manipulated "facts" to produce images; like Catherine the Great he viewed these and found them good.

The next, "A Word is a Word is a Word," pursues that theme. A word used in recording the terms of a specific deal was a reality he respected and honored. But words used in speeches were fleeting instruments to produce a desired effect on a given occasion, not to be held against him on other, later occasions.

"The Po'Boy Triumphant" and "Heroes" tell how Johnson's genuine sympathy for any ambitious man who worked his way out of poverty to power, as he had himself, led to uncritical admiration of Huey Long and trust in many people like Bobby Baker. "Political Sexpots" tells of his propensity for surrounding himself with attractive young women and keeping his office in turmoil by installing one after another as reigning favorite, along with a Victorian view, derived from his mother, of the female nature. He "rarely showed the good taste and judgment that he exhibited in his marriage" (p. 32).

"A Gap of Understanding" deals with LBJ's press relations. He could not comprehend that reporters covered events because they happened; press stories must have ulterior motives and objectives. No separate chapters are devoted to his gullibility to flatterers, deliberate vulgarities, or his paranoia about Bobby Kennedy; nor to darker aspects of his nature, his bouts of heavy drinking followed by outrageous abuse heaped on some loyal subordinate. But these are all spelled out.

On the credit side, Reedy saw a genuine and life-long desire on Johnson's part to alleviate poverty and promote educational opportunities. He saw political courage, as when LBJ confronted Governor Allan Shivers head on over control of the Texas delegation to the 1956 Democratic National Convention. He saw a consummate legislative tactician with a sense for opportune timing and a talent for persuasion in behalf of a specific goal.

Three chapters illustrate these talents, in the censure of Senator Joseph McCarthy, the breakup of the paralyzing bipartisan conservative alliance, and the passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. Whenever disgust brought Reedy to the verge of resigning, some magnificent performance by Johnson brought him back. In his view, LBJ was at his best in his Senate years, and in the year following President Kennedy's assassination; and at his worst as vice-president, and as president in his own right after 1964.

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, SR.
Columbia University

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Love, Eleanor: Eleanor Roosevelt and Her Friends *by Joseph P. Lash. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday and Co., 1982. 534 pp. $19.95.*

One theme dominates Joseph Lash's account of Eleanor Roosevelt's friendships—the importance of that most intimate of social relationships, personal friendship. In recent years, the subject of intimacy has received increased scholarly attention in studies of loneliness, love, hugging, and "bonding." Perhaps because the larger political units, the nation and the world, have been made less attractive by reports of corruption and threats of war, the fundamental unit of human association, the attraction between one individual and another, has acquired increased importance.

Lash's most recent study of Eleanor Roosevelt is timely because her life, perhaps more than that of any other major figure in the twentieth century, reflects the complexity and the joys and sorrows of intimate personal relationships. During the first half of her life, most of Eleanor's close relationships brought her sorrow. Her father, the great love of her early life, drank himself to death when she was only ten years old. Her mother was already dead, and her grandmother, who became her guardian, was well meaning but remote. The great friendship of her adolescent years was with Marie Souvestre, her English headmistress, who befriended her and took her on several trips across Europe. Eleanor might have become Souvestre's protégé, but she returned to New York when she was eighteen, and the headmistress died shortly afterwards.

In her early twenties, Eleanor found the personal warmth she had craved in her husband, Franklin. But over the years Eleanor and Franklin grew apart, and her discovery of his affair with Lucy Mercer undermined her confidence in his love. For the remainder of their life together, they were a peculiarly estranged and yet a peculiarly effective couple. Their partnership as president and first lady was the most remarkable in American history. But Eleanor's closest and most fruitful relationships were with other men and women.

In the 1920s, Eleanor's friendships with Marion Dickerman, Nan Cook, and other women active in current political and social movements, and with New York police sergeant Earl Miller and Franklin's political adviser, Louis Howe, were probably more companionable than with her husband. These were all loving relationships accompanied with words of endearment and tender hugs and caresses. They were, in a sense, preparation for even closer relationships in the 1930s with Lorena Hickok and then with Lash himself. Eleanor's relationship with both people was so passionate as to suggest a sexual association. When the Hickok correspondence was recently released, some readers concluded that they contained evidence of a lesbian relationship, while Lash's friendship with Eleanor was so close that Army intelligence claimed to have had evidence of a sexual liaison.

Lash's frank account places such accusations in their proper perspective. Eleanor craved intimacy in her personal relationships and loved several of her friends with the emotional commitment often associated with sexual passion. But in Robert Frost's phrase, she was more interested in grex than sex. A gregarious woman, she found the personal nourishment of intimacy with a few close friends, and so nourished, she had the inspiration to devote her energies to the myriad social and political programs that occupied her attention during the second half of her life.

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Lash's account, full of letters and other documents represented verbatim, is more a chronicle than a carefully crafted narrative or a closely argued essay. The strength of his presentation lies in his extensive use of the sources and his perceptive remarks throughout the text on the dynamics of Eleanor Roosevelt's friendships and their importance to her development as an individual.

J. WILLIAM T. YOUNGS
Eastern Washington University

Standing Fast: The Autobiography of Roy Wilkins *by Roy Wilkins with Tom Mathews. New York, Viking Press, 1982. 361 pp. $16.95.*

Autobiography is a genre that enables a prominent individual to render familiar public events from the vantage of a unique private perspective. As executive secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) for twenty-two years and a key staff member for forty-seven years, Roy Wilkins provides a retrospective of the civil rights movement informed by his personal views on strategy and tactics, organizational imperatives, and relations with the White House.

The book's dominant theme is that blacks are best served by an unswerving commitment to racial integration obtained through constitutional means. Indeed, at one level the account is a testimonial to the American creed of opportunity for all. Born in St. Louis at the turn of the century shortly after his father fled Mississippi "one step ahead of a lynch rope," the young Roy was raised by his aunt and uncle in an integrated neighborhood in St. Paul and graduated from the University of Minnesota. His uncle, who had a steady job as a cook for the president of the Northern Pacific Railroad, owned his own home and provided adequately for the family. After finishing at the university, Wilkins moved rapidly into a career as a reporter in Kansas City, Missouri, where he met and married Aminda Badeau, a social worker from one of St. Louis's old-line black families. Yet as readers follow this saga of personal good fortune, they are made keenly aware of the omnipresent scourge of racism and the stifling limitations of second-class citizenship.

Experiences evoked from this formative period of Wilkins's life illustrate the character of the man who moved to New York City in 1930 to become assistant secretary of the NAACP. This university-trained Midwesterner of modest origins was acutely sensitive to the problems of educational opportunity, public accommodations, access to cultural events, and threats to personal security for blacks irrespective of class. He had clear notions about the optimal civil rights agenda for blacks in the South—a federal anti-lynching bill, school desegregation, the abolition of Jim Crow, and the reinstatement of voting rights. But Wilkins would never concede that redressing the predicament of poor blacks trapped in the northern urban ghettoes might require a tack other than integration. Consequently, he became politically estranged from numerous individuals, groups, and movements involved in the quest for black advancement. A partial list includes Garveyism in the 1920s, W.E.B. DuBois in the 1930s and again in the 1950s, Paul Robeson after the 1940s, the Black Power movement during the 1960s, and the Communists—who were his special *bête rouge* for decades.

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Much that is gleaned about the inner workings of the NAACP during Wilkins's tenure has relevance for the future viability of this oldest and largest civil rights organization. Two developments—the failure to evolve an effective personnel policy to address the related issues of staff development and succession as well as the tendency for strong-willed individuals to confuse staff and board functions—are especially noteworthy. These issues were apparent when Wilkins arrived in 1930 and became the source of personal tragedy and organizational crisis in the 1970s. During the intervening years, the NAACP's strategy to end segregation and disenfranchisement through the courts, the executive branch, and Congress was a sufficiently concrete and cohesive program to overcome internal strains and sustain the support of the branches. Since the passage of the omnibus Civil Rights Bill of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, however, the inability to articulate a mission distinct from the judicial advocacy of the Legal Defense Fund or the policy prerogatives of black elected officials has had debilitating consequences.

In the absence of significant political representation, presidential lobbying was developed to a fine art by the NAACP's national leadership, and Wilkins interjects graphic tidbits of his experiences with chief executives from Franklin Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter. Lyndon B. Johnson is the clear winner in these pages. The sketches of Franklin D. Roosevelt (negative), Harry S Truman (favorable) and John F. Kennedy (equivocal) broaden the perspective on how liberal Democrats dealt with the race issue. Among the Republican presidents, only Dwight D. Eisenhower is depicted in any detail. Wilkins argues that Ike's civil rights record—which included the first civil rights bill since Reconstruction, the appointment of Earl Warren to the Supreme Court, and the authorization of federal troops to protect school desegregation in Little Rock—was highly overrated. Richard M. Nixon, who ran for the presidency on a southern strategy that wrote off the black vote, and Gerald R. Ford, Nixon's hand-picked post-Watergate successor, are treated almost as nonpersons. Southern Democrats notwithstanding, the national Democratic party was markedly more supportive of the NAACP's programmatic goals during the period in question. However, to be a truly effective strategy in the future, presidential lobbying will have to be practiced with equal vigor no matter which party holds the White House.

This is a well-written book that is splendidly evocative of major events as well as unsung heroes in the protracted struggle for black equality. But the narrative voice wanes in intensity after the victories of the 1960s, and in the 1970s seems fitfully out of touch with the times. Roy Wilkins died "standing fast," perhaps sensing that history had moved on.

PEARL T. ROBINSON
Tufts University

Herbert Hoover: The Postpresidential Years, 1933–1964 (Vol. 1: 1933–1945; Vol. 2: 1946–1964) *by Gary Dean Best. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1983. 522 pp. $75.00.*

Revisionist by design, these volumes reassess Herbert Hoover's position in American thought and public affairs after 1933. The author also addresses certain common misconceptions and certain historians' distortions of Hoover's post-presidential record, such

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as ascribing political impotence and antediluvian social impulses to the ex-president. Best has tapped Hoover's private papers and published writings, in addition to other archival materials and oral histories. From such sources the author extracted ample grist for refuting unjust interpretations of Hoover's record after leaving the White House.

Best successfully refurbishes Hoover's reputation in several respects. The author demonstrates that many Americans misunderstood the ex-president's ideas, that critics misrepresented his views, and that electors distrusted Hoover for misguided reasons. Secondly, Best points out that Hoover earned new respect from Americans after 1940, and that he used this influence in making substantial contributions to the public weal. For example, as a "constructive opponent" of White House incumbents, Hoover influenced national foreign policy formulations, and perhaps enjoyed his greatest glory when leading congressional Republicans in support of the United Nations.

Also by Best's accounting, Hoover's negative, post-presidential image persisted because of "smearing," primarily by New Dealers and later by those forces that diverted New Deal reformism to the left. And in Hoover's conflicts with these camps, Best finds the ex-president's most significant post-presidential service to the nation and claims to his own vindication. As self-anointed national "conscience," Hoover expressed ideas that, the writer believes, have finally become "relevant" to Americans in recent times (vol. I, p. xi). However, Best's thesis presumes a new consensus, improbable even among scholars, on Hoover's axioms: for instance, that the New Deal—to say nothing of more recent welfare state programs—inevitably produces evils such as intrusive government, unmanageable bureaucracies, and destructively shackled capitalism.

These volumes possess significant strengths aside from their revisionist qualities. By analyzing Hoover's post-1933 political partisanship, Best partly accounts for Hoover's inability to reign indisputably as elder statesman. In his finest chapters, the author describes Hoover's self-delusions in twice seeking re-election to the presidency, and subsequently Hoover's self-appointments as presidential kingmaker and drillmaster of the Grand Old Party's congressional contingent. Here Best's research also illuminates so many facets of Republican party affairs that his scholarship is a primary reference on such matters.

Likewise rewarding are lengthy passages in both volumes that recount Hoover's quarrels with New Dealers and his resistance after World War II to certain foreign policies and domestic programs that conflicted with his social ideals and his preferences for mildly regulated capitalism. However, Best uncritically accepts Hoover's claim that he had avoided the "Dead Sea of reaction" (vol. I, p. 113) at such times. Yet Democratic sachems, alongside Republicans such as Dwight Eisenhower's followers in the 1950s, had good reasons for distrusting Hoover's modernist pretensions. On many counts, the volumes demonstrate, only small differences separated Hoover's social fundamentalism from Liberty League thinking in the 1930s. Furthermore, the author's evidence suggests that Hoover dissembled at other times when denying accusations of unalloyed conservatism. For instance, Hoover disliked America's World War II alliance with Russia, endorsed postwar McCarthyism, and generally shared cold war passions of other conservatives.

In short, neither the author's pro-Hoover biases nor his excessive chronicling of the minutiae of Hoover's public regimens conceals, as even Best concedes, the ex-president's frequently peripheral relationship to national mainstreams after 1933. But the writer has

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the last word in another way—Hoover's accomplishments deserve greater acknowledgement, and Best's scholarship facilitates further re-evaluating of Hoover's post-presidential years.

HUGH T. LOVIN
Boise State University

Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist *by Nick Salvatore. Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 1982. 437 pp. $24.95.*

From the Pullman strike of 1894 until his death in 1926, Eugene V. Debs was perhaps the best known working-class and socialist activist in the United States, a leader whose very name came to stand for the humanitarian ideals of socialism in the eyes of millions of native and immigrant workers. Even today, Debs, who was the Socialist party's presidential candidate in five elections between 1900 and 1920, remains the best known and most highly regarded representative of the U.S. Socialist party tradition in America and throughout the world.

Rising above the polemical and almost mythological history of the Socialist party in the early twentieth century, Nick Salvatore's magnificent biography of Debs does his remarkable subject justice. First of all, it easily surpasses Ray Ginger's fine old study, *The Bending Cross*, to become the best biography of Debs ever written. With great skill, Salvatore utilizes the insights of the new social and labor history, urban and family history, and psychology to portray the molding of Eugene Debs in a particular American context. Thus, he shows how definitions of manhood and dignity were central to the working class world from which Debs came and how they helped to shape his political awareness and ideology. Salvatore also explores the influence of the tradition of the American Revolution and American conceptions of abundance and opportunity in the development of Debs's consciousness as a labor activist and socialist leader. Finally, he places the complex political history of the Socialist party and its internal struggles into a framework that elucidates both the debates and divisions on theoretical questions within the international socialist movement and their application in the American political and social context.

Most remarkably, Salvatore has done all this by distilling his massive research into a richly flowing and persuasive narrative history, an exciting exposition that blends the personal and the political aspects of Debs's life and surroundings about as well as I have seen it done in a scholarly biography. At all times in the work, one is keenly aware of Debs's roots in the world of Terre Haute, Indiana, of the pressures on him as a trade unionist during the period of rapid industrialization, and of the enormous strains on his private life caused by his leadership of a divided minority movement committed to a revolutionary mission in the leading industrial nation in the world.

Criticizing this splendid work is a little like looking for weaknesses in the 1927 New York Yankees. From my point of view, Salvatore might have been more critical of Debs's persistent failure to oppose Morris Hillquit and Victor Berger, the right-wing leaders of the Socialist party who profited from his influence even as they sought to undercut him.

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Salvatore also might have been a little more friendly to the left-wing Socialists who did fight Hillquit and Berger, formed the Communist party in the 1920s and who, during the 1930s were able through the CIO to advance the goals of industrial unionism and a politically conscious labor movement, goals that were long identified with Debs. Finally, he might have given more weight to the dynamic of economic expansion and state repression, as against the values of "American society" in bringing about the post-World War I isolation of Debs and the party he led. However, such differences of interpretation in no way detract from the brilliant overall achievement of the work. Salvatore has succeeded in placing both Debs and the socialist and revolutionary tradition in its American context in a way that is non-polemical, authoritative, and genuinely learned.

NORMAN MARKOWITZ
Livingston College, Rutgers University

The Socialist Corporation and Technocratic Power: The Polish United Workers Party, Industrial Organization and Workforce Control, 1958–80 *by Jean Woodall. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982. 281 pp. $39.50.*

Woodall draws on a broad framework of East and West European literature, including Robert Lane, Tony Cliff, Leon Trotsky, Ernest Mandel, Bruno Bettelheim, Paul Sweezy, Hillel Ticktin, Serge Mallet, André Gorz, J. Kuron, K. Modzelewski, Max Weber, Georg Lukacs, G. W. F. Hegel, Marc Rakovski, G. Konrad, Ivan Szelenyi, Rudolf Bahro, Maria Hirszowicz, and Stefan Ossowski, to frame two sets of important questions. First, how does the growth in the size of the Polish industrial enterprise and the acquisition of characteristics resembling Western corporations affect party control over the new managerial ranks? Does the shift in organizational structure contribute to forming a new class of technocrats? Second, how does the change in organizational structure affect the legitimacy of the party in the eyes of the Polish industrial working class? Does it lead to the formation of a new working class?

Woodall traces the trends toward concentration in the big enterprises, associations, combines, and WOGs (Wielka Organizacja Gospodarcza or Large Production Units) from the 1950s through the 1970s. Concentration was effected in the name of modernization, intensive economic development, improved export performance, economies of scale, and better vertical integration. Woodall hints at the possibility that reorganization of industrial lines of authority can also be seen as a means for the center to reassert its control over local enterprise. An exploration of the leadership's motives for organizational change beyond the stated objectives would have been of considerable interest, but this lies beyond Woodall's stated scope.

Woodall asks whether the organizational growth and concentration led to the formation of a new bureaucratic and technocratic class and, if so, what its values were. If such a class values autonomy, it may align with the working class against the hierarchical control of the political elite. If it values hierarchy and privileged access it may side with the elite against the masses. Her main finding is that in Poland there is no cohesive technocratic class. First, the organizational changes generated new low-level bureaucratic

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positions that are neither clearly working class nor purely technocratic. Second, the diverse distribution of powers between the enterprises and the associations, combines, and WOGs with which they were associated, on one hand, and the varied relations of the latter with the central and local political and state authorities, on the other, inhibited the formation of a single technocratic class with common interests. Third, the different class backgrounds of those recruited into technocratic and bureaucratic positions (engineers from intellectual and peasant backgrounds go into general management or research positions, while those from working class backgrounds go into production positions) further inhibits formation of a self-aware class. As a consequence of all these factors, Woodall deduces that there is no coherent technocratic class. Thus, the question of its values and its relationship to the working class is moot.

The Polish leadership's failure to adjust either the workers' councils or the trade union structure to these new organizational arrangements fractured the channels of workers' participation and consultation. The leadership focused instead on increased recruitment of workers into the party; but this strategy failed to reestablish the legitimacy of the regime with the working class. Woodall's account sometimes leaves the impression that organizational discrepancy was the primary cause of the workers' dissatisfaction. This neglects the larger issue of the relationship of the party to the population. During the 1970s, the upper party leadership in Poland was increasingly losing touch with the workers, the intellectuals, and with its own reformist wing. Woodall's focus on organizational change is both her strength and her weakness. It allows a clearly defined stance from which to view the changes taking place, but exclusive reliance on this vantage point limits an understanding of the broader picture.

DEBORAH DUFF MILENKOVITCH
Barnard College, Columbia University

Multilateral Diplomacy within the Commonwealth: A Decade of Expansion *by Andrestinos N. Papadopoulos. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. 172 pp. $39.50.*

It is a tribute to British colonial rule that most of the independent states that emerged from the old empire after World War II have chosen to remain in association with their former rulers as members of the Commonwealth of Nations. The resulting increase in the size and diversity of that curious association has necessitated certain changes. The word "British" has been dropped from its title; and more machinery has been added in the form of a Secretariat set up in 1965 with its headquarters in London but with its staff drawn from all members of the organization.

The author of this monograph is a Cypriot civil servant who worked for some time in the Commonwealth Secretariat as Assistant Director in the International Affairs Division. He believes that the establishment of the Secretariat opened a new era and he has chosen to study intra-Commonwealth relations mainly during the first decade (1966–1977) after that event.

Papadopoulos proceeds in what may be called a classificatory fashion. The longest of

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the four chapters lists all the various types of meetings and conferences through which Commonwealth affairs are conducted. They range all the way from the biennial Heads of Governments meetings, through ministerial gatherings on such matters as trade and finance, as well as meetings of specialists and experts of various kinds and of all sorts of committees, to a concluding category of "seminars, symposia and workshops." Examples are given of each category, with descriptive summaries of their work that read more like the communiqués issued at the end of international conferences than like critical and informative discussion of their functioning and accomplishments.

The hero (if the term may be permitted) of this monograph is the Secretariat. It is the spark plug of Commonwealth achievements, organizing and servicing meetings, implementing decisions, and establishing liaison with other international organizations. The secretary general and senior staff frequently travel to all parts of the Commonwealth keeping members informed, learning their problems and desires, and in general making Commonwealth affairs run smoothly. Papadopoulos gives most of the credit to the Secretariat for the achievements of the association. Nor has the Secretariat's work been concerned only with matters of routine or procedure. Its success in persuading the African members not to secede after Rhodesia declared unilateral independence in 1965 was a very important matter indeed.

Papadopoulos's book contains a good deal of useful information about the Commonwealth. It suffers, however, from being written in a sort of bureaucratic style that dulls the interest of the reader and sometimes even makes it difficult to discern the author's meaning. Moreover, his schematic method of presentation robs the exposition of liveliness and a sense of movement. Readers get more of the anatomy of the Commonwealth than of its physiology, and miss a sense of the Commonwealth in action.

THOMAS P. PEARDON
Barnard College, Columbia University

A Contemporary Crisis: Political Hostage-Taking and the Experience of Western Europe *by Clive C. Aston. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1982. 217 pp. $27.50.*

Aston has presented a badly organized, carelessly drafted, poorly edited, and ridiculously expensive book, the observations and arguments of which might better have been put in a brief, carefully crafted article. At least one-half of the book is given over to a "case study"—a non-German, non-Israeli, English-language print-media pastiche of what the author calls "The Seige of the Munich Olympics, 1972." It is filler. In this section, nothing relevant either to the development or exemplification of the author's argument is presented. Rather, that development and illustration occurs in the earlier and later sections of the work.

The premise of the book is that if "political hostage incidents represent a new form of crisis, they should share certain common characteristics with the more conventional forms of international crisis" (p. xii). Given the validity of the premise, the author expects

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"the modalities of response" to be roughly those employed by governments in responding to crises in general. Such responses are operationally restricted in the six ways discussed in the concluding chapter of the work. It is with such constraints, rather than with governmental capabilities, that the book is concerned.

For the author's purpose, hostage-taking is "said to involve the suddenly enforced physical and/or psychological deprivation of a person's freedom, or the threat thereof, as a means of attempting to achieve some specific end commensurate with the motives of the hostage-taker" (p. 5). Two forms of taking hostages are identified: "kidnapping . . . [which] involves keeping the hostage in a location unknown to the responding authorities" (ibid.); and "a barricade and hostage situation or siege, [in which] the general, if not specific location of the hostage is known throughout the incident" (ibid.). Hijackings are characterized as "a sophisticated version of the siege" (p. 6).

The reader will notice that the two forms of hostage-taking that the author mentions seem to be instances of the physical deprivation of a person's freedom. Yet his definition mentions the possibility of the psychological deprivation of a person's freedom. So there is the problem of puzzling out what the author might mean by such psychological deprivation. The only clue to a possible solution to this puzzle that I have been able to find occurs at the end of the paragraph immediately above the aforementioned definition of hostage-taking. There, the author mentions that, "the hostage-taker need not be physically present" (p. 5).

If, as the distinction between a threat of and the suddenly enforced psychological deprivation of a person's freedom suggests, readers cannot define psychological hostage-taking in terms of the threat of physical hostage-taking, then perhaps psychological hostage-taking has something to do with entrapment. Could the author mean that a hostage-taker not physically present at the time might have placed certain devices that could quarantine, harm, or kill a hostage on command? No examples are adduced to suggest this or any other definition of psychological hostage-taking.

While there is a dearth of literature on political hostage-taking in Western Europe, it is hard to imagine that governments of that part of the world, which the author presumes to advise, need this book to instruct them regarding the constraints under which they operate in crises.

In conclusion, and in passing, it might be mentioned that the author never investigates the terms of his premise. Readers are never provided even a schematic of the constraints that occur within crises in general. So one can hardly judge his assertions of the similarity between such crises and political hostage-taking.

W. R. CAMPBELL
Miami University

Explaining Hitler's Germany: Historians and the Third Reich *by John Hiden and John Farquharson. Totowa, N.J., Barnes and Noble, 1983. 237 pp. $22.50.*

A more precise if less attractive title for this book would have been "Nazi Germany: a Historiographical Essay." A still more precise title would indicate that the book is about

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"explanatory models" regarding the Third Reich. In short, this is a book about other books, and only certain ones.

That is not quite what the authors intended. In their introduction they speak of "the increasing difficulty, for non-specialists, of keeping track of this crucial era of European history" (p. 6) and announce that they wanted "to include a solid foundation of information about Adolf Hitler's Germany, without which some of the problems being debated would scarcely be intelligible to those who are not specialists in the field" (p. 7). Unfortunately, they have not succeeded in doing so. To be sure, there is plenty of factual information in this book. But it is at a level of detail (such as wage fluctuations between 1936 and 1938, the decline in gold reserves in early 1939, the Z-plan for naval rearmament) that can only be appreciated by those who already possess a solid knowledge of the chronology and cast of characters of the Nazi era. The non-specialists and general students to whom the authors refer at the outset are frozen out in the text that follows.

Even specialists will find the text rough going. Though reviewers love to complain when notes appear at the end of the book instead of at the bottom of the page, for readers this is usually only a minor inconvenience. Not so in this book. The first chapter on "The Personality of Adolf Hitler," for instance, consists of 24 pages with 103 notes. Thus in order to understand what the authors are saying, the conscientious reader must turn to the back of the book more than four times, on average, per page. And after the first chapter it only gets worse, because the authors do not always start over with their footnoting, as is the normal practice. Instead, they frequently carry their citations over from chapter to chapter. So the weary reader must not only turn to the end of the book but must then also hunt back through the notes of previous chapters to see what is meant by a particular *op. cit.* Very few people will stick with this book to the end.

If they do, what will they get? The authors have focused their historiographical survey around seven topics ranging from Hitler's personality, through Nazi ideology, "centralized or polycentric dictatorship," "Hitler's 'social revolution'," "foreign policy: ideology in action," to economic management, and the general problem in interpreting National Socialism. Obviously these seven topics do not encompass the whole history of Hitler's Germany, with the result that many important subjects are barely touched on, if at all. Thus there is little on the actual conduct of World War II, no systematic treatment of the New Order, nothing on the resistance movement, very little on what happened to the Jews before 1939 (not even an index entry on the "Nuremberg Laws," for instance), and only passing references to what everyday life was like in the Third Reich. This is just a random and partial list of missing subjects.

What the authors have done is confine themselves to topics that can be treated by theoretical categorization. To be sure, certain controversial topics are well treated along the line. For example, the authors make clear that Hitler was by no means an economic simpleton, as has usually been claimed. But in the end, they are obsessed with classifying Hitler's regime according to "explanatory models."

There is a difference between history and historiography. Specialists who want to review the particular controversies covered by this book will profit from it and its elaborate scholarly apparatus. But, to paraphrase an old German joke about heaven, those who

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prefer the door marked "entrance to Nazi Germany" to the one announcing "seven lectures on the nature of Nazi Germany" will pass this book by and look elsewhere.

ROBERT E. NEIL
Oberlin College

Education in the Soviet Union: Policies and Institutions Since Stalin *by Mervyn Matthews. Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1982. 225 pp. $28.50.*

Matthews is well known to students of Soviet affairs as the author of several important studies on class, privilege, and incomes (official and unofficial) in Soviet society. Now he returns to an earlier interest, Soviet education and occupational placement (the latter was the subject of his doctoral dissertation at Oxford University some twenty years ago). His new book is the first extensive Western treatment of Soviet education and vocational policy since the early 1960s.

When political sociologists study an educational system, what are they looking for? For Matthews, this boils down to a pair of questions: whether Soviet education is a source of stability or change; and whether it is a source of political strength or weakness for the regime.

For much of the past two generations, the Soviet educational system has been one of the regime's greatest sources of strength, because it was an important channel of social mobility and advancement. By the end of the 1970s, nearly all Soviet children were completing eight years of schooling, and about half were finishing ten years (on a full-time basis) (p. 41). But enrollment has now reached a plateau. The number of students in schools has actually declined since the early 1970s, and most of the growth of the general educational system has come from expansion of on-the-job training and retraining programs. Rural enrollments have declined sharply. Full-time higher education takes in a steady one-eighth of each cohort, but the share is not growing. In short, the educational system is no longer the vehicle of social mobility that it once was. Will education become instead a source of frustrated expectations?

Another source of strength for the regime over the years has been the educational system's role as a socializer and inculcator of official values. But under Leonid Brezhnev it became ever more centralized and codified, dogmatic and rigid, and oriented toward military training. Matthews points out that the educational system is increasingly helpless to combat the values of surrounding society. For example, the schools preach egalitarianism, but the message the students receive from all around them favors white-collar professions and city jobs. In that respect, the schools illustrate a growing problem of the Soviet regime—government policy points one way, but badly, and the population goes another, but quietly.

What about the responsiveness of the educational system to the new demands of the technological age? Does it train its students quickly into the new specialties required in computers, biological and health sciences, and the like? This study says no. Under

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Brezhnev, curricula became more traditional than before, as the timid innovations introduced by Nikita Khrushchev were reversed: "Suggestions that socialist education, of the Soviet variety, has much that is worthy of quick imitation by outsiders should . . . be treated with great circumspection" (p. 201).

Matthews deliberately focuses on official documents and decrees as his prime source, and the result is an extremely detailed and carefully researched work. The non-specialist might wish that some of the dryness of the official documents was more frequently enlivened by the testimonies the author has gathered from former Soviet teachers and school administrators. The book is nevertheless a mine of information. Among its many strengths are excellent treatments of Khrushchev's ill-fated reforms (particularly those of 1958), the state job placement system, the early years of the state labor-reserve schools, and Soviet sociological studies of student attitudes and problems.

THANE GUSTAFSON
Columbia University

Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism *by Michael Checinski. New York, Karz-Cohl Publishing, 1982. 289 pp. $22.95.*

Checinski's book is not easy to classify. The author possesses excellent scholarly credentials and his study is well documented, but it is also at least in part a memoir of events in Poland during the 1950s and 1960s written from his vantage point as a former official in Polish counterintelligence. Checinski has also interviewed a number of other witnesses to the stormy events of those years, and in fact several of his chapters are based predominantly on these interviews. The result is a highly interesting book written from the point of view of an understandably disillusioned Polish Jew who now makes his home in Israel.

Checinski's theme is the struggle for power within the Polish Communist party and the decisive role played by the Soviet Union in determining who would rule the country. He is particularly interested, as the subtitle of the book indicates, in the role of the "Jewish question" in the struggle for power and in the manipulation of this question by the Soviet Union. The reader may occasionally wonder if the author is not exaggerating the importance of the Jewish issue within party circles, but his case is well argued and presented in fascinating, if repellent, detail. In broad outline, of course, the story is well known. The new Communist regime, lacking deep roots in native Polish soil, was obliged to rely to a certain extent on the support of activists of Jewish origin, members of a community devastated by Nazism. These activists, not unnaturally, were well disposed to the Left, and were committed to the establishment of a new Poland free of the curse of anti-Semitism. Subsequently, however, everything that went wrong in Poland was blamed on these devoted Communists of Jewish origin, who were rooted out, purged, and sometimes destroyed by a regime that was in fact coming more and more to resemble the semi-fascist regime of the colonels in Poland of the late 1930s. Checinski documents in great detail the uses of anti-Semitism in factional disputes within the party, as various groups sought to

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rally the forces of Polish nationalism against the "cosmopolitan," anti-Polish (meaning Jewish) opposition.

In the author's view, the bête noire in this depressing story is the Soviet Union, whose Nazi-like obsession with the Jews (emphasized but not really explained) was imposed upon the Polish Communist leadership. This Soviet obsession, which led it to support on occasion unreconstructed Polish "national" elements within the Polish party, led inexorably to what is termed, with some exaggeration, the "final solution"—namely the last exodus of Polish Jews to Israel and to the West in 1968.

This reviewer is not entirely convinced by Checinski's emphasis on the "made in the USSR" character of anti-Semitism in post-World War II Poland, and I hope I am not being unfair to the author if I detect here the influence of a long-standing attitude on the part of the Polish Left that Polish anti-Semitism was basically an import, above all from Russia. A bit more in the way of historical background to the events of the 1950s and 1960s might have been useful in dispelling this illusion. The fact is that the specifically Polish anti-Semitic tradition exemplified by the Endecja was very strong in the Poland of the 1920s, let alone of the 1930s, and it is extremely doubtful if this had anything at all to do with Russian-Soviet influences. It is very difficult to accept Checinski's conclusion that the Soviets must have played a major role in the spread of virulent anti-Semitism in postwar Poland because Poland was "a country where virtually no Jews have survived and where the very enormity of the Holocaust should have made the people immune to the germs of anti-semitism" (p. 236). Should have, yes. But did the terrible experiences of World War II render any people in Eastern Europe, and in particular the Poles, any less anti-Semitic?

These remarks notwithstanding, Checinski has written an important book. It will be read with interest and profit by all those interested in the establishment of national Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. It portrays in a particularly vivid way the tragedy of members of an isolated minority, who first provided much needed recruits for an unpopular regime and later served in the more familiar role of scapegoats.

EZRA MENDELSOHN
Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Revolutionary Afghanistan: A Reappraisal *by Beverly Male. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982. 229 pp. $27.50.*

Among a number of recently published books on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Beverly Male's *Revolutionary Afghanistan* fits into a special category. Hers is an energetic effort, to defend the policies and programs of the Communist faction that had taken over Afghanistan in a military coup in 1978. Male, who is a lecturer at the Royal Military College in Duntoon, Australia, emphasizes several themes, each of which suffers from serious problems.

First, she asserts that what had happened in Kabul in 1978 was a "revolution," organized and executed by the Afghan Communists themselves without Soviet knowledge

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or participation (p. 132). Even leaving aside the question of terminology—Male uses the term "revolution" very lightly—there are problems with this. Clearly, as in any other coup, there was much that depended on luck and chance for the success. And there is no evidence of direct Soviet participation in the effort. However, given the relations between the pro-Soviet group and Moscow, the Soviet Union's involvement in the Afghan military, and increasing difficulties in relations between the Kabul government and Moscow, it is unlikely that the Soviets did not know that their friends in Afghanistan were preparing for a coup. In fact, a recent Soviet defector from the KBG went further and asserted that the Afghan Communists sought and received Soviet permission to carry out their coup (*Time*, 22 November 1982, 33–34).

Second, she argues that the events in Afghanistan were "widely misrepresented" (p. 14) in Western media. Male asserts that the Khalqi faction of the local pro-Soviet Communist party, which came to dominate the Afghan government from April 1978 to December 1979, was popular in Afghanistan. She is especially impressed by the person of Hafizullah Amin, a man who has been widely regarded as the strongman of the Khalqi regime, even before he eliminated Noor Mohammed Taraki and took over the presidency in September 1979. Male charges Western media of "deliberate . . . slander" (p. 15) against him. So enthusiastic is she in her support of Amin that she dismisses the charges by Amnesty International that the Khalqi regime had jailed thousands of opponents and executed several thousand political prisoners. Even Amin himself had admitted to more than 10,000 executions by the Khalqi regime after he had gotten rid of Taraki—but of course, he blamed it on the former president.

Third, Male wants to demonstrate that from the beginning Amin was not pro-Soviet, and that he wanted to minimize his dependence on Moscow. In the light of subsequent developments, especially his overthrow and execution by the Soviet forces, this is an obvious conclusion. Clearly, Amin was not as servile to the Soviets as are the current Afghan rulers, and he did not agree with some Soviet policies, such as Soviet efforts to blame him for the failures of the Khalqi regime and to eliminate him in September 1979. There is, however, ample evidence that he accommodated the Soviet Union on all international issues. He declared the 1978 coup to be an extension of the October Revolution, and negotiated the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1978. In exchange, he wanted to entrap Moscow into supporting Khalq in dealing with domestic problems. In other words, Amin aimed to trade off Soviet support for the Khalqi regime in Afghanistan and Afghan support for Moscow on international issues. At the Soviet-Afghan level, Moscow's invasion came largely as a result of increasing disenchantment with the Khalqi approach to domestic problems.

Fourth, at the domestic level, Male provides an extensive and at times not uninteresting discussion of the policy goals and approaches of the Khalqi regime. However, she fails to provide an adequate analysis of why the regime failed so badly. She falls back in the end on the Khalqi party line explanation—that the regime's difficulties arose from mounting oppposition from Iran, the U.S., China, and Pakistan. In doing this, she is inclined to exaggerate very substantially the role of outside powers, and underestimates the difficulties and mistakes committed by the regime. At the same time, she provides little evidence for her accusation of substantial outside involvement, except for hearsay and Khalqi statements.

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Revolutionary Afghanistan is also very weak in its understanding of the politics of the partisan group opposed to the Khalqi government. Male is unclear on the ideological differences and political evolution of these groups. Despite their shortcomings, those looking for a sympathetic view of Hafizullah Amin would find this work to their satisfaction. This is likely also to be the case with those Khalqis opposed to the Karmal regime in Kabul.

ZALMAY KHALILZAD
Columbia University

Industrial Growth, Trade, and Dynamic Patterns in the Japanese Economy *by Miyohei Shinohara. Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 1982. 243 pp. $17.50.*

This volume is a collection of eleven wide-ranging and somewhat eclectic papers on Japanese and international economic topics written by Miyohei Shinohara, professor of economics at Seikei University, Tokyo. According to the author, most of these papers were originally published in Japanese during the past two decades, with translations in English-language journals appearing only since 1979. He does not give the dates of the original Japanese versions (the more recent English-language publications are given), but the data contained in most chapters are generally from 1975 and are only occasionally as recent as 1980. However, the economic issues he addresses remain current; and in general his observations and analysis stand the test of time quite well.

Presumably in order to provide some structure and coherence, the volume is divided into three parts—industrial growth and industrial policy, changes in trade structure, and dynamic patterns in growth cycles—along with a "supplementary chapter" on technical progress and production function by industry. This format helps unify the book, but ultimately it cannot overcome the facts that these are individual papers rather than related chapters, and that insufficient effort was made to give the volume greater continuity by selectively editing and revising several of the chapters. Consequently the volume suffers from both disjointedness and redundancy and, when taken as a whole, is less than the sum of its individual parts.

Despite this flaw, many of the chapters provide useful information and interesting analysis when read individually. Part I underscores the significance of the shift in emphasis from heavy industry (steel and petrochemicals) to processing industries (autos, apparel, and other consumer items) for the rapid growth and successful development of the Japanese economy. In discussing Japan's industrial policy, Shinohara accurately casts the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in the role of arbitrator and coordinator of economic policy, and as a unilateral interloper on only rare occasions. The author fails, however, to acknowledge or describe the important roles and influences of other actors such as the Free Trade Commission, the Ministry of Finance, and state monopolies such as Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT). He also raises important questions about the future direction of the Japanese economy and MITI's role, but ventures only a very impressionistic description of what that future will hold.

The dynamics of international trade and economic relationships are the focus of Part

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II. A thought-provoking essay on the rise and fall of economic powers identifies balance of payments and terms of trade patterns as historical determinants of economic dominance. Although these criteria indicate that America's economic dominance has waned, Shinohara is reluctant to proclaim Japan's economic ascendancy, and instead characterizes Japanese economic power as being of only "medium magnitude." Japan, he feels, remains vulnerable to Asia's developing economies, and in particular to the "boomerang effect"—the process in which Japanese investment and technology transfers to Asia's developing countries results in increased exports by those countries. These exports ultimately compete with Japanese products both in Japan's domestic market and in third country markets around the world. The author's modest assessment of Japan's global economic weight must be questioned in light of his chapter on the dramatic and destabilizing growth of Japanese auto exports to the U.S. and Europe between 1978 and 1980. Conversely, his concern with the developing country challenge seems somewhat overstated given Japan's gradual evolution into a "post-industrial" economy based on high technology, information processing, and service industries.

Part III is a virtual grab bag of topics. It begins with a good overview of Japan's postwar economic development, but one that in large part replicates earlier chapters. This is followed by studies of Japan's high savings rate and postwar economic cycles, and ends with a lengthy examination of technical progress and production functions. These final three chapters are recommended for only the hardiest of economists.

To conclude, the book suffers from a lack of focus and the absence of a unifying theme. These shortcomings make it difficult, though by no means impossible, to appreciate fully the author's impressive range of knowledge as well as his refreshingly sensitive and international view of Japan's global roles and responsibilities.

DAVID G. TIMBERMAN
The Asia Society

Japanese Political Culture: Change and Continuity *by Takeshi Ishida. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1983. 173 pp. $24.95.*

This is a dismal book that makes one wonder by what quirk of the publisher it got into print. Written by a full professor of Tokyo University, it purports to analyze modern Japan's political culture. But it does nothing of the sort, not with any scholarly competence at any rate. Instead, it is by and large an anthology of disparate articles marking the author's odyssey as a Japanese pacifist struggling with his guilt for having once supported the wartime government. For all the seriousness of the author, the book has a comical character because it blithely ignores the most elementary canons of academic or any other kind of writing such as logic, consistency, and evidence.

"Some may criticize me for being a dreamer because of my commitment to pacifism" (xvii), allows the author, and he is unabashedly ideological. On its own terms as a book on Japan's political culture, Part III (three of eight articles), avowedly devoted to "peace research," can be safely brushed aside. Part II, dealing with such diverse topics as Max Weber, Japanese fascism, and the like, is related only tangentially to the subject.

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Then what does the author say in Part I (two articles)? In the first ten pages, he bravely characterizes modern Japan's political culture as resting on two values and two organizations: in-group conformity and competition; and village community and bureaucracy. The origin of conformity is explained this way: "Since the Japanese people from early times settled and grew rice on what little land they had, it is hardly surprising that conformist in-groups were formed in rural communities" (p. 7). With almost a W. C. Fields sort of nonchalance, the author squares conformity with competition, the two values in apparent contradiction. The Japanese are peasants conforming blindly to the emperor at home, but are swashbuckling samurai warriors competing abroad in acquiring imperialist possessions or in cornering the world markets (pp. 30–31).

Is this book then totally devoid of value? On the contrary, it is a very valuable specimen of postwar Japanese political culture dominated by radical-left pacifism. As the author makes abundantly clear, this culture has three chief components: total rejection of everything Japanese as "feudal," "militaristic," "fascist," and so on; a total acceptance of everything about U.S. occupation, including the war-forbidding Douglas MacArthur constitution; and resulting resentment against America for pressuring Japan to rearm today. The pacifists are wholly inward looking and fail to draw implications from the fact that in commercial competition Japan today can eat Pittsburgh or Detroit alive. There is a deep irony in the author's assertion that "Japan possessed no internal force capable of changing the political system" (xvi).

TETSUYA KATAOKA
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

China Without Mao: The Search for a New Order *by Immanuel C. Y. Hsü. New York, Oxford University Press, 1983. 212 pp. Cloth, $19.95; paper, $7.95.*

This useful book focuses on China's political history beginning with the death of Mao Zedong. It includes sections of Deng Xiaoping and the rise of pragmatism, the normalization of relations with the U.S., problems and priorities of modernization and the trial of the Gang of Four, and closes with a brief description of Taiwan's "economic miracle" and the prospects for its unification with the mainland.

Having stated that the death of Mao was an "epochal" turning point (p. viii), Hsü cautions that such changes as have occurred since then, such as the de-sanctification of Mao, should not lead to the conclusion that drastic change has taken place in the nature of the Chinese state. The system has undergone a shift in approach, but remains committed to its four basic principles: the dictatorship of the proletariat; the leadership of the Communist party; Marxism-Leninism; and the teachings of Mao. Hsü holds the now widely accepted view that Mao was a better revolutionary than a leader.

The book begins with sedate reviews of the lives of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong done in biographical dictionary fashion, and with a description of the rise of Hua Guofang. Zhou is presented first, a sequence that, presumably, was dictated by the later date of Mao's death, but that also may reflect the relative esteem in which the author holds each leader. The study reaches a climax in an exciting account of the trial of Jiang Qing. The

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key political issue was separating Mao and Hua from the trial; Hsü's analysis of how the parts leadership went about this is absorbing and convincing. Hsü raises another question: Was the court truly a court of law? He concludes that, despite many shortcomings in terms of legal procedure, the trial was a positive step towards the emergence of rule by law. He closes this section by first making an apparently obligatory statement regarding Mao's "greatness" as a revolutionary leader and immediately following with a list of Mao's policy blunders: the rejection of population control; the enforced isolation of China; "adventurism" in economic development; and his assumption of superiority within the party, which destroyed intra-party democracy and collective leadership. China's new leaders, by contrast, are committed to "a revolution by modernization" (p. 156).

Although China specialists tend to think in terms of that country's uniqueness, many of China's recent experiences are typical of the Third World. A charismatic leader comes to power, persuades the masses to undergo great sacrifices and substitutes ideology for material reward. Since personality has eclipsed institutionalization, once the leader passes on, new policies that are less dependent either on charismatic appeal or party organization must be found if the country is to proceed with modernization.

Hsü's bibliography is comprehensive in English and Chinese, and his three periods of research and teaching in the People's Republic of China add authority to his findings. Yet despite the modern methodology and materials and a clear commitment to constitutional processes, there is a whiff of the dynastic histories in this evaluation of China's immediate past.

RHODA WEIDENBAUM
University of New Haven

The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico *by Nora Hamilton. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1982. 381 pp. Cloth, $36.00; paper, $8.95.*

As the contemporary Mexican state struggles to confront the most severe economic crisis since the first few years after the revolutionary transfer of power, the appearance of Hamilton's study of the Cárdenas presidency (1934–1940) is particularly timely. For this solid, careful, well-organized account traces the rise and demise of the progressive alliance that allowed the Cárdenas administration to enact the most far-reaching structural reforms Mexico has undergone before or since, reforms that ironically paved the way for the long period of economic growth only recently ended. The major accomplishments of the Cárdenas regime came in agrarian redistribution, union organization, and oil nationalization. They were carried out through mobilizational efforts directed or sponsored by elements within the state apparatus itself. Their continuation into the last years of the Cárdenas *sexenio* and beyond was blocked by the reassertion of a conservative class alliance that included both new capitalist groups owing their very existence to the success of Cárdenas's pro-growth policies and old capitalist groups alarmed by the growing

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strength of popular organizations and socialist ideologies. Although populist themes continue to reverberate in official Mexican political discourse and although further land reforms and anti-imperialist rhetorical flourishes have come and gone, Mexico since 1940 has been dominated by what is widely recognized as a "triple alliance" of multinational, national, and state sector capital. The Mexican state no longer enjoys the autonomy it briefly displayed in the mid-1930s, and Hamilton's study shows how very limited even that autonomy was.

Hamilton's principal achievements are three. First, she integrates large amounts of material into a focused analysis that moves from the backgrounds to Cárdenas era in the revolutionary reconstitution of state and society, to the emergence of and contradictions within the progressive alliance, to the limits imposed on the state by private capital (both Mexican and foreign, principally U.S.), to the weakening of the progressives by co-optation, control from above, and counter-mobilization by the conservatives. This volume will become, I would venture to say, the standard account in English, in no small part because of Hamilton's extensive use of excellent Mexican secondary sources. Second, she provides considerable original analysis, based on primary sources, of the emergence and development of economic groups within the capitalist class. She gives detailed examples of the growing reach of banks and investment groups in her three appendices (some fifty pages worth), showing how the state promoted constraints on its own further reform possibilities. She incorporates the results of these analyses into the main text without derailing the presentation.

Third, in spite of a confusion between "relative autonomy" and plain old ordinary autonomy, Hamilton contributes to the ongoing renaissance of political-sociological discussion of the relationship between states and social classes. On the positive side, she casts her whole analysis within the framework of neo-Marxist thought about the conditions under which states can act independently of, and even in antagonism toward, the dominant class or fractions thereof. These conditions include economic crises, military threats, transitional eras, and severe splits within the dominant class itself. The major mechanisms for effecting autonomous state action seem to be the forging of political alliances with segments of subordinate class groups and perhaps the recruitment of bureaucrats from other than the dominant strata. This perspective also enables her to be unusually alert to the ways in which the capitalist class regroups and undermines the possibility of continued leftward movement. In the Mexican case, these ways included the encouragement of armed opposition, capital flight, a U.S.-organized boycott of Mexican petroleum, and the sponsorship of a rival presidential candidate, among others. In addition, her perspective enables her to show how the state itself, even at its most progressive moments, was interpenetrated with capitalist as well as with worker and peasant interests.

On the negative side, there is a conceptual elision between the notion of autonomy she works with for most of the book and the idea of "relative autonomy," a basically trivial notion meaning that in order to reproduce capitalism generally states must be able on occasion to act counter to particular capitalist interests. Another negative aspect is her tendency to interpret in ideological terms the failure of the Left to remain independent and the failure of the Cárdenas regime to continue its progressive thrust—the former was ideologically underdeveloped, the latter did not "understand" the limits of state

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autonomy. Material and organizational explanations are preferable, and, I think, available. These cavils aside, readers do understand those limits better thanks to Hamilton's thorough research and clear presentation.

WALTER L. GOLDFRANK
University of California, Santa Cruz

The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration *edited by A. Jeyaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton. Honolulu, University Press of Hawaii, 1983. 343 pp. $24.00.*

This collection of fourteen essays on modern South Asia appears in honor of the distinguished British scholar W. H. Morris-Jones. They reflect Morris-Jones's wise and stimulating counsel over the years and the current excitement in the study of South Asian politics. The excitement is due to the opening up of archival material from the days of the partition of 1947, the accumulation of over thirty years' research on the politics of the major South Asian states, and the fact that the future of these states—which have just made the transition from one political generation to another—is both increasingly uncertain and increasingly important in human and strategic terms.

The standard of these essays is extraordinarily high. Several draw on newly available material on the British withdrawal from the subcontinent (1946–47). Five essays focus on current problems of national integration in the region, and are based upon original research as well as the cumulative work of many scholars (including Morris-Jones). The final five essays, examining the future of the region, offer provocative hints of what is to come.

The contributors to this volume are a veritable who's who of modern South Asian studies. They include Hugh Tinker, Khalid B. Sayeed, Robin J. Moore, and K. M. de Silva, writing about various aspects of the partition and the early years of politics in independent India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; James Manor, M. Rashiduzzaman, Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, C. R. de Silva, and Dennis Dalton, who focus on various aspects of political integration and disintegration in the same states; Ataur Rahman, Paul R. Brass, Talukdar Maniruzzaman, A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, and Leo E. Rose devote their efforts to the future. There is extensive coverage of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, although none of Nepal or Afghanistan. An annotated bibliography of Morris-Jones's work is also included.

Space does not permit more than a brief noting of the most significant essays. Robin Moore's discussion of the "limits of unity" in India in 1947 uses newly available material to supplement existing work on the politics of partition and the British withdrawal, especially the concern over the lack of strategic unity in the subcontinent. K. M. de Silva points out that the Ceylonese were so concerned with the prospect of an independent India dominating the region that they sought to continue a defense arrangement with the British, a point developed in Leo Rose's excellent survey of regional foreign policies and external involvement. James Manor compares political integration in India and Pakistan, and singles out the lack of a strong political party as Pakistan's undoing. Lloyd and

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Susanne Rudolph offer a penetrating case-study of the textbook controversy in India during the Janata interregnum and conclude that the role of Muslims in Indian public historiography remains an unresolved and particularly troubling issue. Paul Brass's long chapter on "Pluralism, Regionalism and Decentralizing Tendencies in Contemporary Indian Politics" is alone almost worth the price of the book. In a tour de force, Brass contrasts pluralism (increasing) with centralization (fighting a rear-guard battle), using examples from party systems, fiscal management, language policy, and the use of presidential rule. The concluding essays on the future are all well done, but A. Jeyaratnam Wilson's prescient discussion of Sinhalese versus Tamil in Sri Lanka is especially forthright and stark.

The only flaw in this fine tribute to a key figure in modern South Asian political studies is an abundance of typographical and other errors. One in Table 1 (p. 229) presents figures that are off by a factor of 1,000.

STEPHEN P. COHEN
University of Illinois at Urbana

Soldiers Without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces *by Kenneth W. Grundy. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1983. 297 pp. $24.50.*

Since the first appearance of large-scale states, ruling groups have faced the dilemma of maintaining control over the permanent armed forces whose creation was a necessary condition for maintenance of state hegemony. This age-old issue took a new dimension in the era of imperialism, when Europeans sought means of economical conquest and subjugation of alien peoples. In the mid-eighteenth century, the French and British discovered in India a promising formula—recruiting indigenous soldiers, at minimal cost, and organizing them into fighting units under European control and discipline. The effectiveness of this model of "bargain-basement" coercion helped make possible the sweeping colonial conquests of the following century.

In this valuable monograph, Kenneth Grundy examines the further adaptation of the basic formula to the contemporary requirements of sustaining the hegemony of the white *herrenvolk* state in South Africa over the Africans, Indians, and Coloureds that make up over 80 precent of its population. In the 1970s, as the internal and external challenges to white minority rule have mounted, South Africa has been driven to incorporate growing numbers of "blacks" (understood in the ideological sense of all non-whites) into its security forces.

The use of black forces, as Grundy shows, is not entirely novel in South Africa. When the British gained control of the Cape of Good Hope in Napoleanic times, the subject soldier pattern was a well-ingrained imperial habit, and was at once adapted to local colonial necessities. The habit persisted into the era of South African independence, but recently encountered a conflicting fear among the white minority of armed blacks with military skills. Black (especially Coloured) personnel were used to meet the manpower needs of the two world wars, but security forces came to be thought of as necessarily a white monopoly. Indeed, in the interwar years, and the first fifteen postwar years, South

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Africa security forces were very small, and could be easily staffed by whites. Since that time, the picture has changed dramatically, as the repressive apparatus of the South African state has swiftly grown. Controlled utilization of black personnel has been a central aspect of the rise of the national security state.

The major contribution of the Grundy study is the careful analysis of this phenomenon. Only a segment of the data required is in the public domain; Grundy has proved a persistent sleuth in unearthing much fugitive information, although large areas of obscurity remain. His coverage is especially good of the African 21 Battalion and its spin-offs, the "homeland" armies, and the African units and personnel used in the Namibia campaign.

Events subsequent to the completion of the work further underline its importance. In the 1980s, South African security strategy has moved into a more aggressive and military phase, heavily influenced by the Israeli model; with pre-emptive or punitive raids on neighboring countries, and permanent clandestine military operations, particularly in Angola. For this type of operation, black troops are invaluable. Their serious destabilizing impact on neighboring African states confirms Grundy's conclusion that, at least for the moment, "soldiers without politics," or military auxiliaries recruited among the oppressed subject population, can be a reliable instrument of the white minority state.

Some may take the author to task for the weakness of his conceptual structure. Grundy demonstrates in an introductory chapter his familiarity with the theoretical literature, but then makes little use of it thereafter. But overall the book offers competent coverage of a timely topic. The dust jacket marvelously captures the contents, showing a white South African officer in full dress uniform looming over serried ranks of African recruits, heads shaven, clad only in drill shorts.

CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Two Hungry Giants: The United States and Japan in the Quest for Oil and Ores

by Raymond Vernon. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1983. 161 pp. $16.00.

This study gives three more cheers for Japan, Inc. The author uses the theme of the dominance of the United States and Japan as the world's major consumers of crude oil, aluminum, and copper to assess how each country has responded to price and supply instability. He concludes that policy responses in the two countries have resulted from their own institutions and ideologies, which he feels are extraordinarily disparate to the point of incompatibility.

Vernon depicts Japan as a country that has learned to cope with its dependence on imports of oil and ores by following coordinated and effective policies designed to secure stable supplies. The United States, on the other hand, lacks an explicit and consistent national policy. In the case of an international shortage, the United States is likely to see itself cast in the role of a country bumpkin—unheeding before the fact, unprepared after it, and unable to learn from its experience.

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A theme of the book is that the rich American endowment of natural resources, along with its commitment to free markets, the lack of planning, and the constant rotation of senior officials, makes its policy formulation process haphazard and inferior to Japan's. A weakness of the book is that Vernon has to rely on secondary sources on Japan to make his case. The twenty-four pages describing Japan's institutions and practices provide only a sketch of how its decision-making process works and less still about how those decisions are implemented. Moreover, his emphasis on historical determinism, that the "twig was bent" long ago in a direction that molds current policies, offers little help for decision-makers interested in innovative policy initiatives.

Vernon feels that Japan has successfully dealt with oil shortages by following the recommendations of various reports that have defined a framework in which businesses and government have been expected to act. He recommends that the United States do the same, beginning with the 1952 report of the Paley Commission. He seems to underestimate, however, Japan's reliance on the price mechanism (not planning) to allocate scarce petroleum supplies and curtail domestic demand.

Several questionable assertions or factual inaccuracies made certain parts of the book somewhat annoying to read. For example, the windfall profits tax in the U.S. was imposed in 1980, not in 1979 (p. 73). The statement that Japan's tariffs are among the lowest (p. 7) actually applies only to manufactured goods and excludes agricultural products. The assertion seems odd that in the United States, private holdings of oil stocks amounting to ninety-five days of imports in 1982 could not be counted on as a buffer in a time of scarcity (p. 115). Why stockpile, if such are not to be used during shortages?

Throughout the book, the discussion of ores seems tacked on almost as an afterthought to the treatment of oils. A more unified approach, perhaps, would have been to focus strictly on energy—oil, coal, and natural gas. There also is no extensive presentation of statistics dealing with the oil and ore trades.

Nevertheless, Vernon's analysis offers food for thought for policymakers in both countries, particularly in his attempt to place oil and ore policies in the context of institutional rigidities, bilateral relations, and rising U.S. protectionism.

DICK K. NANTO
Congressional Research Service

Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany *by James F. Tent. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983. 369 pp. Cloth, $26.00; paper, $12.95.*

The GDR: Moscow's German Ally *by David Childs. Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1983. 346 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $14.50.*

From Hitler to Ulbricht: The Communist Reconstruction of East Germany, 1945–46 *by Gregory W. Sandford. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1983. 313 pp. $25.00.*

These are three books that explore the political and social reconstruction of both Germanies in the years following defeat and collapse in 1945. *Mission on the Rhine* is a tour

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de force through the emotional underbrush of American reeducation and denazification efforts in postwar Germany. With the help of interviews and documentary sources, James F. Tent expertly chronicles the intense frustrations of various American occupation officials, mostly of the Education and Religious Affairs (E and RA) Branch, in their early attempts to purge, denazify, and reconstruct German education. With personal statements and quotations, the author gives telling descriptions of the hectic atmosphere, the exaggerated press statements and, most of all, the extraordinary difficulties in rendering moral judgments concerning the worth and democratic reliability of German university professors carried over from the Nazi past. Purging them pitted the democratic zeal of American reformers against the espirit de corps of a group that had already weathered Nazi purges and adapted wondrously to the ideological preferences of the Nazis, and that now applied similar survival skills to the occupation-sponsored purges. The struggle for reform was aggravated further by the critical shortages of qualified German personnel, for example in the medical clinics, and the sullen if not openly nationalistic attitudes of German students and war veterans. Small wonder that the occupation officials took umbrage at every hint of recalcitrant German nationalism, especially after a *Feme*-type assassination killed the E and RA senior university officer, Edward Y. Hartshorne.

The bureaucratic rivalries also bedeviled any hope of democratic educational reform at the lower levels. The traditional European two-track system thus clearly won out at the time, at least until the coming of the *Gesamtschule* (comprehensive high school) in some *Länder* (states) in the 1970s. By 1948, just as with denazification, the onrush of time had overtaken even the best considered plans for democratic educational reform. The U.S. reeducators had missed their golden opportunity of the days when German society and politics were still malleable. When the Military Government finally insisted on ordering the waylaid reforms in January 1948, it found itself up against something its own democratizing influx had created. The conservative Bavarian minister of education skillfully orchestrated the new democratic group pressures and public opinion to defeat the reforms.

Was the U.S. reeducation effort not a success? Seeing its progress as eventually turning from reeducation into "reorientation," as the author does, makes it possible to say that it was a success only by adjusting the standards of judgment to its limited achievements. On the other hand, reeducation was a major victory over the natural inclination of the military occupation to force its will upon the recalcitrant Germans. Instead, future pressures from within have come to prevail in due time and have brought substantial changes even in Bavarian education.

David Childs's book about the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is a combination of postwar history and penetrating analysis of topics that reveal the nature of the East German system. The author raises an intriguing question when he suggests that the U.S. might have avoided some of the cold war estrangement had it been more responsive to Soviet requests for credit for Soviet postwar reconstruction (p. 13). But Childs also raises improbable scenarios when he criticizes president Dwight D. Eisenhower on the occasion of the 1956 invasion of Hungary, for "once again . . . [having] abandoned a nation to its fate" (p. 51). At times the reader may also be surprised at the absence of any mention of the role of the Soviet army—during the initial conquest, during the suppression of the 1953 uprising, or in its general relations with the civilian regime.

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The topical chapters all raise and to some extent answer important questions such as the extent to which the GDR conforms to the model of "bureaucratic authoritarianism." Childs also analyzes the composition of the ruling bodies of the GDR, although he ought perhaps to have been more skeptical about the occupational or "class" identities listed for high functionaries in the official literature. There are realistic assessments of the GDR constitutions of 1968 and 1974, economic reconstruction, the educational system, intellectuals, the mass media, women, the National People's Army (NVA), and the foreign relations of the GDR. Of these, the cultural topics are intrinsically the most interesting. The intensity and frustrations of intellectual life alone supply exciting perspectives of creativity and brute repression that exemplify the heights and depths of glory in the GDR.

The subject of GDR women is no less absorbing. East German female employment reached an extremely high level long before any industrial country in the West, and sexual equality is taken rather more seriously there than, say, in the Federal Republic. Yet the dual role of women as housewives and mothers and in their careers is bound to exact its toll.

On the whole, this is a well-rounded work of description and analysis that makes a fine choice for the classroom.

Gregory Sanford's book on the first years of the GDR is a systematic and somewhat revisionist history of Soviet efforts to restructure the East German society and economy. It begins with the development of Soviet plans, which are contrasted with the Anglo-American emphasis on democratic reeducation, punishment, and denazification. The author brings out many telling points, such as the rivalry in the earliest days between the East German Communists and the spontaneous local *Antifa* (anti-fascist) groups. He also shows the extent to which Soviet control of all communications tended to favor the East German Communist efforts over those of all other parties. Even the Social Democratic Party, which had an organization of its own, contributed to Communist success by its own factionalism and lack of unity on crucial issues.

Sandford concentrates especially on the great land reform of the early years and gives a revealing picture of its relative successes and failures. Critical shortages of practically everything, including farming skills, made the redistribution of the Junkers' land something less than a triumph. When readers compare this book to the far more ambitious coverage by David Childs there is a curiously flat, two-dimensional quality about this more detailed description that comes out especially in comparing developments East and West, or in relating the different partisan positions to those of the Communists. Whereas Childs's political world places heavy stress also on personalities and situations, Sandford's seems to be dominated only by group forces and ideologies aligned along a single Left-Right dimension. What he says about the Western efforts at democratization in those years thus often comes out demonstrably wrong and his account of East German "democratization" is excessively simple minded. Who, after all, elected the Communists the representatives of the "proletarian" or "worker class" (pp. 184–85)? This judgment, of course, depends on one's concept of "democracy" and "democratization." But by the author's own description, there was precious little of either to be found in the determined machinations for minority control under the aegis of the Soviet occupation. To equate the "freedom of expression" granted in the "people's democracies" (especially after

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the occupation ended) with its equivalent "under Western occupation regimes" and to speak of "free trade unions" (pp. 222–23) in the same context is at variance with the most glaring realities of the GDR at any time.

In his conclusion (pp. 224–27), the author seems to discount the true reasons for the decline of the Communist party (KPD) vote in the Western zones, believing instead that it must have been persecuted or suppressed by the Western occupying powers. He also does not seem to be aware of the depth of the "*ohne mich*" ("count me out") sentiment there. In summing up, finally, the author attempts a balanced comparison between the Western and the Soviet views of "democratization," and yet he still appears undecided on which side of the "inner-German border" real democracy has established itself. This book is a typical example of the confusion of facts and judgments engendered by some revisionist interpretations of the Western reeducation efforts.

PETER H. MERKL
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After the Palestine-Israel War: Limits to U.S. and Israeli Policy *by Khalil Nakhleh and Clifford A. Wright. Belmont, Mass., Institute of Arab Studies, 1983. 150 pp. $7.95.*

This book sets out to assess the impact of the 1982 Palestine-Israel war. The authors focus their particular attention on the diplomacy of the period from August 1982 through April 1983. They acknowledge the dangers of focusing on such recent issues. Even so, they must be startled to see how rapidly events have undermined much of the relevance of their book. Just a few days prior to the writing of this review, a Mercedes truck loaded with explosives leveled some of their assumptions almost as completely as it did the American Marine headquarters in Beirut. It seems almost impossible to develop a perspective on events in the Middle East that will survive tomorrow's headlines.

The authors do remind readers that as of 1 September 1982, the Reagan administration did have a plan for peace in the Middle East. More important, they have offered six persuasive reasons why that plan so quickly became moribund. First, they argue that the Arabs and Israelis both quickly surmised that the Reagan administration was not seriously committed to its own proposal. Second, the plan lacked credibility, since it held out no real hope that it would secure the objectives of the interested parties—security for Israel or a state for the Palestinians. Third, the authors suggest (without offering much analysis), that the Reagan plan was too sweeping in conception, especially since neither the Israelis nor Palestinians were consulted. Fourth, the United States relied too much on Israel's strength in the region to force on an American ally a plan it opposes. Fifth, Reagan policymakers have once again ignored "the role the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization] has played in defining and coalescing a Palestinian national identity" (p. 120). By refusing to work through the PLO, the Reagan administration made it impossible for any other legitimate Palestinian group to enter the peace process.

Finally, the authors stress that in reality the Reagan plan addressed no strategic necessity. The war had caused no political or strategic realignment to which the United

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States thought itself compelled to respond. Iran and Iraq fought on. Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab states remained loyal to the United States. None of them showed any inclination to champion the Palestinian cause. Nor was there any threat to American interests if the plan actually failed: "The Israelis would still be the undisputed power in the region with unqualified American support" (p. 122).

Recent events have played havoc with the book's general perspective. Israel's power looks far less awesome as the strains of occupation take their economic and military toll. Menachem Begin has left office. But more important, the plight of Lebanon has supplanted the Palestinian question as the focus of Western concerns. Americans are far more preoccupied with the Phalangists and Druse militia than with the PLO. Yasir Arafat has been at least momentarily more effectively exiled from the news than from the PLO headquarters in Beirut. Civil war in Lebanon seems far more troublesome than the question of Palestinian statehood. The U.S.-Israel alliance appears strangely impotent during the recent crises, and it is likely that the Lebanon experience will lead to a reorientation of American policies, though in what direction is hardly clear.

Beyond issues of substance, readers might legitimately ask whether this really is a book at all. It is actually two long essays that are more appropriate for journal articles. The sources are mostly derived from the current popular press in the United States and abroad. There is little or no effort to place any of the issues in either a historical or theoretical framework. Anyone who has not followed the news closely will often find that memory fails to provide enough context to follow the explanation. The authors spend more time tracing what happened in the course of scuttling the Reagan plan than in offering a penetrating analysis of the political currents. Nor do they have inside information or the access to key participants that might enable them to make a significant addition to the public record. We simply expect more from a book than the authors have delivered.

Still, anyone who does read this book will gain at least a renewed appreciation for how quickly events alter our perspective. By then the Palestine-Israel war may seem like ancient history.

MARK HAMILTON LYTLE
Bard College

New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations: Essays Presented to Dorothy Borg *edited by Warren I. Cohen. New York, Columbia University Press, 1983. 294 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $15.00.*

This volume, consisting of eight essays written by different authors, grew out of a conference held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in May 1981. It is in essence a stock-taking exercise, in which the authors review the historiographic development of U.S.-East Asian relations since the turn of this century. Because of its in-depth and concise presentation, as well as its broad coverage, this book serves as a very useful reference for graduate students in U.S.-East Asian studies.

The volume focuses on United States relations with China, Japan, and South Korea.

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Akira Iriye, displaying his extensive knowledge of the subject, discusses the cultural aspect of the ties and asks how "Asians . . . have become Americanized, and Americans Asianized" (p. 45). Waldo Heinrichs reviews the literature on political and economic affairs from 1900 to 1945, and analyses the different approaches undertaken by various authors. Ernest R. May writes on military and naval affairs since 1900, while Warren I. Cohen compares and contrasts the views of different American authors on Sino-American relations since 1945 and provides an excellent summary of their work. Both May and Cohen point out that access to archival material is the major problem that researchers encounter. Carol Gluck concentrates on the period of U.S. occupation in Japan, and Bruce Cumings surveys the literature on the origins of the Korean-American relationships, in the period 1945–1953.

Perhaps the most interesting article in this volume is the one written by Luo Rongqu and Jiang Xiangze, two scholars from the People's Republic of China. Their essay, "Research in Sino-American Relations in the People's Republic of China," indirectly admits that the direction and substance of academic research in China have largely been determined by the prevailing political climate in that country. Peking's policy in the 1950s and 1960s was anti-U.S. imperialism, and this theme was reflected in Chinese scholarly publications. Toward the end of the 1970s, when U.S.-Chinese relations were improved and normalized, Chinese historians were turned to the task of promoting better relations between the two countries. More favorable writings on the United States, tantamount to what Americans call a "revisionist" school, thus appeared. Luo and Jiang, however, also stress that in the more opened academic atmosphere since 1976, competing schools of thoughts can co-exist. The debate between Professor Wang Xi and researchers Ding Mingnan and Zhang Zhenkun on U.S. imperialism and the Open Door Policy, for instance, provided the much needed impetus for further research in this area.

Akira Iriye and Bruce Cumings, after surveying their fields of specialization, raise certain issues with important policy implications. Akira Iriye is concerned about pressure on Japan for a massive military buildup, and reminds readers of the 1930s, "when the Japanese became convinced of the atrophy of American civilization and turned insular and chauvinistic, while at the same time engaging in a military and cultural invasion of China" (p. 70). He raises the vital question of whether increased military power would once again reinforce cultural chauvinism, or whether Japanese cultural forces would resist social militarization.

Bruce Cumings concludes in his study that the present Korean-American relationship will face basic structural changes in the foreseeable future. He cites three main reasons for this. First, a shift in the strategic situation in North Asia as a result of Sino-U.S. rapprochement, in addition to restraint exerted on North Korea by both China and the Soviet Union, have led to a reduction in military tension that will gradually diminish the political-strategic importance of South Korea to the U.S. Second, the economic stake in South Korea may not be enough to sustain a large United States commitment. Third, "Korea has never mattered much to Americans for its intrinsic interest or characteristics, but only as it relates to some broader concern" (p. 277).

The last point raised by Cumings reflects the self-centered and power politics approach undertaken by the U.S. toward the region, and the tragic role as a pawn played by countries like South Korea in the superpower confrontation. If there is any lesson to be learned

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from past U.S. policies toward Asia and any mistake to be avoided in the future, this is the one.

DAVID CHIANG-KAU LANG
University of Southern California

Third World Multinationals: The Rise of Foreign Investment from Developing Countries *by Louis T. Wells, Jr. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1983. 206 pp. $25.00.*

The last few years have seen the emergence of a new phenomenon—parent companies from developing countries that acquire direct investments in other Third World countries. These are the "third-world multinationals" (TWMs). Louis Wells argues convincingly that their investment is "generated from conditions of the home countries" and thus "might be especially well suited to the needs of other developing countries" (p. 3). He has amassed an impressive body of information, both statistical and anecdotal, in an area where data are notoriously hard to come by.

Section I describes these "especially well suited" characteristics of TWMs. For one thing, their factories are relatively small in scale, so they can accommodate the limited markets found in developing countries. In response to small markets, they develop more labor-intensive technology than do the multinationals from more industrial economies. Third World firms rely more heavily on price than on product differentiation, and spend a lot less on advertising than do their industrial country counterparts. Also noteworthy is the much larger propensity of TWMs to form local partnerships. Wells found that some 90 percent of the manufacturing subsidiaries of developing country parents were joint ventures, compared to 40 percent for U.S.-owned multinationals.

In another section, Wells examines the motives for direct investment by TWMs. He concludes that the most compelling reason for the formation of subsidiaries is protection of export markets. For TWMs, direct investment has been preferred to licensing. They have found it especially difficult to capture the benefits of innovation through licensing or other contractual arrangements because of the kind of technology they transfer (smaller scale, less research and development intensive) and their lack of experience with these arrangements.

A final section of the book addresses the question of the costs and benefits of TWM direct investment to both home and host countries. Wells presents compelling evidence that direct investment by TWMs, while not without drawbacks, is highly beneficial for the host country. Too often, however, less developed country host governments have been lukewarm to the idea, despite these economic benefits, not to mention the obvious leverage they gain by encouraging direct investment from a multitude of countries.

This resistance is partly unintentional; it is simply harder for small TWMs to see their way through cumbersome and expensive application procedures. But more importantly, this discrimination can reflect risk adversity on the part of government officials, who favor the best-known firms (that is, those from industrialized countries). It may also reflect government biases in favor of the most advanced technology. As Wells writes:

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"Anything that might be small in scale or labor-intensive is easily associated with out-of-date, inefficient know-how" (p. 141).

In the 1970s, direct investment took a back seat to borrowing from commercial banks. Developing countries with access to the Eurodollar market preferred this no-strings-attached, hands-off development finance. Recently, however, the market for commercial bank loans has taken a conservative turn; even when loans are available at all, they are more expensively priced. For some regions new money is contingent upon accepting rather inflexible International Monetary Fund programs.

In this environment, direct investment could begin to play a more prominent role. Multinational direct investment, however, will probably not be a simple replay of the situation of twenty years ago. For one thing, host countries have gained a great deal of expertise and sophistication in negotiating with multinationals. All sorts of creative investment schemes and co-financing arrangements could develop. Yet a final new factor, not present twenty years ago, is the Third World multinational explored in Well's study, which can offer promising economic opportunities to other developing countries.

LAURIE LANDY
Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Modern French Marxism *by Michael Kelly. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 240 pp. $24.50.*

Michael Kelly has not written a book on all of modern French Marxism. He has chosen instead to examine the history of Marxist philosophical issues—in particular, dialectical materialism—as developed by French Communist Party (PCF) intellectuals and their *campagnons de route*. As such, the book has much to recommend it. It is remarkably clear, deeply researched, and well written. Kelly has a sure hand for extracting the core of an argument, laying it out in straightforward fashion, and evaluating it trenchantly. He presents, for example, a cogent exposition (no mean feat) of the ideas of Louis Althusser, thoughtful reappraisals of neglected thinkers such as Henri Lefebvre, and useful profiles of contemporaries such as Roger Garaudy, Maurice Godelier, and Lucien Sève. As a work of synopsis and critique of difficult concepts by even more difficult theorists, the book is a valuable addition.

The debate over dialectical materialism in France, Kelly argues, is basically a debate over the impact of G.W.F. Hegel on Karl Marx. One line of argument may be traced through the "Hegelians" (Auguste Cornu, Lefebvre, Norbert Guterman, Garaudy), who hold that Marx "inverted" Hegel's idealism, stressing in its place materialism, while adopting Hegel's concept of dialectical change. On the other hand, the "anti-Hegelians," whose most forceful proponent is Althusser, deny Marx's debt to Hegel and seek to expunge the "idealist" temptation inherent in the latter's thought. Kelly skillfully reconstructs these debates through a roughly chronological framework that enables him to treat theorists comparatively and concepts developmentally.

This emphasis on dialectical materialism is justifiable on the basis of its importance in Marxist debates, but it unfortunately excludes treatment of other questions—such as the

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theory of the state or of "state monopoly capitalism"—that have been more central to the party's strategic debates. It is the relationship of Marxist theoretical debates to PCF strategy within a changing historical context that is, in addition to analysis of the debates themselves, the author's primary concern. On this level the book has a major shortcoming: this is mainly a book about ideas in themselves, not a book about ideas in relation to their historical context.

Though the real world of politics intrudes from time to time (usually when renegades like Garaudy get the party's axe), the treatment of the political and social context of the debates, and to which, to some extent, they are intended to respond, is deficient. One telling instance occurs when Kelly argues that the grand philosophical debates between Garaudy and Althusser in the 1960s were "in essence . . . a political struggle to define the political direction of the PCF" (p. 168). This is to admit that philosophy is a smokescreen for politics and that dialectical materialism is not so much a theoretical issue as a political weapon wielded by ambitious intellectuals. If this is so, why are readers given virtually no discussion of the two antagonists' role in the PCF, the role of intellectuals in the party generally, and the strategic debates and political currents within the party with which the antagonists contended?

To his credit, Kelly tries from time to time to sketch the broader canvas, but his interest is clearly on the debates themselves. This is fine as far as it goes. The debates are lively and the level of philosophical sophistication is high. But French Marxist thought, as Kelly admits, has always had a hermetic and inaccessible quality (even as the intellectuals themselves tirelessly proclaim their solidarity with the masses). In addition, the distinction between party "ideologist" and party "theorist" is not at all clear. Thus, the relationship of Marxist philosophical debates to Marxist politics remains clouded, and Kelly only partially penetrates the mystery. Readers are left with the nagging question: What does it all mean?

W. RAND SMITH
Lake Forest College

Communism and Political Change in Spain *by Eusebio Mujal-León. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1983. 274 pp. $22.50.*

The Spanish Communist Party (PCE) has had the most individual and extravagant history of all the larger West European communist parties. Totally insignificant for its first decade and more, it skyrocketed to prominence during the Civil War as the most powerful communist party in Western Europe, only to be outlawed and rigorously repressed by the regime of Francisco Franco that followed. Yet it revived to play a major role in the anti-Franco opposition and in the democratization that followed. After its legalization, the leadership of Santiago Carrillo adopted an extreme stance of Eurocommunism that in some respects went even farther than that of its Italian counterpart. Carrillo's policy nonetheless ended in failure with the party's decisive defeat in the 1982 elections. By that time, the PCE was back where it started, the weakest communist party in any southern or southwest European country.

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Eusebio Mujal-León's study is not devoted to the party's history but to its recent political development and its role in the new Spanish political system. Only the initial chapter is devoted to historical background, and nearly half of the book is then given to a thematic analysis of the PCE's policies and structure. One chapter each is dedicated to the PCE's relationship with Catholicism, its labor policy and organization, its role and position in foreign affairs, and the party's ideology and internal structure. Approximately the last 100 pages then concentrate on the PCE's political evolution during the past decade of transformation and consolidation of the Spanish political system.

The treatment is rigorously empirical throughout, not dominated by any overarching theory as to how communist parties are supposed to operate in western democracies. It is solidly researched on the basis of the communist press, available structural and electoral data, interviews with leaders and militants, and wide reading in the general Spanish political press. The tone and style are objective, and the analysis and conclusions convincing.

Scholars and observers will probably be most interested in the explanations given for the failure of Carrillo's brand of Eurocommunism. Mujal-León's analysis of the sources of communist frustration in Spain is both lengthy and complex, and cannot easily be summarized. One major drawback that he emphasizes is the great difficulty in carving out and defending the specifics of a convincingly Eurocommunist alternative. Despite the earlier appearance of Carrillo's ambiguous little book *Eurocommunism and the State* (1977), the PCE has been unable to develop that position. In fact, the Tenth Party Congress in 1981 moved back nearer to an orthodox Marxism-Leninism in several key respects.

Following the death of Franco in 1975, the PCE was unable to develop the broad strength that its Italian counterpart did after 1944 because national and historical circumstances were extremely different. The Italian party never had to overcome a negative legacy like the PCE's bloody dominance of the Republican side in the Civil War, while the Franco regime, unlike the regime of Benito Mussolini, ended amid peace and prosperity. The revitalization of the Spanish Socialist party (PSOE) under skillful young leadership provided a much stiffer leftist competitor that proved victorious at every level. The severe regionalist problems of Spain also created major tensions and schisms within the PCE itself. Changes in Spanish society and culture that took place prior to the legalization in 1977 were profound, and it is correct to say that the party, with its determination to maintain an increasingly anachronistic proletarian base, has never adjusted to them.

Mujal-León carefully avoids predicting the total eclipse of the party, suggesting that any major political or economic dislocations in Spain might provide opportunity for a strong revival, but he judges such a revival to be difficult under present circumstances. His book provides an excellent and reliable account of the recent evolution to the party, its changes in policy and structure, as well as the reasons for its somewhat specious rise during the 1970s and its more recent fall.

STANLEY G. PAYNE
University of Wisconsin-Madison

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The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles *by Seth P. Tillman. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982. 333 pp. $22.50.*

Focusing on one of the most frequently discussed and potentially explosive regions in the world today, Tillman attempts to analyze the relationship between the United States and the Middle East in terms of America's interests and the obstacles faced in the effort to further those interests. He begins his analytical odyssey with a glance at the path that led to the Camp David summit of 1979. Camp David is viewed as a desperate attempt to effect a cessation to regional hostilities and to initiate at least a degree of peaceful co-existence; subsequent events are recounted as "unfinished business" that could effectively preclude the completion of the peace process. Synoptic and incomplete, the glance into the distance and more recent past provides a basic introduction primarily to one of the major regional dilemmas—the Arab-Israeli conflict. The synopsis practically ignores the other significant dimensions of the Middle East drama and early on establishes the author's myopic approach to the region.

The scope and potential contribution of the volume are futher limited by the choice of nations and groups selected for critical consideration. Only infrequent references are made to such significant Middle East countries as Libya, Syria, and Iran, and the extent of each country's regional influence. The often uncanny interrelationships of the nations in the area or the religious affinities that refuse to recognize political boundaries are ignored. The effect of major personalities like the Ayatollah Khomeini and the cults surrounding them on regional politics and developments is hardly acknowledged.

The five participants in the Arab-Israeli dilemma selected for examination include the United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the Palestinians, and the Soviet Union. The discussions that focus on these five contain readable material, but again suffer from major deficiencies. The Middle East policy of the United States, for example, is correctly linked to the American political system, but the attempt to formulate the framework within which the linkage can be readily considered proves unsuccessful. To paraphrase Tillman, the definition of "national interest" proposed prompts more questions than it answers; the division of ideological, geopolitical and legal-institutional as distinct concepts of national interest appears artificial at best. The contention that American interest in Israel is based on affiliation rather than on strategy seems refreshingly accurate, but again the dimensions of affiliation are hardly limited to an Israeli lobby or the kinship between American and Israeli Jews. Just as significant as the lobby and kinship are the ardent beliefs of fundamentalist Christians, and their lobbying capabilities and increasing political activism. The interrelationship between American belief systems and Middle East policy is far more complicated than admitted.

The titles of the chapters that constitute the analyses of the three Middle East participants in the dilemma hardly seem appropriate to the excellent presentations. In the chapter on Saudi Arabia, more than merely "the politics of oil" are considered, while the presentation on Israel certainly goes beyond the restrictive politics of fear. The argument can be made that the Palestinians are not a "nation in diaspora" but are, as suggested even by Tillman, a group whose sense of nationhood was born out of diaspora. The titles in no way detract from the content or materials in the chapters, but do tend to limit the analyses in conceptual terms.

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Like so many similar discussions, the attempt to determine whether the Soviet Union is a predator or partner in the Arab-Israeli dilemma is plagued by too much theory and too few historical facts. The discussion unfortunately concentrates more on American views of the Soviet Union than on the latter's actual behavior.

In his treatise, Tillman encourages the evolution of an interesting but limited perspective on one portion of the Middle East trauma, but fails to come to grips with the regional dimensions alluded to in the volume's title. His proposals for achieving peace seem vague and inconclusive. He raises more sensitive and controversial questions than he answers. The volume adds to the proliferation of Middle East analyses, but does not contribute significantly to the body of literature that puts forward practical proposals for solutions to the on-going drama in the region.

FRANKLIN T. BURROUGHS
Zolman International, Inc.

Dynamics of European Nuclear Disarmament *by Alva Myrdal, et al. Chester Springs, Pa., Dufour Editions, 1982. 306 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $10.95.*

This collection of essays and speeches offers a good cross-national selection of the thinking of the European disarmament movement. All were written in 1980 or 1981, just before the massive October 1981 demonstrations in Western Europe focused world headlines on this movement. Swedish Nobel Peace Prize recipient Alva Myrdal's title essay accounts for one fourth of the book, while the other thirteen contributions represent diverse countries such as Britain, East and West Germany, Italy, Norway, and the Netherlands.

As a Marxist sociologist, I was immediately struck by the surprisingly sober, almost conservative thinking found here. There are no Third World-oriented radical socialist perspectives, as there were in some of the antiwar movements during the 1960s New Left. When concrete examples are approvingly given of lands without nuclear weapons, these tend instead toward conservative political models such as Switzerland. Johann Galtung, for example, asks "why Switzerland has such a strong defence and gives an impression of being so unconquerable" (p. 163). He answers that this is "(1) because it is not part of an alliance . . . (2) because Swiss defence is not so centralised . . . (3) because not all of the military technology is so complicated that it has a demobilizing impact on the creativity of people themselves" (p. 163).

This type of thinking, plus the repeated stress on a European nuclear-free zone, illustrates the pragmatic bent found among the theoreticians of this new social movement. This trend is borne out even in the essays by more leftist contributors such as Ken Coates and Rudolf Bahro.

Another aspect of this collection is its "nationalist" or at least Eurocentric perspective. Myrdal is outraged by "the fact that a 'European war' would not be of European origin" (p. 212). She argues that "below the fissaparous tendencies there lives on, in Europe, a bond, grown out of a living recognition of a shared historical heritage" (p. 212). Further, she writes: "Above the indigenous forces working for co-operation, mostly economically and culturally determined, there has been created a new superfact: Europe has become,

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politically and militarily, divided down the middle into two blocs of competing alliances. They are of superpower creation. . . . Europe is to be sacrificed, the European industries and farmlands destroyed, the European peoples bleeding to death or doomed to perish in painful and mutilating disease" (pp. 212–213). It is hard not to identify with Myrdal's sense of outrage here. Yet once again, the remarkably pragmatic, even conservative side of this disarmament theorizing emerges as well. Myrdal is not talking about abolishing nuclear weapons, but about creating a few small European "nuclear free zones," such as in the Nordic countries and in Germany and Poland.

Also, she has suddenly transformed Europe from a collection of former colonial powers and from the point of origin of two world wars to a nearly pacifist highly civilized victim of the Soviet Union and America. One need not sympathize with either Soviet or American imperialism to note that Myrdal's European "shared historical heritage" includes not only high civilization, but also the barbarism of Nazism, out of whose defeat emerged the domination by the two superpowers. Myrdal seeks instead to confer on post-colonial European states virtually the status of oppressed nations.

By arguing on pragmatic and narrow grounds such as these, and without a radical critique of European civilization, the disarmament movement has cut the ties that in the 1960s bound such movements to Third World liberation struggles. While this has no doubt helped to legitimate the movement in moderate circles, such as in the West German Social Democratic Party, it lacks the radical cutting edge of the movement of the 1960s or of such current Third World struggles as those in South Africa, Central America, the Philippines, or Chile. The disarmament movement has also cut itself off from the type of radical critique of Western capitalist society made in the 1960s that saw militarization of society in a more total context. Will a movement founded on such pragmatic grounds have the political will and radical vision to persist after the cruise missiles arrive, as it appears they will as of this writing? None of this is intended as an argument against this collection of essays; it is a solid and representative selection of European disarmament thinking, showing both the strengths and weaknesses of this thinking as political and social theory.

KEVIN ANDERSON
City University of New York

International Regimes *edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1983. 372 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $9.95.*

This volume, originally appearing in 1982 as a special issue of *International Organization*, is an excellent compendium of first-rate articles on international regimes. The introduction to the volume, by Stephen Krasner, provides a handy summary of the major theories developed to explain international regimes, defined consensually by the contributors as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue-area" (p. 1). Krasner summarizes the broad theoretical perspectives of the contributors as ranging from structural (seeing regimes as insignificant),

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modified structural (arguing that regimes sometimes matter), and Grotian (regimes are pervasive and significant).

The contribution by Ernst B. Haas goes one step further in placing regimes in the context of numerous schools of thought. Arguing that much disagreement about the role of regimes stems from the philosophical orientations brought to bear on their study, he systematically examines the definitions, objectives, and approaches of the various schools. This endeavor clarifies some of the confusion surrounding the use of the term "international regime" and other associated concepts such as system, structure, and order.

Two articles, one by Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins and the other by Oran R. Young, investigate the development of regimes from a Grotian perspective. Puchala and Hopkins examine the colonialism and food regimes using a framework that classifies regimes by their characteristics; Young investigates the stability of regimes based on whether they were initially spontaneous, negotiated, or imposed.

Arthur A. Stein and Robert O. Keohane examine regimes from a structural perspective. Stein's article distinguishes between collaboration and coordination utilizing game-theoretic concepts. Keohane uses insights from market failure theory to consider, as the counterpart to his earlier articles discussing the "supply" of regimes, the reasons why countries might desire such arrangements.

Five case studies dealing with security issues (Robert Jervis), economic policy (John Gerard Ruggie), trade (one by Charles Lipson and another by Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher), and balance of payments (Benjamin J. Cohen) investigate regime transformation from a variety of different perspectives. These provide useful information about these issues, as well as novel perspectives on the types of collaborative arrangements that have been developed by actors in international politics.

The conclusion to the volume contains two articles. Susan Strange criticizes the whole enterprise on five major counts. She argues that the study of regimes may be a passing fad, that regimes are imprecisely defined, and that the term regime is "value-loaded," leads to static analysis, and is state centered. While some of her points contain some merit, for the most part they appear to be a tirade against American social science. None of the "faults" she identifies stand up to serious scrutiny. By criticizing research on regimes as though it were unconnected to previous work, she fails to see the underlying continuities—with learning as the central thread—in functionalism, neofunctionalism, and cognitive approaches to regimes. Furthermore, balance of power, systems theory, and hegemonic theory have power and interest at the international level of analysis as a central theoretical focus. The argument about regime definitions has more merit, but some inconsistency is to be expected from fourteen contributors. Her view that regimes are value loaded, static, and state centered is incorrect and misleading. The contributors to the case studies not only focus on the distributional consequences of regimes, but on the dynamics of regime change and the role of subnational actors as well.

Finally, Strange also attacks regime analysts as being excessively concerned with order and a search for general theory. The view of "order" as being ideologically biased is an inappropriate criticism. People from varying ideological perspectives can agree that order is important; the question is rather what kind of order and what kind of regime. Here, opinions among the contributors clearly vary. Strange's belief that "the great truths about

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human society and human endeavor . . . were all discovered long ago" (p. 351) damns all of social science in one blow. Her own valuable contributions, which have made a significant impact in international political economy, belie this position.

Krasner's conclusion places the notion of international regimes in the broader realist/interdependence debate. He shows that people's ideas matter; he argues that learning and understanding affect the transformation of regimes. If Krasner is right, this innovative volume will not only affect theory in international politics, but policy as well.

VINOD K. AGGARWAL
University of California, Berkeley

The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives *edited by Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha. New York, Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982. 172 pp. Cloth, $17.50; paper, $9.50.*

Of all the trouble spots in the world, perhaps the one that is most likely to bring about a direct superpower confrontation is the Middle East. This collection of papers, organized by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, analyzes the scope and direction of Soviet involvement in the region stretching from Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa.

Soviet policy in the Middle East is constantly constrained by indigenous factors that are outside Moscow's control. The authors cite many instances in which the Soviets disregarded ethnic and regional animosities and consequently lost influence. Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha note that Soviet influence in the region derives from interstate rivalries that are often volatile and present a constant danger of drawing the USSR into a larger conflict. Clear illustrations of these tendencies are seen in chapters on Soviet policies toward the Northern Tier (Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan) by Malcom Yapp and the Horn of Africa by Robert Patman.

Since the 1955 "Czech arms deal," it has been common to view East European and Cuban involvement in the Middle East as "proxies" for the Soviet Union. Edwina Moreton argues that the reasons for East European and Cuban policies in the region are complex and frequently pertain to their own political interests. East Germany has pursued an active international stance to gain recognition, while Cuba has sought to enhance its position within the Nonaligned Movement.

Anthony Stacpoole surveys various studies of Soviet energy production and consumption and concludes that the Soviet Union will remain self-sufficient in oil through 1990. However, in recent years the Soviets have encouraged the East Europeans to purchase oil from the Middle East to lessen demand for Soviet oil and to free up oil for export to the West.

Soviet commercial interests and policies in the Middle East differ from state to state. Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and South Yemen have observer status within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and are among the least developed nations in the area. Trade with these states has incurred costs to the USSR, especially since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Alan H. Smith notes that the Soviets import oil and gas from

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several of the other states in the region in exchange for machinery, industrial products, and arms. The imported oil is then sold to third markets, generating large amounts of hard currency without creating a dependence on Middle Eastern energy imports.

Shahram Chubin argues that the failure to solve the Palestinian problem provides the USSR with a substantial degree of influence in hard-line Arab and Gulf states. However, he concludes that Soviet attempts to project power in non-contiguous areas will be thwarted by American willingness to risk escalation to deter Soviet expansion.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Washington's determination to enhance the U.S. presence in the area has led to a "globalization" of Moscow's Middle East policy, according to Karen Dawisha. In light of this trend and indigenous factors in the region, Moscow finds itself repeatedly taking actions that make short-term gains, but that undermine the likelihood of achieving its long-term objectives.

This timely and informative volume by a group of leading experts in the field is a welcome addition to the literature on Soviet policy in the Middle East.

GORDON B. SMITH
University of South Carolina

Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy: A Study of Ideology, Power, and Consensus *by John Lenczowski. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1982. 318 pp. $25.00.*

The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine: Implications for Decision Making *by Jonathan Samuel Lockwood. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1983. 202 pp. $19.95.*

Western analysts of Soviet strategic doctrine and foreign policy have for years labored under a handicap created by the paucity of reliable information. Since much of Soviet information has been seen as self-serving propaganda, obfuscating statistics, or dreary ideological incantations, the analysts generally resorted to one of two methodological shortcuts. One such shortcut was an assumption that "whatever they say, they think as we do," implying that regardless of their public rhetoric, the real incentives and objectives of Soviet leaders were close to those of Westerners—in effect, a "mirror-imaging" of them. The other methodological shortcut was premised in the belief that "whatever they say, it does not matter," implying the analyst's belief in the fundamental historical continuity of Soviet foreign policy, seen largely as a continuation of traditional Russian foreign and military interests from the pre-revolutionary period. Both of these approaches shared a belief in the validity of pragmatic, geopolitical, and non-ideological explanations of Soviet foreign and strategic policy, essentially similar to great power politics of other systems.

This Western analytical mindset has been challenged in recent years by certain policy analysts and academic specialists who maintain that important changes in the Soviet Union and in the international system demand the revision and adaptation of Soviet policy analysis to these changes. The two books reviewed here fall into this category; they both subscribe to a third analytic approach to the study of Soviet policy formation, which

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contends that "they think what they say, and are therefore out for superiority over us." Both authors emphasize the importance of ideology in Soviet policy formation, in Soviet assessment of their adversary's behavior, and generally, in the analysis of the international system and the correlation of forces.

Lenczowski focuses on two interrelated questions: how the Soviets assess the world balance of power; and whether the Soviets are guided by the Marxist-Leninist ideology, or whether they behave like the rulers of any other great power. Lenczowski maintains that Communist ideology plays a key role in supplying the Soviets' with a comprehensive world view supple enough to account for almost any phenomenon that crosses their path." Moreover, such a "communist world view is an entirely plausible one, even, one might say, a compelling one," and therefore in "the context of the Soviet system, which has itself been defined by this ideology, it is so basic to all perception that the Soviets must indeed mean what they say" (p. 23).

Lenczowski also asserts that the materials he finds in the Soviet press are an index of their "real perceptions, real desires, or real policy priorities" (p. 23), and he finds the Soviets press so uniformly credible and reflective of the leaders' real views and desires that he is ready to accept the " 'Soviet view' of a particular issue on the basis of an extract from a single article" (p. 24) that can also serve as a basis for broad generalizations about Soviet politics.

He singles out two key developments of overriding importance—Soviet achievement of strategic parity with the United States, and the remarkable growth, both in size and intensity, of Soviet analysis of American foreign policy. Two dominant Soviet schools of thought concerned with foreign policy emerged in the process: the "traditionalists," whose views are consistent with the orthodox analysis of capitalism and its inevitable decline, while remaining steadfast in their ritualistic optimism about the ultimate triumph of socialism; and the "realists," who appear to Lenczowski to be quite sophisticated and attuned to the complexities and weaknesses of the capitalist systems in the era of strategic parity. Among the "traditionalists" are listed people like Anatoly A. Gromyko and several military strategists while the "realists" include people from the Soviet foreign policy research institutes like Georgi Arbatov and G.A. Trofimenko.

Despite strong claims to theoretical and methodological innovation, Lenczowski's book is rather conventional in its assumptions about the objectives, intentions, and internal dynamics of Soviet foreign policy. The substitution of the polarized pair of "traditionalists" and "realists" is not much of an improvement over other previous pairings by Western analysts, particularly since Lenczowski eliminates the significance of their differences in a bit of anticlimactic *Gleichschaltung* when he concludes that "there is a substantial harmony of interests between the realists and traditionalists in the Soviet Union" and that the "community of interests is the political fact of 'critical importance' in understanding the nature of the Soviet system and its relations with other nations" (p. 275).

The Lockwood book is conceptually and methodologically similar to the Lenczowski volume. He adopts the third approach to Soviet strategic policy formation ("they think what they say") in which ideology plays a key role in shaping Soviet perceptions of the international system and of their adversaries. He agrees that Soviet public statements on strategic issues reflect real Soviet ideas, beliefs, and objectives.

Lockwood, like Lenczowski, argues that the Soviets are presently "mirror-imaging"

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American foreign and strategic policies—that is, they impose their own ideologically derived conceptions of U.S. policies on the development of Soviet strategic doctrine and policy. Lockwood lists three major findings: Soviet analysts view U.S. strategic doctrine largely within the framework of their own strategic doctrine; they view U.S. minimization of nuclear-war fighting concepts and the acceptance of pure deterrence doctrines as resulting from the change in the Soviet-American military balance, particularly the strategic balance; and, finally, the decline of the nuclear-war fighting idea in the West and the adoption of deterrence has increased the likelihood of limited war—nuclear or conventional. The key consequence of this process, according to Lockwood, is that "it provides a self-sustaining motivation for the Soviet strategic buildup without any clearly definable upper limit" (p. 7), since it views the buildup of Soviet military power as the primary source of restraint and control over the aggressive West. He concludes that the Soviets appear to have little if any incentives left to seriously consider arms control and other limitations measures.

These two books raised the reader's expectations, since their authors set out to do away with traditional Sovietological orthodoxies and to freshly examine the complex process of Soviet policymaking with special emphasis on the internal determinants. However, the two books, despite the seriousness of the authors' intentions, are in the final analysis rather disappointing. This is because much of their discussion and analysis appears to be shaped by a priori conclusions: that the Soviet Union and its ruling elites remain very aggressive, persuaded of the correctness of their political and ideological goals; and that the Soviet military buildup and the perceived Western conciliatory and accommodating responses to the strategic parity have simply sharpened the Soviet aggressive, militaristic appetite and vindicated those Soviet elites who argued against accommodation with the West. Both authors therefore conclude on a somber note, indicating the need for further Western firmness and resolve in the face of a growing Soviet threat.

The themes of these two books suggest the idea of an ideological resonance. It would appear that analogous groups or institutions in different or diverse political systems respond readily to each other and maintain if not a dialogue, then seriatim monologues, with one another. The "realists" in the United States focus on and emphasize the views of the "realists" in the Soviet Union, the "traditionalists" in the Soviet Union focus on the views of their counterparts in the West. Presumably, this serves as a form of legitimization of one's own position and credibility within the system, and thus further supports the *Doppelganger* notion of the mirror-image. If so, this result would suggest a further complication of attempts at objective analysis in international affairs as a result of a peculiar form of ethnocentrism or a variety of sub-cultural bias.

ROMAN KOLKOWICZ
University of California, Los Angeles

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The Politics of Pressure: American Arms and Israeli Policy Since the Six Day War *by David Pollock. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1982. 328 pp. $35.00.*

David Pollock has written a useful book on a topic that is often debated in Washington and elsewhere: Can the United States influence the policies of another country, in this case Israel, by withholding or offering arms supply? His study consists of a careful description and analysis of the U.S.-Israeli relationship from 1967 to 1981. His conclusions are modest—yes, some influence may be gained, but context is all important, not the mere decision to sell or not to sell.

This does not purport to be a theoretical study of influence or of power, but it does provide good material for anyone inclined to seek broader generalizations. Pollock uses the available literature well and with a critical eye. Most of the events are already well known, and there are few surprises in his recounting of history. In some cases, however, he has gained impressions from interviews that are added to the narrative. A careful reader will want to check the footnotes for these nuggets.

One of the themes touched on by Pollock, but not fully developed, is the domestic political cycle. He notes that administrations have been more inclined to try to pressure Israel through arms supplies in non-election years, but he has not really gone into the ways in which Israel and Israel's friends operate within the U.S. political sphere to offset attempts at pressure. On one level, the answer is perhaps not much more complicated than calculating votes and weighing political support, but that does not account for the full story. Nor is it clear that presidents will inevitably be cautious in election years when it comes to pressuring Israel, as in the case of Dwight Eisenhower in 1956.

On balance, Pollock is stronger in taking into account Middle East political realities as he carries out his analysis than he is in weighing global strategic concerns (probably important to Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger) or domestic politics (an issue for Jimmy Carter). Nonetheless, Pollock has written a solid book that deserves attention.

WILLIAM B. QUANDT
The Brookings Institution

Raoul Wallenberg, Angel of Rescue: Heroism and Torment in the Gulag *by Harvey Rosenfeld. Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1982. 261 pp. $19.95.*

The saga of Raoul Wallenberg remains one of the most compelling, inspiring, and mysterious chapters in the tortuous history of the twentieth century. As is now well known, Wallenberg was a Swedish aristocrat, educated in the United States, who came to Budapest in July 1944 in order to help stem the tide of the Nazi genocide of European Jewry. Wallenberg's mission, supported by the Swedish and American governments, was simply to save as many Hungarian Jews as possible from the last ravages of Hitler's mania as the war came to a close. Wallenberg produced and distributed thousands of passports, identity cards, and documents that granted immunity and protection on the flimsiest grounds to innocent men, women, and children condemned to death. Displaying much courage

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and daring, this shy, lonely, and otherwise undistinguished Swedish diplomat thrust himself into crowds of Jews surrounded by Gestapo bayonets, and claimed diplomatic immunity for himself and anyone he could salvage. As a result, tens of thousands of Hungarian Jews were saved. The fate of their savior, however, was far more complex. When the Red Army liberated Budapest, Wallenberg was placed under the "protection" of the Soviet authorities and was removed from Budapest. His family and friends never heard from him again.

At first, the official Soviet position was that nothing was known about Wallenberg's fate. This was later amended to a statement that he had died in 1947. Since that time, however, a substantial number of witnesses have testified that they knew Wallenberg in a variety of Soviet prison camps, and both his family and his many supporters around the world believe that Wallenberg may well still be alive somewhere in the Gulag.

This account of Wallenberg's activities in Budapest and subsequent fate in the Soviet Union is only one of the spate of works on this subject to appear in the last few years. This particular volume, written by the editor of *Martyrdom and Resistance*, a periodical devoted to the study of the Holocaust, is not a scholarly analysis of the Wallenberg case, but rather a passionate paean to the "angel of rescue" and a demand for justice on the part of one intimately involved in the case. As such, this is a moving and in many ways overwhelming work. Perhaps inevitably, though, analytical rigor and the objective canons of evidence are not well sustained. It may well be that it is impossible to judge the authenticity of prisoners' recollections and oral history (and the author has done an impressive amount of research in this regard), but many of his interpretations and conclusions are based on naive and amateur speculation from a variety of academics and others posing as expert witnesses. This problem is compounded by a rather serious lack of organization in the argument, and the absence of strict editorial guidance.

But this book does succeed in its most important task—it recounts the incredible, uplifting, and vitally important story of a man who was able to preserve human dignity in the face of murder and unmitigated bestiality. That story is not over.

MICHAEL STANISLAWSKI
Columbia University

Soviet Policy in the Arc of Crisis *by Fred Halliday. Washington, D.C., Institute for Policy Studies, 1981. 143 pp. $4.95.*

The most refreshing concept in this book is Halliday's recognition that there is more to the "Arc of Crisis" (which he defines as constituting Afghanistan through Iran and the Arab Middle East down to the Horn of Africa) than superpower manipulation. There are very real and very serious tensions both within and between the countries of that volatile region that create if not all, then most of, the conflicts. However, this book is limited to a necessarily cursory examination of those internal tensions. Its real purpose, as the title suggests, is an examination of Soviet, and by contrast U.S., policy in the "Arc."

Halliday roundly rejects the Reagan administration's view that the Soviet Union "underlies all the unrest that is going on," as well as the "softer" view that while the

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Soviets have not controlled all the events in the region, they certainly started the "rock-slide" of revolutions. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are guilty in Halliday's book of meddling in the region to suit their own purposes, with blatant disregard for the intricacies of the Arc countries, and with the result that nobody's purpose was served. If anything, Halliday sees the United States as the worst meddler, and one whose meddling has succeeded in enhancing its power in far more instances than has the meddling of the Soviet Union.

Regarding Soviet motivations, Halliday rightly dismisses the extreme view of a Soviet Union actively promoting revolution throughout the world, but goes too far in rejecting the concept of a Soviet Union that takes advantage of instability when it presents itself. An appreciation for the opportunity presented by instability has been a staple of Soviet foreign policy ever since V. I. Lenin realized that the Third World was ripe for revolution by virtue of its political and economic unrest. A dissatisfied population breeds political instability, and, as Samuel Huntington has noted, communism is much more appealing to the economically deprived than democracy. Nonetheless, Halliday is right on target in arguing that the United States greatly exaggerates the Soviet threat to the region. While I would disagree with his perception of Soviet motives in Afghanistan, I would strongly agree that it did not represent a Soviet move on the Gulf. The so-called New Cold War is not a function of a new Soviet threat, it is primarily a function of a U.S. need to reassert its primacy in world affairs following a series of humiliating debacles highlighted by Vietnam and Iran.

But while I agree with some of Halliday's basic assertions, I break sharply with him on his prescription for the Gulf. He argues for a reassessment of U.S. policy in the Third World, with the realization that there are internal causes of social and political change and that all unrest is not the product of Soviet manipulation. But he then goes on to suggest the United States and the Soviet Union should get together and work out the ground rules for behavior in the Third World—what is acceptable and what is not. He writes: "Once a degree of realism and balance has been introduced, it is possible to work within such a framework for substantive mutual agreements on a wide range of issues" (p. 125). Apart from what appears to be a surprisingly chauvinist view, a "degree of realism and balance" has yet to be reached on virtually any subject between the United States and the Soviet Union since World War II (with the dubious possible exception of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [SALT I]). I don't see such a breakthrough occurring in an area of such economic and strategic importance as the Gulf, particularly in light of Halliday's own assessment of the high level of tension within the region itself. Contrary to what Halliday asserts, the basis of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry is a function of two superpowers in a bipolar world competing for what necessarily must be finite influence. The lesson in Halliday's book is that the most successful policy in the "Arc" will be the one that both recognizes and seeks to alleviate the internal causes of instability while protecting one's own interests at the same time.

DONNA BELTZ
University of California, Los Angeles

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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